Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF-subject file

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the President

top secret

The following summarizes the notes which I took at the meeting1 this morning in the Cabinet Room of the White House attended by:

The President of the United States

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State

William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense

W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security

Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army

Francis P. Whitehair, Under Secretary of the Navy

Roswell L. Gilpatric, Under Secretary of the Air Force

General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence

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General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations

General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF

Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor, Department of State

Paul H. Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State

U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Brig. General R. B. Landry, Air Force Aide to the President

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC

The President opened the meeting by explaining that this was a follow-up of a previous meeting that he had had with Defense officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding future course of action in Korea.2

Secretary Acheson assured the President that there was no major difference between State and Defense on this question. He said that it was agreed we should stick to the proposition of no forcible return of prisoners of war. The Communists are holding out for an all-for-all exchange. As a result the armistice negotiations have gotten nowhere and are recessing from week to week.

Secretary Acheson felt that the time had come when we should sum up our position in the negotiations; then if the Communists reject it, as is possible, we should recess until the Communists are ready to come up with something we can consider. There is some question as to how this should be done, but our people in the field feel that this will show the Communists that we are firm on our package proposal.

Secretary Acheson said we should also recognize the consequences. Such a step will accentuate the feeling in the U.N. that a commission should be set up to settle the prisoner of war issue. We will oppose that and will have to try to get our Allies to support our position that the U.N. Command has acted rightly. Domestically we are in the heat of a political campaign and it will be said that the Administration does not know what to do. It may increase suggestions that we go all out in bombing, although the tendency to support that view is decreasing throughout the country, based on recent polls.3

If we are to bring about a recess there is a question as to how this should be done. State and Defense are agreed that General Harrison should hold a meeting reviewing our position. This statement should cover the question of screening prisoners of war and here we might consider proposing a different method, such as taking them to a neutral zone and then letting them go north or south as they choose. Secondly, there is the question of the possible exchange of 12,000 of our prisoners [Page 534] for 83,000 of theirs while we continue discussions regarding the remaining prisoners. This presents real difficulties. It will give the Communists a face-saving way out but gets us into trouble everywhere. It might give the impression that we are weakening in our position and we must make it clear that we are not giving up on non-forcible return. If we make that clear, that takes away much of the face-saving value and therefore makes this proposition less useful. If it is rejected it may weaken our position. If it is accepted there is deep concern, more by the Joint Chiefs of Staff than by State, that this would leave another unresolved issue and that the armistice might later break down under conditions less favorable to us, since the Communist build-up could then go on without bombing by us. There is also the danger that the armistice might then break down on other more important issues such as the boundary line since the Communists might then go back to their desire for the 38th parallel.

Our policy is to get an armistice on the terms which we have put forward. If we get an armistice there will undoubtedly be strong pressure domestically to weaken our position in Korea while we are not certain there will be similar pressures on the Chinese Communists. If we do not get an armistice the Joint Chiefs of Staff can best tell us whether we can increase the pressure without unacceptable casualties. Secretary Acheson summed up by saying the question is whether the time has come to recess the armistice negotiations.

The President stated that the situation has arrived where a decision must be made whether we let the prisoner of war issue go over for political discussion without changing our position or whether we will do anything in the world to get an armistice. He said that he wished to be perfectly clear that he was not willing to do the latter. The only purpose of an armistice should be to try to get peace in the Pacific but not under conditions which may later enable the Communists to take over Japan or elsewhere. We have been striving to prevent World War III but this situation contains all the elements which could cause that war to come about. If and when the armistice is signed, we will find ourselves in the same position as on September 2, 1945, when we accepted the surrender of Japan and then tore up our military machine. Everyone was involved in that development and it is impossible to put the blame any one place. The President said that we cannot sit down now with the doors open and no military machine to protect us—we must build up our military strength.

Secretary Foster said he thought Secretary Acheson had made a fine summing-up. Secretary Foster said that Defense was concerned about the morale problem in Korea. There is also the rotation problem to be considered. To put over the prisoner of war issue to political discussions would be disastrous. We must have a sound military armistice that will protect our troops in the field. Even then we will have all the difficulties [Page 535] mentioned. Our Field Commanders believe they have the ability to increase pressures without bringing on all-out war. One possibility is the use of two Chinese Nationalist divisions in Korea.4 In any case we can increase our pressure on the ground, including amphibious landings.

Secretary Foster said that all the people in Defense feel that the time has come to put our package proposal before the North Koreans and Chinese Communists and ask them to accept it. We have already made concessions. The airfield question involved a great concession which was made only in order to get our package proposal. Defense has come to the conclusion that the weekly meetings give the impression that we have something further to retreat to. General Harrison, not the President, should make a summary of our position, give the Communists time—say ten days—to accept as our final terms; then if they reject it, have an indefinite recess during which we increase the pressure, although not necessarily over the Yalu or by blockade. If we create the impression that we are increasing the pressures it will improve the morale of our troops there, since it is the stagnation that gets them.

General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs feel that we must not give up on our main point. If we insist on that it may deter all-out war since there is a chance of increased desertions and an easy surrender movement. Any new proposition will indicate we are giving in and will postpone the chance of an armistice. General Bradley said that the Joint Chiefs felt that it is time to re-state our package proposal.

The President asked General Smith if he had any information indicating that the Chinese Communists are tired of what is taking place.

General Smith said that there are only indications that they are feeling economic pressures although this is not conclusive evidence. Subject to their other desires regarding Asia, the Communists would like to have an armistice. But even a temporary armistice should not be expected to lead to peace in Asia. General Smith said that, while he agreed generally with everything that had been said, this only makes it all the more important that we develop increasing pressures.

