795.00/2–1452: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Telac 5. Personal eyes only for Secretary from Matthews. Re: Lovett’s phone call on JCS proposal for show of force in Far East.1 Have received from Defense on informal basis recommendations of JCS with respect to show of force.2 (Presumably SecDef will not approve prior to talk with you.) Nature of proposed show of force involves naval sweep through Formosa Straits to and including Hainan and simulated B–29 air sweeps and strikes turning off fifteen to twenty five miles from China coast, both as described at State–JCS meeting of February 6.3
JCS recommendations to SecDef signed by Fechteler based on following three points:
- 1
- —JCS of opinion course of action would “improve the military position in the Far East”.
- 2
- —After stating that at State–JCS meeting Dept representatives indicated an objection which was based on possible adverse effect such a course of action might have in England, JCS informed SecDef they do not consider show of force will have adverse results but instead will improve political position of UN forces in Far East.
- 3
- —Show of force will expedite conclusion of Korea armistice negotiations.
Suggest in discussions with Lovett you ask in what way show of force will improve military position in Far East. JCS recommendation does not specify nature of improvement in military position.
We are clear that proposed course of action would have adverse political effect among allies and that this will have to be balanced against any expected advantages. We pointed out at February 6 meeting adverse effect among allies might outweigh whatever beneficial effect on Commies action might have. In absence of prior consultation and explanation, allied governments will be extremely worried. Even with prior notice to governments, if such action becomes known it will almost certainly lead to statements and debates which might detract from usefulness of “greater sanction” statement. Prior notice would in itself have dangers since leaks from those opposed to course of action would blunt any effectiveness show of force possesses.
In view possibility proposed sweeps along China coast might cause Chi commies to react with force against naval units and aircraft involved, [Page 47] you may wish explore with Lovett consequences and possible pressures to broaden conflict.
JCS do not elaborate view that proposed course of action would expedite armistice negotiations and we suggest you explore this question with SecDef. We doubt whether any appreciable effect should be anticipated.
For your information at conclusion initial discussion this matter February 6 Bradley suggested State and JCS think matter over and discuss it again at subsequent meeting. No further discussions have been held, and in view present status of matter we do not plan to undertake such discussions here.
- This telephone conversation between Lovett and Acheson took place on Feb. 12; memorandum of conversation, not printed (795.00/2–1252).↩
- On Feb. 12, 1952, the Director of the Executive Office of the Secretary of Defense, Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, sent Matthews a copy of a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense to which was attached a draft of a proposed message to Ridgway ordering a show of force along the China coast (795.00/2–1252).↩
- See the memorandum, p. 39.↩