Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

[Extract]

top secret

Washington, May 28, 1952—11 a.m.

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Korea

General Bradley: We might discuss this draft telegram to General Clark.² We have talked it over here. It seems to us that if you are going to have rescreening before an armistice, you don’t gain anything by letting the Communists be observers. No matter what happens they are bound to come down, look around, and then go back and say the situation was just what they thought it would be and that all prisoners who say they don’t want to be repatriated are, in fact, being forcibly retained. It is possible that the second alternative mentioned in the telegram might be useful. That would be to have a sufficient number of neutrals assist in a rescreening so that there will be an effective counter to what the Communists are saying.

Mr. Nitze: It seemed to us that the important point in the first alternative was that we would secure Communist agreement to abide by the results of a rescreening.

General Bradley: In that case we should say not only that they must abide by results but that they would conclude an armistice on the basis of the results. But in any case it seems to us that we should have enough neutral nations to attest to the accuracy of the results of the rescreening and counter whatever the Communist observers might say.

Mr. Johnson: We agree there is a basis for your worries about having Communist observers, but we don’t believe the Communists will agree to this proposal, and if they refuse we think it would weaken their propaganda position.

General Collins: The trouble is the Communists could agree to abide by the results and then repudiate the agreement after they had been observers at a rescreening. I don’t see that we gain a thing by having any Communists take part in screening. They would come down, observe the situation, and then repudiate their agreement, then go back and beat their drums. It seems to me we have already made too many mistakes in assuming the Communists might operate as decent people should.

Mr. Bohlen: Nobody is going under the assumption the Communists are decent people. We know just the opposite. What we have to figure is how to deal with people whom we must consider thoroughly crooked and dishonest. I agree that there is no point in undertaking a rescreening unless the Communists do agree to conclude an armistice on the results. I personally think that the lack of confidence in the validity of our screening on the part of our Allies isn’t sufficient to justify the necessity for such a rescreening. After all, the troubles have been in the Communist camps on Kojedo who have not been screened and not among the anti-Communists who have said they don’t want to go back. If, however, we make a proposal for a rescreening on the basis that the Communists agree to abide by the results and conclude an armistice, I think the possibility that they might make such an agreement and then repudiate it is a calculated risk worth taking.

General Collins: I am interested in Mr. Bohlen’s statement that he doesn’t think the Allied lack of confidence in our screening necessitates a rescreening.

Mr. Johnson: Actually we are caught by worries on both sides. Congressmen tend to worry about the pro-Communists we haven’t screened whereas the UK is worried that the figures of non-repatriates which we have secured are too high.

General Collins: I don’t see how the figures can be too high. Anybody who once said he doesn’t want to go back to a Communist country would hardly reverse himself now. If he did go back he would know just how he would be treated after having once said he didn’t want to go back. If there really are major doubts on the part of our Allies on that point, why don’t we ask the UK and Australia to send over a group not to rescreen prisoners but just to check to their own satisfaction on the validity of the screening that has already taken place. But I really don’t see why you should let Communist observers come in on any screening.

Mr. Nitze: We only would if we could get a commitment from the Communists to conclude an armistice on the results of the screening. Nobody can guarantee that if the Commies made such a commitment they wouldn’t repudiate it. On balance, however, even though it is unlikely they would make such a commitment, it would seem probable that if they did agree to a rescreening and to abide by the results, they would only do so if they had the intention of arriving at an armistice.

Mr. Bohlen: What we really have to think about is how we can improve our position in the negotiations. The Kojedo business has made it difficult to go ahead with what we originally planned to do. We wanted to present a clear package proposal and then suspend negotiations on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The questions that have come up because of the Kojedo mess make it seem unwise to suspend negotiations at this particular juncture because of the confusion that has followed the Kojedo business. We can’t now suspend negotiations with the support of our Allies. If we could introduce some new element by making an offer of screening before an armistice, maybe even screening prisoners of both sides, then we might get back to where we were before and have Allied support for suspension of negotiations if the Commies should reject such an offer.

General Bradley: Is there some message in the British talks with India which deals with the possibility of screening prisoners of both sides.

Mr. Johnson at this point read the draft telegram to General Clark³ informing him about Nehru’s suggestions to the British and Eden’s reply.

General Bradley: My personal opinion is that we are now on dead center. Maybe we have to do something, which may have to be through an intermediary such as India, but our principal worry is whatever we do there should be enough neutral nations represented on any rescreening to be able to refute Communist statements and to demonstrate that our screening has been OK.

