Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

FE files, lot 55 D 128: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, July 3, 1952—4:46 p.m.

JCS 912791. From JCS.

1. Ur C 51282¹ and C 51286² are encouraging. This development, together with approach outlined JCS 911932³ and what may be parallel suggestion by a Soviet official in UN (details being transmitted in sep msg), appears significant. However, a literal reading of Commie statement in C 51282 wld not appear to indicate any basic change in Commie position. It may in fact be that our bringing up subj of wording of Article 51 has been misinterpreted by Commies as indicating change in UNC position. Accordingly, we believe that UNC Del must proceed cautiously, fully exploring Commie position, and seeking as clear meeting of minds as possible with Commies on interpretation of Article 51 prior to UNC making any firm commitment as to lists or numbers. In this connection it appears obvious that main problem remains question of disposition of Chinese. We have no clear solution to this problem but are entirely flexible and open minded on any solutions within framework principle nonforcible repatriation which may suggest themselves as result further negots. If disposition of Chi POWs not repatriated appears as final and only bar to agreement on POW issue we wld appreciate ur estimate as to whether a firm commitment not to send these POWs to Formosa might result in agreement to armistice. Request ur views and suggestions on this point as negots develop. Meanwhile, however, in accordance with previous guidance, you are auth to make clear to Commies if question raised by them that we have no plans for disposition such POWs and that their ultimate designation is entirely question of individual desires.

In view of foregoing:

a. UNC Del shld proceed to explore Commie position and seek as clear meeting of minds as possible with Commies on interpretation Article 51. We agree that executive sessions offer best climate for accomplishing this.

b. We believe best chance of obtaining Commie agreement may lie in avoiding discussion or use of numbers and reference to “screening” or “rescreening”, and leading negots directly to point to which each side wld exchange lists. It appears here that by avoiding discussion of numbers and “screening” or “rescreening” Commies may be able to accept our proposal without having, on record, accepted principles applied by US in compiling lists or acknowledging the relatively small number of POWs who are willing to return to Commie control. In presenting the UNC list to Commies UNC Del shld represent it as full compilation of POWs available for repatriation avoiding emphasis upon finality of list. However, on other hand, UNC Del shld do all possible to avoid giving Commies impression that this list represents merely another intermediate bargaining position on part of UNC.

c. If tactics set forth in Subpara b above not successful and Commies insist on discussion numbers either prior to or fol exchange of lists, you are auth, at time of ur discretion, to submit new figures of POWs available for repatriation to Commies. When and if new figure is submitted to Commies, believed proposed statement in ur CX 51216⁴ shld be revised to take into account sit as it has then developed. However, in this connection, we believe preferable to avoid emphasis upon finality of figure and continue to avoid use of words “screening” and “rescreening”. It wld appear more desirable to stress impartial and objective manner in which figure was obtained, and that it represents best figure UNC can reach at this time. If Commies clearly reject figure UNC Del position shld be that UNC always ready consider any reasonable proposal Commies may have for impartial verification of figure either before or after an armistice has entered into effect.

d. Foregoing shld be considered only as general guidance subj to modification as negots develop. We desire to give you all possible latitude at this critical stage of negots and are prepared promptly to act upon ur recommendations for such changes as may be considered desirable during progress negots.

3. Presume that you will solicit cooperation of local press representatives in preserving executive nature of discussions as long as sessions are continued and respected by Commies.

1. Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 369.
2. Supra.
3. Dated June 23, p. 347.
4. Dated July 2, p. 372.