Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/9—352

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Phillips) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Public Affairs (MacKnight)¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 3, 1952.

Subject:

• Truce Negotiations

I have read the telegrams from Tokyo and Pusan saying that everything possible already is being done to induce the Chinese to make panicky demands on the Russians.² Here are some further suggestions which have Departmental approval:

1. A covert operation to spread rumors in Korea, Japan and China that an amphibious operation is being prepared.

2. Spread the following rumor through covert channels so that it would get circulation in Korea and Japan and China, if possible:

The U.S. has consistently refused to accept prohibitions on the atomic weapons. The reason for this is that the atomic bomb is our real ace in the hole in Korea, but the U.S. Government has been against their use. But pressure from some elements in the U.S. is intense to use them. The present saturation bombings in Korea have been launched in an effort to restrain these elements by satisfying them that we are taking vigorous action. But the saturation bombing obviously is not going to be decisive. A Presidential campaign is on and already one party is demanding more decisive action. As the Presidential campaign grows, this pressure will get much greater. The Government probably will not be able to resist it. There is one way to prevent the use of atomic weapons in Korea. This is to get an armistice without delay. If that is not done and atomic weapons are used, they may not prove decisive since they have never been tried on troops in the field. If that happens, then the same pressure undoubtedly will be exerted to extend the bombings to China, using atomic weapons.

1. This memorandum was sent to Richard Umstead of the CIA with a request in a covering memorandum that the CIA undertake implementation on an urgent basis. It was also noted in the covering memorandum that the project had the approval of Matthews (memorandum by MacKnight to Umstead, Sept. 3, 1952; 795.00/9—352).
2. The reference was to telegrams 260 from Pusan and 729 from Tokyo, both Aug. 27, 1952, neither printed (both 795.00/8–2752). These cables were in response to a suggestion made by Kennan that the arrival of a PRC Delegation in Moscow in mid-August offered a “unique opportunity” to frighten the Chinese and increase supply demands on the Soviet Union. Kennan suggested “something in nature of increased milit[ary] threat or feint” balanced by “some sort of conciliatory gesture” to the Soviet Union indicating that the United States was prepared to move to a cease-fire (telegram 321 from Moscow, Aug. 19, 1952; 795.00/8–1952).