795.00/7–952
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State1
Subject:
- Recent Developments in Korea
Armistice Negotiations
No progress has been made following the entry into executive sessions which began on July 4 at the request of the Communists. The Communists have made it unmistakably clear that their position is: (1) All the 20,000 Chinese held by the UNC must be returned; (2) The figure of Koreans to be repatriated must be “realistic” although there is obviously considerable flexibility in their position on this.
This, of course, represents no change in their position which has been adroitly and carefully explored by Harrison. In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to understand why they asked for the executive sessions. One possible explanation is that they wrongly interpreted Harrison’s carefully phrased and temperate statement of July 1 as foreshadowing a change in the UNC position or, as Harrison believes, they are waiting for us to come forward with a counter-proposal.
Harrison and Clark recommended that the UNC Delegation now inform the Communists of final results of the UNC screening which has been completed. (These results are approximately 86,000 non-repatriates—72,000 Koreans and 14,000 Chinese—and 83,000 available for repatriation—77,000 Koreans and 6,000 Chinese.) This failing to achieve agreement, Harrison and Clark have recommended they be authorized to propose a plan at Panmunjom under which non-repatriates would, upon conclusion of an armistice, be turned over to a “group of neutral nations” for control and supervision and the conducting of interviews to determine the prisoners’ desires. Their proposal would also embody a commitment by the UNC not to permit Chinese non-repatriates to proceed to Formosa.
We consider that it would not be wise for the UNC Delegation to introduce the figure on the results of the completion of the screening at this time—the Communists have made it clear that the revised figure would not be acceptable and our raising the figure from 70,000 to 83,000 following the Communist mention of the 110,000 figure may give them the impression that we are prepared to bargain on the figure. We also have some serious doubts on the practicability of Clark’s proposal for turning the prisoners over to a group of neutrals. We discussed the whole subject with the JCS on July 9.2 The JCS is in general agreement, and General Collins, who leaves for a visit to Tokyo and Korea the morning of July 10, is to discuss the matter with General Clark and General Harrison and submit his recommendations, probably about July 13 or 14.
[Page 397]Panikkar–Chou En-lai Proposals
There have been no further developments through this channel. It now appears doubtful whether Menon even transmitted to New Delhi the text of our reply to Chou En-lai’s Alternative B which we discussed with the UK Embassy June 20 and which was subsequently discussed by the UK Foreign Office with Menon. We have also not been able to determine what instructions were actually sent by the Government of India to the Indian Charge at Peking. (Panikkar has now departed from Peking.) We are greatly concerned that the Chinese may be obtaining a very incomplete and inaccurate concept of our views. All we know is that instructions of some kind were sent to the Indian Chargé and that, being unsuccessful in seeing Chou En-lai, he saw the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs about two weeks ago. We have told the UK Embassy that this matter is too vital to be left to the vagaries and uncertainties of Menon’s reporting and strongly suggested that, as a means of removing one weak link in the channel of communication, the Foreign Office consider having the UK High Commissioner at New Delhi deal directly with Nehru or the Indian Foreign Office on the question. We have also urged on the British the great importance of determining what in fact the Indian Chargé at Peking has said to the Chinese.
Zinchenko Approach to Gross
As Zinchenko’s statements to Gross at the Security Council dinner on June 273 appeared to bear some similarities to Chou En-lai’s Alternative B and as no results were being achieved through the Indian channel, Gross was instructed on July 8 to attempt casually to see Zinchenko prior to the latter’s departure for the Soviet Union July 9, outlining to him Chou En-lai’s Alternative B without indicating its source. Gross was to ask Zinchenko if this was the type of thing which Zinchenko had in mind in his previous conversation, in order (1) to determine, if possible, whether Zinchenko was making a specific suggestion on behalf of the Communists; (2) to determine whether this suggestion was the same as that reported by Panikkar or in what respects it differed; and (3) to indicate to the Communists that we were not disinterested in the Zinchenko approach. However, Zinchenko refused to see Gross, saying that he was “too busy with packing”.
Korean Internal Situation
With the passage by the Assembly on July 4 of the compromise constitutional amendment, the Korean internal crisis appears to have resolved itself, at least for the time being. However, we do not yet have any word that martial law has been lifted in Pusan although Rhee has ordered a new trial for the Assemblyman sentenced to death by court [Page 398] martial for the murder of an Army captain. Censorship has been lifted from the local press and the relay of VOA restored.
The compromise amendment appears to be a sensible and, from our standpoint, acceptable solution to the crisis. Briefly it provides: (1) popular election of the President; (2) a bicameral legislature, both houses of which to be popularly elected; (3) a greater degree of Cabinet responsibility to the Assembly.