Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
routine

Tokyo , January 3, 1953—5:11 p.m.

CX 60809. 1. I contemplate notifying the Communist Del through the ln offs that the immunity granted to convoys between Pyongyang and Kaesong, granted unilaterally on 25 Nov 51 by the UNC Ln Off, will be rescinded until such time as the armistice negots are resumed. This will not affect the curr bilateral security agreement covering Kaesong, Panmunjom and Munsan-Ni. At the present time there appears to be no need for tvl between Pyongyang and Kaesong of the Communist Del mbrs, and certainly a daily convoy in both directions is not required for the log spt of the Communist Del under curr circumstances. Intel considered to be reliable indicates that the Communists have taken advantage of the immunity to atk of the Kaesong restricted area by basing major hq and a very substantial sup cen in the area. It appears obvious that the Communists are using the daily protected convoys for courier svc and in spt of other activities which they have centered at Kaesong.

2. I realize that the Communists will immediately charge that we are attempting to force them to terminate armistice negots by preventing the log spt of their armistice del, however I feel that the contemplated action is fully justified to deny the Communists a very considerable mil advantage. If complete withdrawal of convoy immunity is considered too drastic, I could limit their protected opns to one day a week in order to counter the anticipated charges and still obtain most of the desired effect.

3. In light of the US Govt policy set forth in JCS 920838,¹ NOTAL, rqst your comments and/or concurrence.

1. In this telegram, dated Oct. 11, 1952, the JCS instructed Clark to ensure that the UNC Delegation at Panmunjom should carefully avoid presenting the implication that the UNC considered it desirable that the negotiations should be transferred to another forum. It was the U.S. Government’s position that if the armistice negotiations were to continue, they should do so at Panmunjom. (FE files, lot 55 D 128)