Memorandum by the Special Assistant (Kitchen) to the Secretary of State 1


Doc Matthews telephoned again. He said that the latest British proposal2 had been shown to Chip Bohlen, David Bruce and Paul Nitze, and Alex Johnson, and that they believed it constituted almost complete capitulation, and they were unanimous in believing we could not accept it. They thought that the author was undoubtedly inspired by worry regarding what the next administration might do in connection with possible phase 2 activities. Mr. Bruce will discuss it with the President at 12:30 and we will know his views after lunch.3 Bohlen pointed out that he thought the move was tactically very bad in the light of Vyshinsky’s harsh speech the other day.4 (This remark is consistent with his position in the staff meeting at the UN the other afternoon.) Bohlen added that he thought it would be harder for the Commies to accept a resolution which made the denial of forced repatriation vaguely acceptable than it would be to assume the posture of being outraged with regard to a “harder” resolution. Phil Jessup, who took the telephone call from Washington, says he is not impressed by this latter point, nor am I.

  1. Marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.
  2. For the British proposal and draft resolution, see Delga 180, Nov. 12, 1952, supra .
  3. See footnote 1, infra .
  4. The reference is to the Vyshinsky speech of Nov. 10 before the First Committee; see footnote 1 p. 598.