Admiral Fechteler: Aren’t we waiting for suggestions from General Clark as to what things should be done.

General Collins: I think on the other hand he is waiting for some decision from us.

Admiral Fechteler: For my part I am against any rescreening by anybody at any time.

General Bradley: Is there a message in from George Kennan on the desirability of our standing firm on all our positions at this time.

Mr. Bohlen: That message dealt with Berlin and pointed out what was already agreed on—that we should be firm in case there is an encroachment on our rights in Berlin.⁴ I would like to know of Admiral Fechteler how he thinks without any rescreening we can get off dead center.

Admiral Fechteler: Just break off negotiations and wait for them to agree.

Mr. Bohlen: If it hadn’t been for Kojedo, we might have done just that, but with this Kojedo business, we need some new element.

Admiral Fechteler: I think that from the very beginning all our guesses about the screening business have been bad.

Mr. Bohlen: I agree there is no point in rescreening just for the sake of rescreening. But if you get a commitment for an armistice on the basis of the results, that seems to be a different matter.

General Bradley: Personally, I have a feeling that we must insist on two things. First, enough neutrals must be present at any rescreening, and second, there must be a Communist commitment for an armistice on the basis of the rescreening.

General Collins: It seems to me that this telegram mixes up two different things. We have two objectives. The first is to try to put the Communists on the spot so that if we do terminate negotiations we can do it on a good basis. The second is to try to get Allied approval and support for what we have done already. On the first alternative my major worry is that the Commies might agree to abide by the result of a rescreening and then repudiate that agreement. On the second alternative I can see some merit in having some sort of interrogation or sample questioning by our Allies of the validity of the screening that has already been accomplished. I am still worried that we may not be clear enough in our realization that these Communists are and will act like SOB’s. What guarantee can there be that they won’t repudiate any agreement they make.

Mr. Nitze: There can’t be any guarantee that the Commies wouldn’t repudiate an agreement to abide by the results, but we figure that even if they would make such an agreement and then repudiate it, we would still come out on top propagandawise.

General Bradley: It is essential that we have enough neutrals to refute the charge that the Communists would make if they did repudiate an agreement. I think it would have to be neutrals like the Indians, Swiss, and other people and not the ICRC.

General Collins: You can’t trust the ICRC. They are objecting right now to legitimate measures that we have to undertake in restoring control of the prison camps, such as cutting off food or use of concussion grenades.⁵ I believe the telegram should be redrafted by State and clarified. We should put forth clearly objectives that we are after and means we are considering to reach those objectives. The first objective is to put the Commies on the spot. To that end we must have neutrals to observe any rescreening and we must have a Communist commitment to conclude an armistice on the basis of the results. Our second objective is to allay any questions as to validity of our screening operations thus far on the part of our Allies. To this end we might have an interrogation of those prisoners who have refused repatriation undertaken by a group of our Allies.

General Bradley: The question of how necessary it is to satisfy the doubts of our Allies and how we should best go about it is really State’s business. We have to take your judgment on the necessity of such an operation and go along if you think it is necessary. But if we do take any such action as rescreening, let’s be sure to have enough neutrals to refute Communist arguments.

Mr. Bohlen: The question of how necessary it will be to allay doubts of our Allies depends a good part on what happens in the next few weeks. It’s possible that the whole Kojedo matter might subside, in which case it might not be necessary to take any steps to allay Allied doubts.

General Collins: The trouble is that things are apt to get worse rather than better. I am sure chances are 10 to 1 that we are going to have further bloodshed when we try to break up prisoners in small controlled groups. The Commies, of course, will say that bloodshed came about because we were trying to screen the camps forcibly.

Admiral Fechteler at this point suggested a redraft of the message which in essence would have given General Clark considerations set forth in State’s draft and asked for Clark’s proposals for a course of action.

General Bradley: I feel that we have to do something. If we should break off negotiations now, we would undoubtedly lose a lot of domestic and Allied support for the operations in Korea.

Mr. Bohlen: For a new element, we might try to get back to principles rather than to mechanics. Our principle is clear. We won’t agree to forcible return of prisoners. We might reiterate this principle to the Communists, tell them that we are not fixed on any particular procedure through which to arrive at this principle and ask them what proposals they have to make. It is my thought that they can’t agree to the principle, that they will refuse it—then we can break on a matter of principle rather than on a question of mechanism. In effect, that is what the British proposal adds up to.

