795.00/4–2353: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
1257. Pass Tokyo; repeated information Tokyo 347. Ambassador Murphy please pass General Clark.
General Clark was my overnight guest in Pusan April 20–21, visit which afforded us opportunity discuss at some length various issues involved in armistice negotiations and related matters. Our point of departure was Clark’s top secret telegram CX 61976 of April 18 to Joint Chiefs of Staff,1 in which he commented on my telegrams 1225 and 1226 of April 15 (DIP 464 and 465)2 reporting my conversation previous day with President Rhee. Assuming Clark’s telegram has been made available to Department I am tying in following observations with pertinent paragraphs of part 1 of that telegram.
Paragraph B. General Clark opposes consideration of bilateral security pact at present, stating that such pact “at least at this time” appears to conflict with his primary mission as laid down by JCS. Although Clark and Department must be in agreement on this point, I recommend question of possible bilateral security pact be explored soonest by State and Defense.
Should we assume that President Eisenhower’s message of April 153 to President Rhee constitutes the unilateral declaration referred to by Secretary in his discussion with Ambassador Yang on April 8?4
Paragraph C. I told Clark I was unable agree that armistice negotiations are “purely military” although there may be details and aspects of those negotiations which are primarily of military interest (or even exclusively military interest—demarcation line for example). Nevertheless, there are many other questions involved, including over-all prisoner of war problem, not to mention proposed post-armistice political conference, which are primarily political and as such of important continuing interest to this Embassy. I added that attitude of ROK Government and heightened official and public agitation here on subject of armistice imparts an even greater political significance to entire armistice question. I therefore suggested inter alia to Clark that Embassy Pusan be kept closely informed regarding developments at Panmunjom. I said I was not prepared at this juncture recommend appointment of Embassy political liaison officer to serve with US delegation at Munsan-Ni but that [Page 932] such appointment might in due course be desirable. I indicated my principal interest at present time was to work out practical modus operandi It was left that on my next visit to Seoul (beginning April 27) I shall discuss this subject with General Harrison.
With respect to President Rhee’s desire to have representative of his own on armistice, delegation, General Clark recognizes this problem does exist but hopes he may persuade President that Rhee’s wishes in this matter can be met through ROK military liaison officer presently serving with delegation.
Paragraph D. With regard to General Clark’s concern over possibility President Rhee might endeavor to make independent use of ROK military forces during armistice of post-armistice period, I said President had never raised subject with me and should he do so I proposed reply that it is military matter which could better be discussed with the UN command. In this connection, although I still doubt whether President Rhee is contemplating a step as extreme as independent use of ROK forces, both ROK Government and National Assembly are continuing to arouse public feeling against any settlement except on basis of complete withdrawal of Chinese Communists from North Korea and disarming of North Korean Communists (that is President Rhee’s points 1 and 2). If we are to persuade Rhee to change his attitude before he “boxes himself in” by stirring up popular agitation to point from which he would be unable to retreat, or at least where he might run risk of losing his maneuverability, it may behoove us to get on as urgently as possible with our consideration of ways and means by which Rhee might be prevailed upon to adopt less intransigent attitude.
Paragraph E. This paragraph of General Clark’s telegram reads as follows:
“Any questions as to the unification issue, the nature and duration of future rehabilitation assistance, ROK participation in political negotiations after armistice, establishment of time limits for such political discussions, etc., appear to be appropriate for resolution at governmental level.”
I commented that all these issues must be faced and dealt with now, at whatever level or levels may be appropriate, and I could see no useful purpose in trying to pretend they do not exist in order postpone consideration of them until after armistice has been completed and tidily put away. This seems more than ever true since these are all issues which ROK Government is likely to endeavor inject into armistice negotiations.