Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, July 7, 1952—7:20 p.m.

CX 51489. This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

1. Re C 51435¹ which is HNC 1370. Since the Communists have introduced the question of numbers and appear to be interested in a new accounting of POWs, I intend, in the next two or three days, unless you have contrary views, to authorize the UNC Delegation to present to the Communists a round number of persons to be repatriated to the Communists, plus those to be released in South Korea. This will be introduced as a total of 121,000, broken down as follows: (Note: Parenthetical figures in subparas a and b below, are for your info only. Do not contemplate giving this info to Communists at this time.)

a. Koreans who are to be repatriated to Communist control—76,500 (62,000 NK POWs plus 4,500 SK POWs who desire to go to NK plus 10,000 civilian internees who desire to go to NK);

b. Koreans whose homes are in SK and who are to be released to return directly to their homes—38,100 (11,700 SK POWs plus 26,400 CIs currently being released);

c. Chinese People’s Volunteers to be repatriated to Communist control—6,400.

2. Concurrent with the presentation of the new figure, the following points will be stressed:

a. Emphasis on the care with which the final figure has been prepared.

b. Request for a similar accounting of the UNC prisoners in Communist custody, with a reminder that they have never given us a satisfactory accounting of the prisoners they admitted having captured but who were never reported to us on any prisoner of war list.

c. Request for a date to be set for the exchange of lists, in accordance with Article 51 of the Armistice Agreement, indicating that we will have our list by 1 August.

d. Reiteration of our previous proposals to permit individual interviews of NK and CCF non-repatriates by a bilaterally acceptable neutral organization, or joint teams with or without military representation; such interviewing to take place after the signing of the armistice with both sides agreeing to abide by the results of the free expression of choice by each individual interviewed. (It may be feasible to restrict the offer of these interviews to non-repatriated Chinese POWs only. This course of action could be defended on the basis that the release by our side in South Korea of the North Korean non-repatriates parallels the unilateral action, admitted by the NK Communists, of releasing from a POW status SK captured personnel, most of whom were converted to members of the NK Army.)

3. If, as we expect, the Communists continue to reject the rescreening of non-repatriates after an armistice and have not made any proposal as to the disposition of the non-repatriates that would be in accord with the principles of both sides, I believe we should ask them by direct questioning for their solution on the disposition of the Chinese and NK non-repatriates.

Part 2.

1. If we fail to secure an armistice as the result of the action set forth in Part 1 I feel that we should be prepared to present a reasonable solution to the disposition of the Chinese and NK non-repatriates. In C 51435 the Communists have stated in quite clear terms that the principal issue remaining to be solved prior to securing an armistice is the ultimate disposition of the Chinese Communist POWs. It should not be inferred that I am ignoring the disposition of the NK non-repatriates; this remains an important issue however, I believe a solution acceptable to the Chinese Communists will be accepted by the North Koreans. In addition they have left us a loop hole whereby at least a small portion of North Korean non-repatriates may be released in accordance with their stated position that all captured military personnel must be released and allowed to return home. The homes of a portion of these personnel lie north of the 38th Parallel but south of the present front lines and might therefore not have to be repatriated.

2. The Communists have also stated that any unilateral action on our part with regard to the POWs held in our custody would undermine the entire basis of the present armistice discussions.

3. In view of their previously announced opposition to screening or rescreening, I feel that a new proposal must be developed and presented to the Communists. Such proposal should not include any rescreening or require unilateral action on our part. It should be made as attractive to the Chinese Communists as possible and still not require any deviation from our firm position of no forced repatriation. I believe the solution proposed below embodies these necessary characteristics. In brief, this solution to which I believe we should give very serious consideration is as follows:

a. An armistice would be signed on presently agreed terms except for several paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to repatriation of POWs.

b. These few paragraphs would be so modified as to permit the following:

(1) Repatriation and release upon the armistice becoming effective of all POWs who expressed a desire to be repatriated or who can be released to proceed directly to their homes.

(2) Upon signing the armistice the supervision, control, and responsibility for the determination as to the ultimate disposition (see (3)) of all POWs of both sides who have not been previously repatriated or released would be passed to a group of neutral nations.

(3) Both sides would agree in the armistice to abide by the decision of such neutral group as to disposition of non-repatriates with the stipulation that no CCF POWs would be permitted to proceed to the control of the Nationalist Chinese. (The Communists have been adamant in their stand that they would never consent to having any CCF POW turned over to the Chinese Nationalists.) Subject to this stipulation, personal preference of the individual would be the primary factor in determining ultimate disposition of non-repatriates.

(4) Ultimate disposition of POWs to be determined within a specified period of time.

(5) Under supervision of neutral nations, both sides would be given an opportunity to persuade non-repatriates of their respective sides in custody of the group of neutral nations to return to their control and proceed to their homes and lead peaceful lives.

(6) Both sides would deliver to each prisoner in dispute a duly authenticated amnesty agreement to insure safety of the individual and his family.

4. The Communists may attempt to retain some of our own POWs in status of non-repatriates, in fact, hostages. Any proposal in the nature of that discussed above would thus have to insure that any United Nations POWs retained by the Communists would also be placed under custody of such a neutral group.

5. I am in no position to properly evaluate the political and international aspects of this proposal nor the effect on my Government or the United Nations were this proposal to be adopted. If the political and international aspects do not appear insurmountable and any adverse effects on my Government or the United Nations is acceptable, I recommend that I be authorized, to propose to the Communists, the foregoing as an honorable solution to the disputed question of repatriation of prisoners of war if action set forth in Part 1 above fails to produce an armistice.

1. In this telegram, dated July 6, Clark relayed to the JCS Harrison’s report of the meeting at Panmunjom of that same day during which the Communist Delegate insisted inter alia that the only solution to the POW impasse was for the UNC to return the 20,000 captured personnel of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (FE files, lot 55 D 128).