Office of the Historian

FE files, lot 55 D 128

Memorandum for the Record by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)1

top secret
[Tokyo,] February 19, 1952.

1. Present:

  • General Ridgway
  • General Hull
  • Mr. Johnson
  • General Hickey
  • General Milburn

2. Following were the highlights:

a.
In anticipation of a possible United States Government directive to release certain categories of POW’s, who violently oppose repatriation, now in U.S. custody unilaterally without reference to the Communists, there was presented an outline of the procedure by which this might be done.
b.
This procedure envisaged:
(1)
A covert screening, and
(2)
An overt screening.
c.
If release is directed, CINCFE strongly favors the overt as against the covert, feels it should be done within the daylight hours of a single day.
d.
The manner in which the choice is offered under this procedure to be carefully considered, but regardless of how done, once having been initiated, the screening and segregation is to be immediate and final.
e.
The UNC to retain custody of those electing not to return and to keep them in ROK until after Armistice Agreement is in effect.
f.
The procedure to be followed by the UNC Del, assuming the foregoing has been directed, to be substantially as follows:
(1)
Reach agreement on Agenda Item 5.
(2)
To go to Plenary Session.
(3)
Propose that of the two remaining unresolved issues, that we are willing to concede on the airfields if the Communists concede on all for all exchange with voluntary repatriation. Use as an argument to support our position:

The Communist release of ROK personnel impressed into their armed forces, which in fact represents the implementation of the principle of voluntary repatriation by the Communists. If the Communists accept, we are then practically at an agreed armistice.

(4)
If proposal in (3) above is rejected:
(a)
Implement immediately the screening and segregation referred to in paras. 2c and d above.
(b)
Inform the Communists that the voluntary repatriation which they in fact executed by their own admission, is now being applied to the POW’s in our custody.
(5)
Propose to the Communists an all for all exchange of the remaining POW’s, retaining at this time our original position on the airfield question.
(6)
If the Communists accept our proposal on the all for all exchange of remaining POW’s, and propose in exchange our concession on the airfield question, we will accept. This should be our final position.
g.
The proposal contained in (5) above will contain two issues which, if not accepted by the Communists, will place our Delegation in the position of having a break occur on two issues rather than a single one.
M. B. Ridgway
General, United States Army
  1. The discussion recorded in this memorandum grew out of the trip of Hull and Johnson to Japan and Korea, which took place Feb. 9–22. For a general account of this mission, see the memorandum for the record, Mar. 10, p. 76.↩