Mr. Nitze: Of course they might come up with a mechanism which we would find unacceptable and then we would have to argue with them on procedure.

Mr. Bohlen: They might, but in general I don’t think they could even accept the principle.

General Bradley: It might be helpful if we would go ahead and ask neutrals to undertake interrogation of the prisoners we have already screened.

General Collins: The type of question we are now discussing can’t really be settled by any agency in the Government except the NSC. This kind of question is largely political and really isn’t a JCS business. Our business is really only strategic guidance. The State representatives here also aren’t really the policy deciders on these questions. It seems to me these questions should be settled in some forum where decisions can actually be taken.

Mr. Nitze: The Secretaries of State and Defense really have to decide as to what recommendations to make to the President, but they can’t go into the whole range of questions that we have discussed this morning. We can advise them as to what kind of recommendation we think they should make to the President⁶ and in advising them, the kind of discussion that we have had this morning is very useful.

General Bradley: The point is that the JCS does not make decisions in this field. These policies are governmental policies. Statements have been made in fairly high quarters in the State Department that the Joint Chiefs determined what happens in Korea. We don’t set the policies, we just transmit decisions to the field.

Mr. Nitze: I am not aware of any such misunderstanding. Certainly all of us here realize what the Joint Chiefs role is.

General Bradley: My impression of the misunderstanding really arose from an accumulation of things, some of which came from correspondents, attributed to the State Department, who must have been talking at a pretty high level.

Mr. Bohlen: In arriving at policy decisions you have to consider the practical situation involved and what our actual capacities are for dealing with them. For example, with the question of rescreening it will be the U.S. Army which in the last analysis will have to arrange for the rescreening and we have to find out that kind of thing over here.

Mr. Nitze: Also, as an example, without the discussion this morning we might have gone off on the wrong track on the question of ICRC handling our rescreening. It was very useful to have your opinions on the inadvisability of that.

General Bradley: We agree that these discussions are useful but we just want it clear that the JCS isn’t a decision-making body on these questions.

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1. A note on the source text read: “State draft. Not cleared with any of participants.” Generals Bradley, Collins, and Twining and Admiral Fechteler attended for the JCS; Bohlen, Nitze, Allison, Johnson, Stelle, and Ferguson represented the Department of State. These ten were the only participants at the meeting. Berlin was also a topic of discussion at the meeting.
2. Dated May 26, p. 244.
3. This draft was eventually sent as JCS 910520 to Clark, June 5, 1952, not printed (795.00/6–2852).
4. For documentation on Berlin, see volume vii.
5. The objections to which General Collins referred were contained in a letter from the Chief of the ICRC Delegation for Korea, Dr. Lehner, to Clark; the letter was transmitted to the JCS for their information as telegram CX 69236, Clark to JCS, May 28, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 128).

6. According to a memorandum for the record by Johnson, dated May 31, 1952, it was agreed that Johnson would redraft the message to Clark to meet some of the points raised in this State–JCS meeting. Johnson did this and submitted a redraft to General Bolté on May 29. The Operations Deputies of the JCS decided, at a meeting on May 29, that they were not qualified to consider the message. On May 30, the message was again presented to a meeting of the Operations Deputies and again they decided they could not consider it and that it must be handled by the JCS (FE files, lot 55 D 128, tab 154).

   Johnson’s revised draft contained minor stylistic revisions and two additions. In Part III, paragraph 1, subsection (a), the following sentence in parentheses was added to the first possible course of action, which was an offer of an immediate impartial rescreening with Communist observance and a commitment by both sides to abide by the results: “(This would apply to all non-repatriates including those which would develop from future screening in compounds hitherto unscreened.)” The other major change was the addition of paragraph 5 to Part III which read as follows: “Alternative 1 (a) [impartial rescreening with Communist observance] would appear to be preferable and the making of this offer, if rejected, would not preclude subsequently taking the action set forth in alternative 1 (b).” A text of this revised draft is attached to a memorandum by Johnson to Acheson, May 30, 1952, not printed (FE files, lot 55 D 128 tab 146).

   For subsequent revisions of this draft, see the memorandum of discussion, p. 295; a text of an earlier draft, May 26, is printed on p. 244; the draft message was sent as telegram JCS 910484 to Clark, June 5, p. 310.