Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark) 1

top secret
operational immediate

JCS 935344. From JCS. Following is preliminary thinking here with regard to problems raised by Chou En-lai’s statement reported Peiping radio March 30, and now formally submitted to President UNGA.

1.
It is not clear whether attempt to negotiate on basis of proposals will be made in UN or Panmunjom. From our standpoint negotiations at Panmunjom much more desirable and likely to be productive if Communists are acting in good faith.
2.
It would be desirable to place on Communists burden of putting forward as detailed a plan as possible prior to Delegations entering into any negotiations thereon. In order to accomplish this purpose as well as to encourage negotiations at Panmunjom rather than the UN, consider it desirable that at an initial or early meeting on exchange of sick and wounded, UNC should make reference to Chou En-lai’s message to President UNGA stating that the UNC would be pleased to receive at as early a date as possible detailed statement of suggestions on the implementation of the proposal in order that it could be studied while arrangements for the exchange of sick and wounded are being completed. UNC should avoid making any commitment with regard to acceptance of the principle of the Chou En-lai proposal or the undertaking of its discussion by the Delegation, stating that it would like to have a clearer idea of what the Communists have in mind.2
3.
If Communists show good faith in reaching and beginning to implement an agreement on exchange during hostilities of the seriously sick and wounded, and if any detailed statement from them on implementation of Chou En-lai’s proposal also indicates good faith we would have no objection to proceeding immediately thereafter to discussions of Chou En-lai’s proposal while agreement on sick and wounded was being implemented.3 If Communists do not show good faith in reaching and beginning implementation of an agreement on exchange of sick and wounded we would, of course, have to reconsider whole question.
4.
Do not believe that we should permit question of whether meeting to arrange repatriation of seriously sick and wounded is to be termed meeting of liaison groups or of Delegations to be built up to a serious issue, particularly if during course of preliminary discussions it appears Communists intend to discuss Chou En-lai proposal.
5.
When discussion of Chou En-lai proposal undertaken believe tactics should be such as to place on Communists burden of putting forward a detailed and practical plan acceptable to UNC. Perhaps Chou En-lai proposal could best be developed along lines suggested in paragraph 3b, Part II your CX 51489, 7 July 1952,4 except that it would be desirable to avoid any commitment not to permit Chinese POWs ultimately to proceed to Nationalist China.
6.

For your information and comment:

It appears here that among the specific questions raised by the Chou En-lai proposal which must be resolved before a decision can be reached on the proposal are:

a.

What is the “neutral state” contemplated by the Communist proposal?

Comment: A Soviet satellite, of course, is entirely unacceptable; if custody is to be taken within Korea, a state such as Sweden or Switzerland would be most desirable from our standpoint.

b.

Are prisoners to be physically transported to such a state or is the state to take custody of the prisoners within Korea, or perhaps in the demilitarized zone, i.e., what is meant by “hand over” within the Chou En-lai proposal?

Comment: Physically moving prisoners from Korea to any other country clearly presents serious problems of varying degrees of seriousness dependent upon the country to which prisoners are to be moved. While we have never dismissed this possibility in its entirety, it would be difficult to accept any solution other than a “hand over” in Korea, either in present locations, in small groups in the demilitarized zone, or alternatively setting aside an island or other such area.

c.
If the prisoners are physically to be moved to a “neutral state”, how is this to be done without the use of force; who will provide shipping, financing, food, camps, etc?
d.
One paragraph of the Chou En-lai proposal speaks of “both parties …5 to hand over the remaining POW’s to a neutral state”, and the following paragraph of “those captured personnel of our side … be handed over to a neutral state”. Does this distinction imply that the Communists are prepared to return all UNC prisoners so that the provisions concerning the neutral state would in effect apply only to UNC held prisoners?
e.
Is any distinction to be made between the handling of Korean and Chinese repatriates? Transporting Koreans from Korea to a “neutral state” is clearly absurd. Their prompt release in Korea would be the preferable solution, with only the Chinese being subject to whatever arrangements are agreed upon.
f.
What is contemplated by the proposal for “explanations by the parties concerned”?
g.
What will be terms of reference for the neutral state in determining the ultimate disposition of personnel turned over to it, i.e., will the neutral state itself determine after such “explanations” whether or not prisoner still persists in his refusal to be repatriated, and if so what disposition shall it make of him? In other words, what is a “just solution” to the question of repatriation?

  1. This telegram was drafted in the Department of State and cleared by Army, Navy, and Air Force and by H. P. Smith for Nash. Secretary Dulles approved the draft and expressed the view that it need not be referred to the President. Lemnitzer then cleared the draft with Bradley, who directed that it be transmitted as a JCS telegram. (Memorandum from Dwan to Steers, Apr. 1, 1953; JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45))
  2. According to telegram DA 935413 to Clark, Apr. 1, 1953, which clarified this telegram from the JCS, Clark was authorized to act on paragraph 2 at his discretion. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
  3. According to telegram DA 935413, this suggestion to proceed to negotiate on the Chou En-lai proposal while the exchange of sick and wounded was being implemented was for Clark’s comments only; no action or public statement to that effect was to be made unless otherwise instructed.
  4. Ante, p. 380.
  5. Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.