Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/11–2652: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State

secret
niact

New Delhi, November 26, 1952—7 p.m.

2213. Reftels 1543¹ Delga 3 Nov 24 and Delga 4 Nov 25,² Delga unn [5] Nov 25, latter sent Dept as Delga 256.³

Early this morning fol receipt niact reftels, Wilkins⁴ arranged appointment for me with PM at 12:30 through R. K. Nehru. At latter’s request Wilkins discussed with him further clarification para 17 of Ind res in preparation for my mtg with PM.

Two principal points emerged from this prelim discussion:

1. R. K. Nehru who had just recd full text Menon’s speech⁵ before polit comit clarifying Ind res interpreted remarks re para 17 to mean responsibility to dispose of non-repatriates wld not pass to UN agency in event of disagreement. Latter wld merely “look after” non-repatriates.

2. Nehru concluded that in that event non-repatriates wld have status of displaced persons whom UN was maintaining and caring for.

Wilkins stressed Secty’s remarks re our interpretation Menon’s speech and emphasized importance of unity on res and UN step toward Kor peace. Nehru seemed agree. Although willing to tele Ind del NY, he rptd Menon virtually had free hand and again wondered if US and Ind dels cld not work out acceptable para 17. Nehru felt matter cld be further discussed during conversation with PM at 12:30.

Subsequently saw Nehru with Pillai, R. K. Nehru and Wilkins also present. I showed PriMin revised text para 17 Ind res and our suggested amplification. Without commenting on our proposal PriMin immed brought up subject Vyshinsky’s speech⁶ and expressed deep disappointment at Sov action. PriMin stated while it desirable secure agmt on res, our principal objective was secure Chi agmt to armistice in order to stop fighting and res was only means to that end. I was fearful at first he might say since Russians had taken this apparently adamant position, there little point passing Ind res at this time.

However, I referred to news-story in Delhi morning paper which quoted UN gossip to effect that violence Vyshinsky’s statement might indicate difference of opinion had arisen with Chi Commies and that Vyshinsky may have stated publicly and vigorously his disagreement with the res in order to emphasize private advice to Peiping that Ind res shld be rejected by Chi as basis for armistice. After some thought, Nehru said this possible and since Vyshinsky normally spoke violent terms we shld perhaps not pay much attention.

Nehru asked if Sov Union had power veto this res. I stated that it is GA action and hence no veto possible. He said he assumed Sov Union and Commie Chi were together since they usually were but seemed inclined accept possibility there some disagreement. He asked what wld happen if res was passed. I stated it wld be sent by Pres of GA to Commie Chi Govt and to North Kor authorities.

I asked him if Chi Commie had expressed any view on res beyond noncommittal attitude which he described to me previously. He did not answer directly. I again pointed out Chi had everything to gain from armistice including eventually possibility broad Asian settlement and agmt, and that Sov Union seemed have every reason keep fighting going. Nehru seemed to agree.

After this discusssion he read para 17 and our amplification rather casually and stated he had no real objection our language. Said that he thought matter more less question of detail compared to importance of armistice itself, and had become even less important fol Vyshinsky’s speech yesterday.

Nehru stressed fact Ind UN del have been given wide powers develop Kor res as broadly and satisfactorily as possible. He stated final decision had to be in their hands because they more familiar than he with development in UN. He emphasized, however, he had no personal objection whatsoever our wording and that he wld recommend it to his del for their consideration and discussion with US del.

It clearly evident that US and Ind have common desire achieve armistice Kor. We are virtually in agmt on UN res which is designed to achieve this objective.

Even tho Chi turn this res down, such a res in agmt with Ind and other independent nations will place us in very strong position here in Asia, and it will be clear to every one that Sov Union and Commie Chi have defied what amounts to world opinion.

However, there are only two reasons why Ind will continue to support the passage of this res on which we are working:

1. Whatever hope she may have Chi will still accept res and effect armistice despite Vyshinsky’s speech.

2. Fact she has become so involved it might now be embarrassing for her to abandon her position. However, these two factors can be blown out window in next two or three days either by negative msg from Peiping or by change of heart on the part of Nehru. We shld realize Ind has gone extraordinarily long distance our direction and indeed for first time is well on way to associating herself with us in opposition Sov Union and Chi on issue of crucial importance.

Thus we believe every effort shld be made agree promptly on res and to secure its immed passage. If on top Vyshinsky’s speech word shld now come from Peiping that Chi Govt definitely will not accept this res or one similar to it, there is strong possibility if not probability that Ind Govt will pull out this whole situation, return to its usual neutralist position and that opportunity will have been lost. For this reason we believe speed is of the essence.

Bowles

1. Telegram 1543 from New Delhi, Nov. 10, 1952, not printed. (991.61/10–1352)
2. Telegram Delga 3 is printed as telegram Delga 252, p. 677; telegram Delga 4 is not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, pp. 678 and 679.
3. Ante, p. 679.
4. Fraser Wilkins, Counselor of Embassy at New Delhi.
5. Presumably the reference was to the speech of Nov. 19; see UN document A/C.1/SR.525.
6. The reference was to the speech of Nov. 24, 1952; see UN document A/C.1/SR.529.