FE files, lot 55 D 128
Memorandum by the Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation (Harrison) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark)
Subject:
- State Department Paper on Solution to Prisoner of War Question, 9 July 1952, Copy 41
- 1.
- The following are United Nations Command Delegation comments on Chou En-lai’s “Alternative B”.
- 2.
a. Since we are already committed to rescreening after the Armistice if the enemy desires it, we feel that the United Nations Command could accept the suggested plan, provided we can insure certain safeguards. In view of past Communist actions it is our opinion that at the rescreening the Communists will use every possible expedient to persuade or intimidate prisoners to return to their side. Therefore the administration and handling of the prisoners in the neutral area and during rescreening must be such that no man is coerced by physical force or threats of physical force. It is essential that the integrity of the United States be maintained above reproach.
b. Although the particular form, place, time and procedure are subject to negotiatory agreement, the details should not be difficult to work out. Pan Mun Jom is a suitable site for rescreening. Before starting to Pan Mun Jom all prisoners to be rescreened should be fully informed [Page 405] as to the purpose of the trip, given assurances that they will be allowed to make their own decision, and promised that they will not be turned over to the Communists by force. We feel that these prisoners must be brought to Pan Mun Jom under guard. Regardless of our explanations, many of them will be extremely fearful that they are being turned over to the Communists and may try to escape.
c. We should not accept Chou’s allegations that these prisoners are now under the influence of Kuomintang or Rhee agents, as implied by the wording of his proposal. We must not accept the presumption that all prisoners, prima facie, want to be repatriated, but rather that any person who has previously indicated he would resist repatriation will be brought to the rescreening point and allowed to make his own decision.
d. Since the Communists have never claimed that any of our people have refused to return to our control and have repeatedly insisted that it is their intention to return all of the approximately 12,000 United Nations Command prisoners of war, we should insist on the full exchange of our 12,000 for the 83,000 prior to initiation of rescreening. (We would, of course, carefully check the lists and require an accounting for the many United Nations Command prisoners of war whom they have failed to include.)
- 3.
- As an over-all comment, there will be opportunities for the Communists to argue, cavil, and delay, if they desire. Whereas the Armistice Agreement requires complete exchange of prisoners of war within sixty days, it is possible that the addition of this rescreening may provide opportunities for the Communists to cause extended delays beyond that period of time. They may hold out some of our prisoners of war until the rescreening is completed. Meanwhile they will enjoy the benefits of an armistice. If this plan is adopted I see no alternative but to enter into it in good faith with the hope that the Communists will do the same.