State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extract]
. . . . . . .
Negotiations in Korea
General Bradley: I was talking to you yesterday on the phone, Doc, and thought it might be useful to talk here about negotiations. We told Clark we had the second part of his message2 under study. We also said the Commie proposal discussed in Part 1 was close to one of Chou En-lai’s alternatives. It might be a first step toward agreement. (General Bradley then read a draft message3 to Clark on this matter.)
The question is should not we discuss Part 2 and Chou En-lai’s alternative B now. Also, one of your experts ought to read over this message from Clark4 to see if there is any hidden meaning in the Commie language.
Mr. Bohlen: I have read it over with a fine-tooth comb and I see nothing new. I don’t know why they put forward something they have been saying for months.
General Bradley: We cannot find anything new.
Mr. Bohlen: The subsequent remarks in the first statement might be read as saying that we could reclassify the Chinese and North Koreans, but the next part says they don’t mean that.
General Bradley: Do you think Nam Il will come up with alternative B soon?
[Page 387]Mr. Johnson: Harrison thinks he won’t and thinks he is waiting for us.
General Bradley: If we thought they were coming up with alternative B we should wait. If we propose something like B they would probably turn it down. Is there anything to be gained by our proposing something?
Mr. Matthews: We have discussed that this morning and we don’t know.
Mr. Nitze: There are dangers in a proposal. You start with the principle that every prisoner is presumed to desire repatriation and then add an exception. They might accept the principle and not the exception.
General Collins: That worries me. They suggest moving the prisoners without guards, which is utterly impracticable.
Mr. Johnson: Could you do it in small groups?
General Bradley: Yes, you could do it in small groups.
Mr. Hickerson: If you had an agreement I think those difficulties could be handled.
General Collins: Well, we had to shoot some who were trying to get out of the new compound.
Mr. Matthews: If that were the only problem I think we could find some way to handle it.
General Collins: As far as I am concerned, if you could get them up in the north somewhere and they all decided to go back it would suit me.
Mr. Matthews: If the first group did that you would have difficulty with the next group.
General Bradley: If some took off across country, you would have trouble catching them.
Mr. Johnson: We did not understand that Clark was saying he would turn them over to neutrals.
General Collins: I will discuss that with Clark and Billy Harrison in Korea.
General Bradley: We talked some about using the Indians. That may be where Clark got the idea.
General Collins: Could you get any neutrals to accept this job? I doubt it.
Mr. Matthews: There were some questions on Part II which we have listed.
(Mr. Matthews handed General Bradley a copy of Mr. Johnson’s paper, which General Bradley read. Attached.)5
Mr. Nitze: We have discussed the possibility of turning the Chinese over to the Indians and letting the Indians deal with all of them.
[Page 388]General Collins: The only thing in the message they are trying to make clear is that they want all of the Chinese back.
General Bradley: Couldn’t we list all the people with Chinese names so that on the surface it would look like 20,000? We don’t have to publish the list and we don’t have to separate the Chinese from the North Koreans. It is a little dirty pool but I am beginning to think in terms of dirty pool. We can have Collins ask the question and send a message back.
General Collins: The other matter is whether we should submit alternative B.
Mr. Nitze: I thought we ought to be clear in our own minds whether we should work out something that would be acceptable to us. Do you take the prisoners up to the tent. Do you just explain and let the POWs make the choice so that there is no need for judgment on the part of the neutral supervisors. And there is the question of how you get them up north and what you do in the camps before hand.
General Bradley: There is still another thing that might fit in. Suppose you say that they can come down and get them and we will have neutral observers there. We can give them an LST to take them back. We would say we would not let them use force and take anybody back. That is a slight variation of alternative B.
General Collins: Even an LST wouldn’t carry them all.
General Bradley: You wouldn’t want to do it all in one trip.
Mr. Bohlen: You would only be dealing with those that said they didn’t want to go back, so the number would not be very large.
General Collins: That’s a possibility. Another suggestion would be to take off fifty at a time. We could put that many on a plane—C–47—and fly them to a field near Panmunjom and have them checked there. Those who didn’t want to go back could get on a plane and fly south.
General Twining: I am afraid they would run back and forth in the planes in a riot.
General Bradley: I don’t know what the advantage of a plane is.
General Collins: Well, it is easy to take small numbers at a time that way.
General Bradley: There must be some way you could figure out an alternative of B.
Mr. Johnson: We have done some work on that. (A draft memorandum on this subject is attached.6) We ought to know what we would like to see done.
General Collins: It would be far simpler for them to come down to the camps.
Mr. Nitze: I feel there would be difficulties on their side in coming down.
[Page 389]General Collins: There is no railroad line to Panmunjom. How do you march them up there without a guard?
General Bradley: They would all escape.
Mr. Nitze: You could have some kind of neutral guard.
Mr. Hickerson: If you took a group up and an appreciable number said they did not want to go back to the Commies and you returned them to the camps you would have less trouble with later groups.
Mr. Johnson: The difficulty is, who is the “somebody” to whom we would turn them over at Panmunjom.
Mr. Nitze: You would need some kind of guards. Maybe joint patrols as in Vienna for the mile or so they would have to travel.
General Collins: It is more than a mile or so.
Mr. Johnson: They were building a railroad to Panmunjom when we were out there.
General Bradley: You could get them within marching distance.
