Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Korea”

Paper Prepared by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 16, 1952.

Disposition of anti-Communist POW’s

Problem: To determine US policy with regard to disposition of those Chinese and North Korean POW’s in Korea who have indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation to Communist control.

Discussion:

1. Further search for a formula, mutually agreeable to the enemy and ourselves, for disposition of those Chinese and North Korean POW’s who have indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation, has now been clearly demonstrated to be hopeless. The Indian resolution, passed by the General Assembly, constitutes the furthest that this Government can go in the way of compromise on the mechanics of settlement of the POW issue without actual surrender on the issue itself. Rejection of that resolution by both the USSR and the Chinese Communist regime demonstrates that under present circumstances there is no possibility that the USSR and the Chinese Communists will agree to any formula which holds to our basic principle of no forcible repatriation.

2. In this situation it appears that we should seriously consider what we can usefully do to dispose of the POW issue. The obvious course of action which offers itself is for the UNC immediately to reclassify as political refugees those Korean and Chinese prisoners who will not be repatriated, to hand over the Koreans to the control of the Government of the Republic of Korea, and to transfer the Chinese to their choice of whatever countries may be willing to receive them, with the expectation that practically all of them would go to Formosa.

3. The advantages of such a course of action would be:

a. To forestall the possibility of further divisive debate among the Free World countries on formulae for settlement of the POW issue.

b. To remove the POW issue from any possibility of negotiation and thus to present the Communists with the possibility, if they should eventually come to desire an armistice, of accepting a fait accompli without explicit surrender of their own principle.

c. To provide the basis for effective exploitation of the propaganda and political warfare values inherent in the UN position of no forcible repatriation.

d. To remove any doubts that the Communists may still entertain as to the possibility of our compromising on this issue.

4. The disadvantages of such a course of action would be:

a. The difficulties we might encounter in persuading our allies of the utility of such unilateral disposition of the POW question.

b. The possibility that we would present the Communists with an opportunity and an incentive to undertake some form of retaliation against the UN prisoners whom they now hold.

5. In terms of timing, the present situation appears to be propitious for a unilateral disposition of the POW issue. We have clearly demonstrated our willingness to accept any formula which does not violate our principle. The Communists have clearly demonstrated their unwillingness to accept any such formula. The formula which the Communists have rejected has had the full sanction of the overwhelming majority of the members of the UN. The difficulties which we may expect in securing Allied acceptance of this course of action at the present time will probably be less, and certainly no greater than might be expected at any foreseeable time in the future. The possibility of Communist retaliation against our own prisoners may be precipitated, but this possibility has always existed, and could not be completely avoided under any formula for an armistice which squared with our principle of no forcible repatriation. With armistice negotiations at Panmunjom indefinitely recessed, there is little need to consider repercussions on those negotiations. Perhaps equally important in terms of timing is the probability that the sponsoring of such a course of action by the present US administration, even though undertaken with the obvious approval of the incoming administration, would be less unsettling to the members of our coalition than the early sponsorship of such a course of action by the incoming US administration.

6. The advantages of undertaking the suggested course of action appear to outweigh the disadvantages, and in terms of timing, immediate action appears advantageous.

Recommendation:

1. The Department should secure US Governmental concurrence to the following course of action:

a. Immediate reclassification as political refugees of those Korean and Chinese POW’s who have indicated they would forcibly resist repatriation—such reclassification to take place after interviews in the presence of International Red Cross observers indicate that the POW’s have not changed their views;

b. Transfer of such Korean POW’s to the control of the Government of the Republic of Korea;

c. Transfer of such Chinese POW’s to their choice of the countries willing to receive them;

d. Similar disposition of all POW’s we may capture in the future who express themselves as unwilling to return to Communist control.

2. Approval should be sought from the incoming administration for such a course of action.

3. The US should then attempt to gain acquiescence of our principal Allies to the immediate undertaking of this course of action.

1. In a covering memorandum to Nitze, Dec. 22, 1952, Matthews indicated that he had discussed this paper with Bruce, who did not disagree with the recommendation of the fait accompli solution, but did believe that the implications and possibilities of the repercussions (particularly on American POWs) were so important that nothing should be initiated by the Truman administration during its last weeks. Evidently, Bruce did come around to agreeing with the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff “that something on this order might be passed on to Mr. Dulles”, according to a note from Matthews to Bruce, Dec. 29, attached to a slightly revised version of this paper submitted by Johnson to Matthews on Dec. 24. In this note, however, Matthews suggested that Bruce might want to raise the issue with Acheson because it was an important step (695A.0024/12–2452). On another copy of this memorandum, dated Dec. 24, Johnson indicated that the matter had not been discussed with Dulles (FE files, lot 55 D 128).