695A.0024/4–253: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea1
618. Part I.
For your information only, following is preliminary thinking here with regard to problems raised by Chou En-lai’s proposal now formally submitted to President UNGA and to UNC at Panmunjom.
From our standpoint if negotiations are to be resumed Panmunjom much more desirable than UN. Increasing pressures for discussion Chou En-lai’s proposal in UNGA can best be withstood if negotiations at Panmunjom underway or imminent
Before decision can be reached on resuming armistice negotiations, Communists must show good faith in reaching and implementing agreement on exchange seriously sick and wounded. We will not agree to prior resumption armistice negotiations as condition for exchange sick and wounded. However, Clark has been authorized at first or early meeting on sick and wounded to have UNC liaison officers invite Communist statement their detailed suggestions on implementation Chou En-lai’s proposal so that it could be studied while sick and wounded exchange being worked out. Believe burden should be placed on Communists to put forward detailed workable plan acceptable UNC.
Government presently studying the numerous specific questions raised by Chou En-lai proposal before decision even in principle can be reached thereon. Without precluding other solutions, from our standpoint, most desirable solution would be a formula which would permit prompt release of Korean non-repatriates in the ROK and “hand over” of Chinese non-repatriates in their present location to a “neutral state” such as Sweden or Switzerland with terms of reference which would permit those determined by the “neutral state” to be genuinely opposed to repatriation to proceed within a reasonable period of time to any destination available to them.
Part II.
If President Rhee at his initiative raises concern ROK Government recent armistice developments you may at your discretion reply to him that US Government has been carefully studying developments and that UNC presently proceeding along lines of Clark’s March 31 letter2 to Communists. US and UNC proceeding with utmost caution. It too early to assess Communist intentions.
You may wish state that regardless of developments US will continue have strong interest in ROK security. You may again refer to Greater Sanctions statement brought to Rhee’s attention February 22, 1952.3
[Page 835]Department will keep you informed developments. If conversation takes place with Rhee please inform Department immediately.