Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
priority

Tokyo, September 1, 1952—8:57 p.m.

C 54499. Refs: A. C 52788.¹ B. CX 51489.² C. JCS 915579.³ D. State msg 268, 25 Jul.⁴ E. C 69351.⁵

1. As set forth in ref A, I feel that we have not as yet exhausted the positive action which we can take at Panmunjom to achieve an honorable armistice. The del and myself are of the opinion that a continued display of firmness is essential to securing an armistice; that this display of firmness must be supported at all levels and by all elements of our Government; that, insofar as actions at Panmunjom are concerned, this firmness can best be displayed by continued unilateral recesses of plenary sessions; this firmness in negotiations to be supported militarily by continued heavy bombing attacks. Upon receipt of ref D, I initiated study of possible courses of action which might not only result in an armistice, but which might also lead to a determination of whether the Communists do in fact desire one.⁶ After a thorough analysis of the situation to date I have developed an overall course of action which I recm be given careful consideration in determining the action to be taken as outlined in para 4 of ref C.

2. In developing this course of action, it was assumed that the UN would not retreat from the principle of no forced repatriation, and careful consideration was given to the folg:

a. Securing and maintaining public and international spt for our firm psn. View here is that, to achieve and maintain spt for any unilateral action in event we fail to achieve an armistice, such unilateral action should be immediately preceded by a maximum effort on our part to achieve an armistice.

b. Maintaining firmness of our psn. Recent alternate proposals developed here and at governmental level to solve the question of nonrepatriates are, for the most part, either identical to or modifications of proposals which the del have previously made, have discussed in detail, and have been rejected by the Communists. The end result has been an apparent impasse at the conf table, and, I am afraid, has resulted in unwarranted faith being placed in the value of a series of alternate proposals. To continue introducing additional proposals periodically for an indeterminate length of time while still maintaining our firm stand on no forced repatriation can only be interpreted by the Communists as a sign of weakness and holds out to them the hope that we have not presented our final psn.

3. The main points of this course of action which I feel you should consider are outlined in the succeeding paras.

4. Step nr 1, to be accomplished at one plenary session: Gen Harrison would present a carefully prepared statement constructed along the folg lines:

a. The Communists are fully aware of the objectivity and sincerity with which the UNC del has attempted to find a solution on nonrepatriated POWs that would be sat to both sides.

b. Compare the blatant admission of the Communists that they have converted from POW status thousands of UNC pers and impressed them into their armed forces with the UNC efforts to achieve a mutually agreeable solution for the disposition of those pers who have stated they would forcibly resist repatriation. Point out the freedom of action accorded International Committee of Red Cross pers by the UNC as compared with the Communists refusal to allow such pers access to Communist POW camps.

c. The disposition of about 14,000 CCF POWs appears to be the principal obstacle to an armistice, yet these persons are alleged by the Communists to be members of a volunteer force having no direct political connection with any sovereign government. The Communists strongly support the right of these individuals to volunteer in the Korean venture but now adopt an inconsistent psn that these same individuals in the custody of the UNC have no right to transfer to the control of a power other than the one under which they were serving at the time of their capture.

d. The past year of negotiations has produced a mass of material which neither the public nor the press can easily digest or remember. The extensive efforts which our del have made during this long period have probably been forgotten. At this point in Gen Harrison’s presentation he should recapitulate the various alternative solutions which we have previously offered and which the Communists have summarily rejected. These are:

(1) Admittance of joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without mil observers of both sides, to the POW camps of both sides to verify the fact that the non-repatriates would forcibly resist rtn to the side from which they came.

(2) All POWs of both sides to be delivered in grps of approp size to the demilitarized zone (D/Z) and given the opportunity to express their pref on repatriation. The screening to be done by one or a combination of the folg:

(a) ICRC.

(b) Teams from impartial nations.

(c) Joint teams of mil observers.

(d) Red Cross representatives from each side.

e. After Gen Harrison has reviewed proposals already made, we believe he shld then, as part of the same statement, present all of the alternatives acceptable to our government which have not previously been discussed at Panmunjom. There are listed below those proposals which I feel have merit. They wld be presented to the Commies as representing our best efforts to produce final agreement, all contingent on first signing an armistice.

(1) Delivery of non-repatriated in grps of approp size to the D/Z where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be released from mil control and, without interview or screening, be free to go to the side of their choice. This to be accomplished, if desired, with or without mil representation from each side, under the observation of one or combination of the folg:

(a) ICRC.

(b) Joint Red Cross teams.

(c) Observers from impartial nations.

(d) Joint mil teams.

Discussion: These alternatives are a modification of original rescreening proposals and eliminate the actual screening interview, but allow the indiv to express his free choice on repatriation by moving from a neutral location in the D/Z to the side of his choice. One of the agencies selected from the list above will be required to check POWs against list to insure that all POWs entered the neutral zone. Within the neutral zone there will be established UNC and Commie receiving pnts. Without coercion each POW will be shown where the receiving pnts are and those POWs reporting to the Commie receiving pnts will be taken to Commie-controlled territory, and those reporting to UNC receiving pnts will be taken to UNC-controlled territory.

