Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/2–553: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

secret

New York , February 5, 1953—6:56 p.m.

484. Re Korea.

1. Korea is first item on resumed GA agenda.¹ We see little prospect of altering Chinese Communist opposition to armistice through any recommendation which GA might make. On other hand, pressures outside of GA may well affect in time Chinese Communist attitude toward armistice.

2. General strategy of USDel in resumed GA session should be, therefore, as outlined in Deptel 2161,² January 30 to New Delhi, to stand on approval and support of Indian resolution to oppose any variations or changes in it which would result simply in flowering of divisive debate, the weakening of our position, and not in any change in Communist position.

More particularly, we see some likelihood that Indian or perhaps Indonesian initiative might be in direction of invitation to Chinese Communists to come and be heard by GA. This would be position which we would expect strongly to oppose considering the continuing aggression by Chinese Communist regime and their contempt for all efforts to settle Korean case by negotiation.

3. Procedural situation in Assembly involves 21-power resolution, Mexican resolution and Peruvian resolution on table and technically before GA. As second part of Korean item, UNKRA report will be up for consideration.

There is also possibility of Indonesian initiative along lines suggested ourtel 411,³ January 12, for establishment of commission along lines suggested by USSR and immediate cease-fire with POW item to be negotiated later.

4. As an effective means of carrying out policy summarized in paragraphs 1 and 2, we see certain advantages in stimulating or proposing resolution which might contain following ideas:

(a) General affirmation of UN support for Indian resolution and statement of GA determination to stand on principles involved and to continue vigorously to resist aggression;

(b) An economic clause to be given co-equal publicity and treatment which would recognize concern of UN and UNKRA with all problems of Korean economy and which specifically would urge Agent General to present to 8th GA long-term program of two to five years duration, together with his views on practically possible budget or over-all figure. Such program would be developed in consultation with and coordinated with Unified Command and ROK and would involve procurement of capital goods having a direct effect on restoration and improvement of civilian economy. Around elements (a) and (b) general argument by US and our friends would include points such as following:

(a) Importance of improvement in economy to morale and creation of larger ROK military forces. It would show an intent to balance increased ROK contribution with increased UN concern for economy which must support it.

(b) Such initiative on economic side would indicate to Asians and Latin Americans that humanitarian action is being pressed, its effectiveness to depend in part on their own contributions. This plan, by providing constructive alternative, would also render more manageable initiatives undesired by US on political side as suggested by Indonesians. We realize that proposals of this sort involve risk of unrealistic and gigantic financial demands by ROK and possibly very substantial demands by Kingsley as suggested Pusan’s 937,⁴ January 30. We believe political advantages of this course warrant its serious consideration.

(c) Reaffirmation of principles of Indian resolution would make it difficult for Indians, Indonesians, or others to urge weakening changes in that resolution. So long as Menon is at UN headquarters we see real risk of tendency in that direction. Indians might attempt weakening amendments to type of resolution we suggest, but we think this approach could be checked because US would start with an affirmative position and GA program. This would involve careful diplomatic preparation.

(d) Presence of resolution containing these two principles would make it simpler for Mexicans and Peruvians to refrain from pressing for vote on their own draft resolutions.

(e) Debate on political side could cover tentative UK suggestion of exchange of wounded prisoners of war pursuant to Article 109, of Geneva Convention. It would enable us as well to make a vigorous statement emphasizing our determination to abide by our commitments in Korea, and to place in proper perspective President’s recent orders to Seventh Fleet.⁵

5. In short, above tactical suggestion would give us strong, flexible basis for standing on Indian resolution. It would make it possible effectively to discourage initiatives in other directions without US appearing to be negative. It would give us basis in our statements and negotiations for showing that in face of Chinese Communists’ opposition we are willing to fight on in Korea. As part of our tactics we can conceive of letting USSR representatives know indirectly, through some deliberate indiscretion, our strong attitude on continuing hostilities. If we indicate a strong position and willingness to continue hostilities and not exhibit an anxiety to settle, we may well be able to develop some element of willingness in Chinese Communists to settle that would not otherwise exist.

Lodge

1. The UN General Assembly resumed on Feb. 24, 1953.
2. Not printed. (795.00/1–2853)
3. Not printed. (795.00/1–1253)
4. In this telegram, the Embassy reported statements made by Kingsley and picked up by newspapers that the amount of dollar aid required to stop inflation in Korea would be over $1 billion during the next five-year period and that, furthermore, $2 billion would be the price of making Korea independent of foreign aid over the same period of time. (357.AD/1–3053)
5. In his “State of the Union” speech to Congress on Feb. 2, 1953, Eisenhower stated that he was reversing the decision of June 1950 which ordered the Seventh Fleet to both prevent an attack on Taiwan and also to insure that Taiwan not be used as a base of operations against the mainland. Because of the Chinese Communist invasion of Korea and because of their rejections of UN armistice proposals, the President was “issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China”. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 16–17)