Truman Library, Truman papers, Material from the Department of Defense Relating to the Korean War

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

top secret

CX 56022. Reur 919187.2

1.
This is an interim reply which covers my curr planning on the subject.
2.
Since assumption of my present comd I have considered as one of my primary missions the attainment of an honorable mil armistice in Korea. Constantly cited as the reason for failure to achieve a mil armistice [Page 549] is the apparent impossibility of agreement on repatriation of POWs. On the surface that does seem to be the final impediment to the realization of an armistice; however, I am of the firm conviction that the basic, underlying reason for failure thus far to achieve an armistice is that we have not exerted suf mil pressure to impose the rqmt for an armistice on the enemy.
3.
Our problem is, of course, difficult. We confront undemoralized enemy forces, far superior in str, who occupy excellent, extremely well organized def psns in depth and who cont to provide themselves with suf log support. Under these conditions, it appears evident that positive aggressive action, designed to obtain mil victory and achieve an armistice on our terms, is not feasible by this comd with curr forces operating under curr restrictions. Gains that might be achieved by removal of restrictions cannot properly be exploited except by concurrent ground action which is dependent upon augmentation of forces. On the other hand, gains which might be achieved by intensified ground action with augmented forces would be purchased at highly unpalatable pers cost, if not accompanied by the advantages that would accrue from the removal of certain restrictions.
4.
In consonance with my conviction that achievement of an armistice is dependent upon a degree of mil victory, I have had this subject under active study to determine the extent of aggressive action in Korea nec to establish conditions whereby the enemy will be compelled to seek or accept an armistice on our terms. This study develops the concept for a mil victory of suf magnitude to establish these conditions.
5.
In development of the concept of opns in this study, 3 assumptions were made which have the force of my convictions. First, that the Communists will not accept an armistice on present terms under the present mil sit. Second, that the UNC will not recede from its stated psn re forcible repatriation of POWs. And third, that the contemplated actions will not cause the USSR to enter the hostilities, thereby possibly precipitating World War Three. The USSR has no qualms about dishonoring pledges such as may be included in the Sino-Russian mutual assistance pact. The USSR needs no excuses for her acts. In fact, the UNC has already been accused of countless alleged violations of the Manchurian border and atks on Chinese territory. I believe that World War Three will not be brought about by action on our part, that conflict will commence only when the USSR so determines on her own appraisal, unaffected by US or UNC actions, and that therefore any so called extension of the Korean opns presents little risk insofar as precipitating World War Three is concerned.
6.
In considering means that might be adopted to attain an armistice, a distinction should be made between exertion of mil pressure on the one hand and winning a mil victory on the other. It appears unwise to me to commit the resources, both human and mat, and accept the losses [Page 550] inherent in offensive action or pressure that does not contemplate the destruction of hostile forces. An advance to the narrow waist of Korea (generally from Pyongyang to Wonsan) that failed to encompass a concept aimed at major destruction of enemy mat and forces could not be worth the cost and would be disadvantageous to the UNC since a battle line there, though shorter, would not be as strong for a considerable period of time as our main defensive psn as presently organized. Therefore I feel that any contemplated course of action must include provision for carrying the battle all the way to the Yalu in the event that a mil victory cannot be achieved short of that line.
7.
In connection with case one and case two of your para 3, my curr studies have convinced me that no action in extension or intensification of Korean hostilities under those conditions is feasible or recommendable except for extension of the air war to suitable tgts beyond the Yalu including the Antung afld complex. Altho this is a curr capability of assigned forces and can be implemented upon order, I do not feel that it will, by itself, achieve the desired mil objective. However, in view of the fact that air atks against critical tgts in Manchuria and China and an imposition of a naval blockade against China would to a degree inflict damage, strain enemy resources, and decrease enemy capabilities, it is possible that such actions would cause the Communists to accept an armistice on curr terms. In any event, but subsequent to arrival in the theater of force augmentations, I would wish to implement this extension of the war before launching a maj ground offensive and committing maj elms to an amph assault.
8.
With ref to case 3 of your para 3, preliminary est of force rqmts for our concept, which is also envisaged for implementation in the spring of 1953, deviates from those cited. It calls for additional ground forces, amph lift, and differently augmented air forces.
9.
The study being developed here is now being elaborated into outline plan form if suf detail to establish concept of opns, feasibility and force rqmts. This project can be further developed and prepared for presentation in Wash by a team of staff offs from this hq on or about 20 Oct. It is visualized that enroute to Wash the team would acquaint CINCPAC with the details and coord approp matters with him. I will discuss this with Adm Radford during his contemplated visit to Tokyo on or about 6 Oct 52.
  1. Repeated to CINCPAC for information.
  2. Dated Sept. 23, p. 527.