Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

top secret
routine

CX 51399. Ref JCS 912098, 26 [25] Jun,2 CX 50901, 27 Jun,3 DA 912291, 28 Jun.4

1.
The detailed plans referred to in para 3 of CX 50901 have been prepared covering a series of eventualities. These plans have been coordinated with Eighth Army and discussed with Muccio. I had my rep meet with UNCURK and explain my plan but UNCURK has not been apprised of the existence of any plans for intervention.
2.
Ref para 4a, part 2 of JCS 912098—do not cons that UNCURK, Embassy and CINCUNC jointly shld present any demands on Rhee until decisive action has been rqst by the nations involved and all plans have been perfected for subsequent action if demands are not complied with. Ref para 4b, part 2 of JCS 912098—I do not believe that I shld recommend to US JCS that intervention be auth based on a rqst fr UNCURK and my rep has not informed UNCURK. In my opin proper procedure wld be for UNCURK to pres their recommendations through their normal rptg channels. UNCURK undoubtedly feels that CINCUNC shld make strong stand vis-à-vis Rhee but seems unwilling to anticipate any subsequent action in case strong stand by CINCUNC is ignored by Rhee.
3.
Ref para 5 of JCS 912098—the principles gen agreed to are that in any action short of estab of a UNC govt the symbol of the ROK Govt [Page 378] shld be preserved and that the action in the name of the UNC shld be called “assistance” even though the assumption of a certain amt of control wld be neces. The use of the ROK Army alone is not considered advisable since it might precipitate a form of civil war, or if such did not result, then later, enmities caused by the ROK Army action might result in serious repercussions against individuals in the ROK Army who acted against their own countrymen. I cons it preferable to use a majority of ROKA troops augmented by UN troops under UNC command.
4.
I am prepared to take action in case widespread disorders affecting my mission suddenly break out. If there were time, it would be preferable that any action taken wld be at the rqst of the nations actively participating in the conflict against Communist aggression in Korea.
5.
It is not consd here that this matter shld be refd to the Security Council of the United Nations since this wld result in publicity being given the plan prematurely and wld permit Rhee to organize his resistance against foreign intervention.
6.
In order to be prepared in case intervention becomes neces, I am having a detailed plan prepared along the fol lines:
a.
Pres Rhee wld be invited to visit in Seoul or elsewhere—anywhere to get him out of Pusan.
b.
At an apptd time the UNC comdr wld move in to the Pusan area and seize between 5 and 10 key ROK officials who have been ldrs in Rhee’s dictatorial actions, protect all UNC installations and ROK installations deemed advisable, and take over the control of martial law through the Chief of Staff, ROK Army, until it is lifted.
c.
Rhee wld then be informed of the action taken as a “fait accompli”. He wld be urged to sign a proclamation lifting martial law, permitting Natl Assembly freedom of action and estab freedom of the press and radio without interference fr his various strong armed agencies.
d.
If Pres Rhee wld not agree to issue the proclamation, he wld be held in protective custody incommunicado and a similar proclamation wld be presented to Prime Min Chang Taek-Sang.
e.
It is believed here that Prime Min wld agree. However, if he does not, it wld then be neces to take further steps approaching a UNC interim govt.
f.
In the event that either Rhee or Chang agree statements wld be released to the press to the eff that it had been neces for mil rsns and (if appropriate) at the rqst of the nations participating in the conflict for the UNC to step in and remove certain individuals who had been taking illegal actions which interfered with the United Nations Mission. These statements wld stress the fact that the ROK Govt was taking the action and was being assisted by the UNC.
7.
Since 10 of the Assemblymen have been released and since the Natl Assembly passed a compromise constitutional amendment last night, it is consd here that the polit sit in the Rep of Korea will shortly return to normal. In order to be prepared for any eventuality, gen plan [Page 379] refd to in para 1 and plan outlined in para 6 above will be completed and filed here for future use if neces.
  1. This telegram was sent separately to Muccio, Van Fleet, and Herren for their information.
  2. Ante, p. 358; the reference telegram was sent on June 25, EST, and presumably it was dated by CINCUNC according to the time of arrival in Tokyo.
  3. In this telegram to the JCS Clark stated that, for the present, he believed that all representations to Rhee from the UNC which would serve any useful purpose had been made. However, he thought it wise to continue diplomatic pressure on Rhee and believed Muccio and UNCURK were in the best position to take such action. To prevent suspicions from being aroused as to the existence of a plan for intervention in South Korea, Clark suggested that he and Muccio not meet for the moment, but that coordination take place at the staff level. Clark informed the JCS that he and his staff had been working on a detailed plan for intervention and that both he and Van Fleet believed that the ROK Chief of Staff and ROK forces would be loyal to the UNC (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).
  4. In this telegram the Army Chief of Staff informed CINCFE that the JCS agreed that Clark and Muccio should not meet and the contact should be at the staff level. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)