Mr. Matthews: We were thinking of the possibility of using the Indians.
General Collins: They don’t want to check on the screening on Koje-Do.
Mr. Hickerson: They would feel differently about this. We don’t think we would want to use the Neutral Armistice Commission. We would prefer a different group.
Mr. Nitze: If the Commies agreed, the Indians would certainly do it.
Colonel Matthews: You have a joint guard in Panmunjom right now. You might use that.
Mr. Johnson: Then you could have them interviewed by the Indians, say, with Red Cross observers from both sides.
Mr. Nitze: You want to set it up so that the interview would be just an explanation, so the prisoners would have a free choice. The Indians would not have to decide anything.
General Bradley: Is this something that Collins should talk over when he is out there?
Mr. Matthews: Yes, it would be useful.
General Collins: I would be glad to.
General Bradley: I doubt whether the Commies would accept that. It gives the POWs a choice.
Mr. Hickerson: We have had only one indication on this matter.
Mr. Matthews: Well, we had some indication from Zinchenko also.
Mr. Bohlen: Zinchenko wasn’t as specific as Chou En-lai.
Mr. Matthews: We have tried to have Gross see Zinchenko but we don’t know whether he will be able to.
Colonel Matthews: We assume we have no problem with South Koreans. We could say we agree on the Koreans, so we are only in dispute about the fifteen or sixteen thousand Chinese, and only these [Page 390] really need to be subject to further checking. That makes it more manageable.
Mr. Johnson: Yes.
Colonel Matthews: I don’t know whether we want to separate the Chinese and the Koreans that way.
General Bradley: Is that desirable?
General Collins: I have assumed that is what we were doing. Even thirteen thousand would take a hell of a long time.
Mr. Nitze: Taking five hundred a day, it would take a month.
General Bradley: You could increase the number in the groups after the first ones came back.
Mr. Bohlen: What I don’t know is whether Chou was giving a solid position. The only supporting event is this Zinchenko thing which is not so clear. What is going on in the tent seems to indicate that it is not yet the line. If it is firm, I don’t think the details will be too hard to work out. I persist in thinking that Panmunjom is not so important if they accept the idea of the prisoners having a choice. If they make a choice in the neutral zone, it is a worse black eye. If they come and get them they can fuzz the matter up. I think the agreement giving prisoners a choice has only a slim chance.
General Bradley: Didn’t Harrison ask the Commies how they suggested we do this.
Mr. Johnson: We told him to say that, but I don’t know whether he has asked it or not.
General Bradley: Yes he did ask, but he got no clear answer.
[Here follows a short discussion on the advisability of publicizing for propaganda purposes early treaties signed by the Soviet Union, including the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, on repatriation of prisoners. Bohlen was opposed to using them at Panmunjom.]
Mr. Bohlen: I wonder if the time is getting close when Kennan ought to talk to the Russians. We are worried about the Indians. It can be dangerous to have the Indians interpret the U.S. Government views.
Mr. Hickerson: It is clear that Zinchenko didn’t want to be used. Shouldn’t we consider whether we want to propose something like Chou En-lai’s alternative B? Kennan might do it with the Russians along with the point about the Russian treaties.
Mr. Bohlen: There are a lot of different ways of doing these things. The Secretary gets back today and we would want to discuss the matter with him.
General Bradley: Don’t wait until Saturday night to do it.
Is there anything else?
Mr. Johnson: Well, with respect to Part I of the message, if Clark comes back and says he wants to do this shall we wait until General Collins gets there to talk to him?
[Page 391]General Bradley: A lot can be accomplished by sitting down and discussing a subject. Chip and I learned that when we were out there.
Mr. Bohlen: Yes, that is certainly right.
Mr. Matthews: I think the Commies would regard this as giving something new away.
Mr. Bohlen: Well, if you follow the gambit of separating the Koreans and Chinese, you might mention a number.
Mr. Stelle: You might mention the number of North Koreans who would be returned.
Mr. Hickerson: I don’t think we will advance it much here.
Mr. Johnson: I think we should not authorize a new number pending General Collins’ talk with him.
General Collins: I thoroughly agree. You would be throwing in the last card and weakening the position. I will be in Tokyo on Saturday and I am going to Korea Sunday. I think it inadvisable to call Harrison back to talk. Clark will probably go to Korea with me, but it will be hard to have Harrison meet with us without knowledge of it getting out in the press.
Mr. Bohlen: That would be perfectly normal anyway, as I understand it. Then if something comes in from Clark we should reply that General Collins will discuss it.
. . . . . . .
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A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS as well as Vice Chief General Twining. Matthews headed up the Department of State contingent; Admiral Page Smith represented the Department of Defense. In all 20 persons were present. In addition to Korea, the Middle East Command and Yugoslavia were discussed at this meeting.
↩ - The reference was to telegram CX 51489, Clark to JCS, July 7, p. 380.↩
- Presumably the message which Bradley read was JCS 912998 to Clark, July 8, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128). If this is the case, it had already been sent the day before the State–JCS meeting and it was incorrectly described as a “draft”.↩
- The reference was to telegram C 51435, Clark to JCS, July 6, 1952, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 380.↩
- The paper was not attached to the source text; for its text, see supra.↩
- The draft memorandum was not attached to the source text; for its text, see infra.↩