Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/6–2452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

top secret
priority

Washington, June 24, 1952—7:39 p.m.

Tosec 14.² Mtgs were held between Dept and Selwyn Lloyd June 23 and 24³ and between Alexander, Lovett and Bradley on June 23. Bruce and Matthews participated in mtg between Lovett, Bradley and Alexander afternoon June 23.

Lloyd spoke in glowing terms of impressions he and Alexander had recd on way things being handled in Korea and success in welding diverse UN forces into homogeneous fighting unit. Impressed with job Boatner has done in cleaning up Koje. Also Lloyd, on basis personal questioning number of individual North Koreans classified as resisting repatriation and discussions with US officers charged screening Chi, expressed full satisfaction with screening and accuracy of results. Lloyd also expressed satisfaction with UNC Civil Info and Education program among POWs.

Lloyd asked for US views on “strong” joint US–UK representations to Rhee or preferably by Clark to Rhee involving nine-point program, viz.: (1) constitutional compromise embodying Rhee’s proposal for popular election Pres and bicameral legislature and Assembly’s proposals for increased Assembly power over govt; (2) lifting martial law; (3) release arrested Assemblymen without prejudice subsequent trials; (4) trials of Assemblymen to be in civil courts open to public; (5) free elections possibly under some form independent observation; (6) no purge polit opponents and no death sentences to be carried out for polit offenses; (7) removal of some of Rhee’s advisers and officials such as Lee Bum Suk; (8) freedom of Army from polit interference and polit appointments; (9) cessation of anti-foreign propaganda. Lloyd apparently thinking in terms of ultimatum type approach to Rhee by Clark making clear that if Rhee accepts, all agreeable that he continue as Pres. Dept agreed take UK views under consideration. Dept also pointed out importance of knowing what we are able and willing to do if Rhee refuses demand.

Lloyd also raised with Dept, and Alexander and Lloyd with Defense assignment of Brit Deputy Chief of Staff to UNC. Defense indicated receptivity to this proposal but desired to consider and discuss further in US Govt before giving definitive reply. FYI only JCS have stated desire discuss this with Dept at mtg June 25.⁴ Dept will take position that from polit standpoint we support UK proposal provided UK obtains agreement other Commonwealth countries having forces in Korea that such representation will also cover their interests.

At mtg Noon, June 24, Lloyd expressed considerable concern over UK reaction to bombing Yalu River power plant. Made points (1) that at talks between you and Morrison September 11, 1951,⁵ UK had assented to US view that in event breakdown armistice negotiations, among other measures Yalu River dam and power installations wld be bombed, there thus being at least implied commitment by US not to bomb under other circumstances except after consultation; (2) that it was common public knowledge that during “MacArthur period” there had been restrictions on bombing Yalu dam even fol entering Chi Commies into hostilities, and therefore polit significance, particularly in UK public opinion, was inevitably attached to bombing dams at this time; (3) that although power installations bombed were entirely in North Korean territory it was known that installations also supplies [supply] considerable power to Manchuria and therefore could not be said objective attack was simply cutting off power North Korean industries and facilities. Dept reps replied that they not aware of any commitment requiring consultation prior to bombing Yalu power plants within NK and that decision do so did not represent any change whatever in either polit or mil policy of UNC. Decision bomb plants and timing dictated entirely by mil considerations. Also emphasized that attacks were directed only against power installations all of which on Korean side river and not against dam.

Subsequently Dept also pointed out to UK Emb which is transmitting to FonOff that Yalu plant was only one of five plants included in coordinated attack upon power installations and that while Yalu plant also supplied power Manchuria its operable capacity available to North Korea represented 40 per cent of all operable hydroelectric capacity available to North Korea. We referred also to press reports which we cld yet confirm that Pyongyang including Pyongyang radio had been entirely blacked out ever since raid.

Alexander raised with Bradley and Lovett question of polit adviser for Clark devoted solely to CINCUNC matters. Defense reps replied Clark was not in favor. Lloyd also raised same question with Dept which replied question wld be considered.

Bruce

1. This telegram was drafted by Johnson and cleared by Perkins and Matthews.
2. On June 22, Acheson left Washington for London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rio de Janeiro as well as minor stopping points for refueling the Presidential plant Independence, which Truman had lent him. The trip was essentially ceremonial; for more information, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1544–1548, and Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 658–670.
3. Fuller accounts of these discussions can be found in files 795.00/6–2352 and 795.00/6–2525, respectively.
4. The extract of the State–JCS meeting of June 25, p. 356, does not include discussion of this question. The matter was only briefly discussed. The plan was agreeable to the JCS who thought it should be cleared by the President. Truman agreed (Telac 4 to London, June 25, 1952; 795.00/6–2552).
5. See the U.S. Delegation minutes, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 893.