The President said that General Smith had shown him some startling figures regarding trade with China. This showed that the number of Communist ships were less but they were using more British shipping. The President said that he had spoken to Secretary Acheson about this and was taking it up with Mr. Churchill, who had said, when he was here, that he would stop it without placing any conditions on it.

General Smith said that there were various ways to cut the coastal shipping with sources other than our own. He thought this would have more effect than any policy statements we might make.

The President said that he was prepared to recognize and hear from anyone in the room on this important question.

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Mr. Gilpatric said that we do have greatly increased air power. Therefore if it is desired to go beyond the present limitations it is possible to do so, not on a sustained all-out effort but effectively nevertheless.

In answer to the President, Secretary Pace said that the capability of our ground forces has been affected by rotation but that this has been partially countered by the increased effectiveness of the South Koreans. Leadership and supplies are still problems. Secretary Pace pointed out that the two armies facing each other are well dug in and either side is likely to suffer heavy casualties in an offensive.

The President asked what happened to our men after they have been rotated back.

Secretary Pace said that they could always be called back into service if there was a greater emergency. Most of them go home after their period of service and are not immediately available, but they are kept on reserve status. We are, therefore, building up a pool of trained, experienced manpower. Secretary Pace again mentioned how well the South Koreans were developing.

Mr. Whitehair asked to speak about the question of the effect of stagnation on morale. He said that he had read all of the communications received in Navy from families of naval personnel. Over sixty percent of naval personnel have shipped back for a second tour of duty. However, he had noted that there is an increasing desire on the part of the people back home for a further clarity of purpose and what we mean to do. He felt that the sooner this could be cleared up the better.

In answer to the President, Admiral Fechteler said that the Navy was in good condition. In the event of increased pressures in Korea, reinforcements from the Atlantic might be required, but this could be handled all right.

The President jokingly said that during the next thirty days he would not be so interested in military decisions. However, before he left on his trip5 he would make a decision.

Admiral Fechteler said that he would like to repeat what the President had heard from Admiral Libby, which others in the meeting might not have heard. Admiral Libby feels strongly that the Communists will not give in on repatriation when military pressures are relieved. If this question is deferred for post-armistice negotiations the Communists will put it in the category of Item 5, on which our negotiators have had a most difficult time in confining the discussion to Korea. The Communists will put in questions regarding Formosa, seating in the United Nations, the presence of the Seventh Fleet, etc. If the repatriation question is deferred we will therefore be under strong pressure [Page 537] to open Item 5 to other subjects than Korea, which have so far been successfully kept out.

The President thought that Admiral Libby was right. Unless we wipe the slate clean, an armistice will do no good. We do not want to bring on World War III in order to get victory, but we do want to get some settlement that is satisfactory to us.

Mr. Harriman said that he assumed that there was agreement to increase pressures. He personally agreed that economic pressures would be very important.

General Smith repeated that we do have assets and resources not being used with full effectiveness. He felt that building up a Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa was perfectly safe because they will be unable to go anywhere unless we release the trigger in the form of air and naval support. On the other hand, the Communists would know that we always could do that at any time.

The President noted that this question had been discussed many times but that we must take into consideration both the forthcoming U.N. meeting and our impending election. Both of these make it difficult to do this without creating a political situation which might upset the whole apple-cart.

The President stated that we should adopt the following procedure. General Harrison should put in his package proposal, give the Communists about ten days to accept it, and then be prepared to do the things that seemed necessary if they reject it. The President hoped that these things would not be necessary but we should do them if they are. The President repeated that he has been trying to prevent World War III and he would hate to end his political career by bringing it on, but we cannot give in on principles. The President said that he would always be available, if necessary, while on his projected trip.

Secretary Acheson suggested, and it was agreed, that when the ten days are up we should not say to the Communists what we plan to do. In other words, we should not issue an ultimatum—rather we should put in our proposal and then assess the situation when they reply.

Mr. Bohlen said that he had always been opposed to making any new offer in the negotiations. He also had heard no powerful military reasons for sending two Chinese Nationalist divisions to Korea. He said that the State Department does not see any psychological advantages to that step.

The President said that he was thinking about the situation on the Chinese flank. He thought that the value of the Chinese Nationalists would be the threat they posed to Shanghai and the China Coast, not their use in Korea.

Secretary Foster explained that he was suggesting that the Chinese Nationalists be armed and have them ready, but that we not cross the other bridge of their use at this point.

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General Smith said that he could give a lot of psychological reasons for increasing Chinese Nationalist strength. He felt, however, that the economic situation was a more immediate problem. He felt that the Chinese coastal shipping could be interdicted without involving us, if we give the Nationalists moral and some material support.

Admiral Fechteler asked confirmation, which the President gave, that the question of non-repatriation is one to be dealt with in an armistice and that there would be no move to defer this question for political discussion.

Secretary Pace asked when, after the ten days had elapsed, would we begin to increase pressure. The President said immediately.

In answer to Mr. Harriman, Secretary Acheson said that he would propose to discuss this procedure with our Allies, but not to wait until they are firmly wedded to it.

The meeting then adjourned.

James S. Lay, Jr.
  1. This off-the-record meeting is also reported on in a memorandum of conversation by Johnson, Sept. 24, not printed. (795.00/9–2452)
  2. See memorandum for the record, by Lovett, Sept. 15, p. 512.
  3. The reference was to a survey, done by the Division of Public Studies of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, which is not printed; it was attached to a memorandum by Phillips to Acheson, Sept. 15, 1952 (795.00/9–1552).
  4. For documentation on this question, see volume xiv.
  5. President Truman left Washington on Sept. 28, 1952, to begin an extended campaign tour.