General: This discussion applies equally to proposals subpara (2), subpara (5), subpara (4) and subpara (5) that fol All POWs who expressed a desire to be repatriated or who can be released to proceed directly to their homes in accordance with oft repeated Communists proposals will be released or repatriated when the armistice becomes eff. Both sides wld agree to abide by the decision of the impartial nations as to the disposition of the remainder of the POWs. Adequate safeguards to include freedom of press wld, of necessity, be placed on the impartial nations to insure that personal preference of the indiv wld be the primary factor in determining the ultimate disposition of non-repatriates; thus the impartial nations wld be unable to compromise the UN psn of no forced repatriation. The ultimate disposition of the POWs wld be determined within a specified prd of time.

(2) Delivery to the D/Z of non-repatriates where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both sides and responsibility for their disposition be turned over to representatives of impartial nations, with both sides agreeing to abide by the decision of such impartial nation.

Discussion: The main advantage I see in this proposal is that it removes UNC-sponsored rescreening to which the Commies have objected so violently. This, however, wld be an exceedingly difficult procedure to implement because we cannot guarantee our non-repatriates contd custody by the UNC and ultimate disposition according to an established procedure. In order to avoid violence in mvmt to the D/Z we wld first have to convince the indivs concerned that they wld get fair and equitable treatment from the impartial nations.

(3) Both sides agree that upon signing the armistice the supervision, control, and responsibility for the determination as to the ultimate disposition of all POWs of both sides who have not been previously repatriated or released wld be passed to a grp of impartial nations.

Discussion: (See part 2, CX 51489.)

(4) Both sides agree to sign an armistice, to retain all nonrepatriates in protective custody until a grp of mutually acceptable impartial nations decides on the ultimate disposition of these nonrepatriates.

Discussion: This delays the decision on the non-repatriates for an indefinite prd and may result in unrest and increased violence among the non-repatriates because of the long prd of confinement. This proposal is simple and easily implemented.

(5) Delivery by each side of non-repatriates to the custody of a body of mutually agreeable impartial nations at an acceptable location, either inside or outside of Korea, with each side agreeing to abide by the decision of such body as to the eventual disposition of the non-repatriates.

Discussion: This generally fols the proposal discussed by India with the Chinese fgn ministers. The main difficulty we foresee here is, again, in convincing non-repatriates prior to mvmt that we are acting in good faith, and that they will not be arbitrarily rtd to Commie control.

f. I firmly believe that a primary requisite to the four new proposals is that the prd of time allowed to determine ultimate disposition on non-repatriates be kept to a min. I believe that proposals subparas (1), (2), (3) and (4) may be accomplished prior to convening of the political conference. Location of the spot selected for the delivery of nonrepatriated wld affect time required for accomplishment of new proposal subpara (5).

g. After presenting the above proposals, Gen Harrison wld then emphasize that they represent the widest selection of choices which the UNC offer. Each of them will produce an armistice. Each of them will expedite the final disposition of non-repatriates. Upon the completion of his presentation, Gen Harrison wld close with a statement that he hopes the Commies will give mature and careful consideration to our proposals. He will then recess (bilaterally or unilaterally) for a prd of about 10 days for the announced purpose of allowing the Commies adequate time to analyze all of our proposals. He wld inform them that staff offs wld be aval at any time during the recess to ans questions on any of the numerous proposals.

5. The above procedure must be carefully prepared in adv. Copies of Gen Harrison’s statement wld be released to the press immed after the conf and shld be fold ASAP, and continued throughout the prd of recess. By approp, strong supporting public statements of allied and US leaders at the highest governmental levels, emphasizing that the UNC had offered 13 possible solutions which cld obtain an honorable armistice. This procedure shld secure the max national and international public support for any subsequent action the UNC may be required to take.

6. Step nr 2: If, upon reconvening the next plenary session, the Commies refuse to accept any of the proposals or to offer a satisfactory counter-proposal, it shld then be apparent that the Commies do not desire an armistice on terms acceptable to the UNC. At this time the UNC wld be in a most favorable psn to recess unilaterally for an indef prd and Gen Harrison shld be authorized to so recess at this time in accordance with conditions as stated. If we recess unilaterally, we wld agree to reconvene plenary sessions only after the enemy submitted in writing the text of any further proposals. This unilateral recess I consider essential if we are to retain the dignity and firmness of our psn.

7. At the time we recess unilaterally, it is my firm conviction that, for all practical purposes, the mil aspects of the negotiations will have been completed. Further discussion on a mil basis by the UNC wld be pointless and wld in fact further contribute to the serious loss of prestige which we have already suffered in dealing with the minor forces of Red China and North Korea, on an assumed equal footing. Unless mil force in excess of that now aval to me were to be applied to secure agreement to our armistice terms, it might then be logical to remove the ques of peace in Korea from the hands of the UNC.

8. This summarizes my eval of our psn today. I realize there are many factors which must be considered at governmental level with which I am not thoroughly familiar. However, I am convinced we must abandon our piecemeal efforts in favor of a carefully prepared, overall plan of action. I strongly recom that the foregoing course of action be given serious consideration and submit that it is highly preferable to that outlined in State msg 268 of 25 July 1952, on which I commented in my msg C 52788, for determining if the Commies really desire an armistice. I also consider it preferable to the course of action proposed in JCS 917260.⁷

1. Dated July 30, p. 427.
2. Dated July 7, p. 380.
3. Dated Aug. 8, p. 451.
4. This telegram to Tokyo was a repeat of telegram 92 to Moscow, July 25, p. 422.
5. Dated May 31, p. 270.
6. See Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 278 for a discussion of the UNC staff studies of possible courses of action.
7. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 467.