FE files, lot 55 D 128
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)1
Subject:
- Panikkar’s Report of Communist Proposal on Prisoner of War Question
Participants:
- Sir Christopher Steel2
- Mr. Dennis Greenhill
- Mr. John D. Hickerson
- Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
- Mr. Louis Henkin
Sir Christopher Steel and Mr. Greenhill called to obtain our preliminary reactions to the report of Panikkar’s conversations with Chou En-lai3 which the British had given to us the previous day. Sir Christopher stated that they now had another report on the same Panikkar–Chou conversations from the UK High Commissioner. This report accords pretty well with the one which had been reported previously by the Indian High Commissioner in London. There is no difference in the two versions of alternative “a”. In alternative “b” the UK High Commissioner reports Chou told Panikkar that there should be agreement in principle on the provisions of the Geneva Convention and that in implementation thereof the steps outlined should be taken. This second version of the report spoke of a “neutral place”, not specifically Panmunjom, as the place to which PWs would be brought; it made no mention of the Red Cross teams of both sides; and it spoke in terms of “recommendations” by the neutral commission, rather than a determination by this commission of the desires of the PW who allegedly refused repatriation. The report added that Chou En-lai also complained that agents of Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek had been smuggled into the camps. He also complained about the tone which the UNC delegation was taking in the negotiations.
[Page 345]I told Sir Christopher that it was our impression that the Chinese Communists have not put anything in writing and that we have only reports based on Panikkar’s recollection. Sir Christopher agreed that that was his impression also. In the circumstances, I continued, … the reports must be viewed with care, but I agreed that the matter should be followed up “cautiously but promptly”. Dismissing alternative “a”, I stated that alternative “b” has interesting possibilities. If the Communists really want an armistice this might be a reasonable basis for achieving it and offers them a face-saving device. There are, however, several points requiring clarification and elaboration and our initial question is what is the best way of getting it.
Sir Christopher agreed and stated that our reaction was exactly his. We discussed possible channels of communication with the Chinese Communists and discarded the possibility of using the UK Chargé at Peiping, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, the Swedish Representative in Peiping, or a direct approach by the US or the UK to Moscow. We agreed that it would be best to continue with India as the channel, and to let the Government of India itself decide what is the best way of getting a message to Peiping.
I then suggested that in our view the kind of message which the Indians should send to Peiping would read as follows:
“The alternative proposal ‘b’ which Chou En-lai is reported to have offered as a possibility for breaking the deadlock in the armistice negotiations, is interesting and would seem to offer possibilities for progress. There are, however, a number of points in regard to this proposal which require clarification and elaboration. It would be desirable to know what channel or machinery would, in Chou En-lai’s view, be appropriate for such clarification and elaboration.”
We would hope that the Indians would use this language, without indicating US authorship, but describing this as the US reaction in which the UK concurred. Sir Christopher agreed with this approach and suggested that it might be even better if this message were represented as the UK reaction in which the US concurred. I indicated we would have no objection and that we would leave that matter to the UK Foreign Office.
I then informed Sir Christopher of some of the points in the message which, in our preliminary reaction, seemed to require elaboration or clarification. For example, is it intended that this interviewing of PWs by a neutral commission should take place before or after an armistice? Would the steps outlined be written into the armistice agreement? How could resisting PWs be brought to Panmunjom except under a “military escort” (Mr. Johnson pointed out that we may have trouble getting them there even under military escort, since these are persons who would resist repatriation and who might not have full faith in the outcome of this proceeding). We also wished to know whether persons not [Page 346] resisting repatriation would be exchanged before this procedure begins since we are, of course, anxious to obtain the return of our own PWs. Also, what if there is disagreement among the neutrals as to what the true wishes of a PW are? I cited these merely as examples of questions which occurred to us on a preliminary reading, stressing, of course, that since we have nothing in writing there is no point in weighing the exact language of something which is only one person’s recollection of a conversation. Sir Christopher agreed. He did express that in his opinion the Communists probably do want an armistice and would want to use this method as a means for resolving the impasse while saving face. He thought the proposed procedure would be written into the armistice agreement and would be carried out after an armistice goes into effect. He agreed, however, that there are questions which require elaboration.
I told Sir Christopher that we have not told either our people in New Delhi, or at USUN of these latest developments and that we considered it important that as few as possible know about them. In about a week, however, when Ambassador Bowles returns to New Delhi, we intend to inform him fully, and we hope that the UK Foreign Office would instruct its High Commissioner at New Delhi to work closely with Ambassador Bowles. I expressed the hope also, since Sir Christopher indicated that Sir Gladwyn Jebb and the Commonwealth countries have already been informed, that these would be urged to exercise the greatest discretion and to discuss the matter with no one.