795.00/5–2352
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of
Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)1
top secret
[Washington,] May 23, 1952.
Subject:
- Courses of Action in the Event of a Break-off of
Negotiations
I believe that the NSC should urgently
consider whether, in the event that armistice negotiations are
terminated and it becomes apparent that the Communists do not intend to
initiate an all-out offensive, this Government and the UNC should:
- (a)
- Recognize the existence of a military stalemate and endeavor
to create a situation which, for all practical purposes, would
achieve the objectives outlined in paragraph 1 of NSC 118/22 without
regard to the formal conclusion of an armistice agreement (Tab
A); or
- (b)
- Exercise additional military and economic pressures designed
to inflict severe punishment and heavy casualties upon the
enemy, thereby forcing him to accept an armistice on the basis
of our package proposal” (Tab B); or
- (c)
- Launch an all-out offensive designed to drive the Communist
forces from Korea and unify the country by force (Tab C).
In the event that the Communists terminate the negotiations and resume
hostilities, we will be faced with a fait
accompli, and the only reasonable course open to us will be to
oppose force with force and endeavor to impose such heavy casualties and
inflict such punishment upon the aggressor that in due course we may
assume the military initiative and compel him to accept our stated terms
for an armistice, or if the occasion presents, destroy his forces and
achieve a complete victory.
It is entirely possible, however, that even though the negotiations are
terminated, the Communists will not assume the offensive, but will
continue to adopt a defensive posture, thereby leaving the next move up
to the United Nations Command. Under these circumstances, our selection
of the appropriate course of action will be based on military as well as
political factors. I recognize the tremendous effect which the military
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factors must have on our
selection and do not believe a final decision can be made until such
time as the Military Establishment has reviewed the alternatives in
light of UN and Communist capabilities, the strategic importance of
Korea to our security interests in Japan and the Far East, and the
feasibility of expanding the ROK forces.
For this reason the papers attached at Tabs A, B and C confine
themselves only to a review of the probable political advantages and
disadvantages accruing to each of the aforementioned courses of action,
and to comments on the applicability of specific provisions of NSC 118/2 to those courses.
Tab “A”
Memorandum Prepared by
H.O.H. Frelinghuysen of the Office of
Northeast Asian Affairs
Problem
To determine whether it is politically advisable and feasible for
this government, in the event of a break-off of armistice
negotiations, to adopt a course of action which would recognize the
continued existence of a military stalemate; and whether, if it is
decided to adopt such a course of actions, the recommendations
contained in NSC 118/2 are
applicable.
Discussion
Our military objectives in Korea are to repel aggression and to
restore international peace and security in the area. Secretary
Acheson and our military
leaders have stated publicly that these objectives could be achieved
if the territorial integrity of the ROK were maintained, the fighting brought to an end,
and safeguards established against the renewal of aggression. We are
trying to get the enemy to stop fighting on this basis. The failure
of the current armistice talks would not, of course, alter these
objectives.
A course of action recognizing the military stalemate, minimizing our
casualties and the hostilities, except for air and naval action,
would for all practical purposes accomplish these objectives. It
would command the support of the participating nations and other UN
member states. It would keep to a minimum the number of casualties
resulting from hostilities, and reduce our economic and military
burden. It would permit our efforts and treasure to be devoted to
the expansion of ROK forces and the
rehabilitation of the country, and reduce the likelihood of an
extension of the hostilities. It would, at the same time, with
expanded ROK forces progressively
replacing UN forces, permit the maintenance of strong military
positions on a defensible line and pose a constant threat to the
Communists, thus tying down Chinese forces and preventing them from
engaging in action elsewhere. It would probably tend to
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encourage both the
participating nations and those not now participating to contribute
additional troops as a sign of their continuing interest in Korea
and it would permit us to maintain a strong security outpost for
Japan.
On the other hand this alternative would be criticized by those who
already believe we have appeased the Communists. It would give added
emphasis to the charges that we do not want to win a victory in the
Far East. Being unacceptable to the ROKs, it would increase the danger of their
non-cooperation and possibly inspire them to take such military
action as would in effect nullify our own efforts to restrict the
hostilities. It would incur the risk of having the Communists
interpret our action, particularly if they involve the reduction of
our forces, as a sign of weakness thereby encouraging them to launch
an offensive at some later date. Since it would not be a clear-cut
victory on our part, it would have an adverse propaganda effect in
the Far East. It would impose no moral obligation on the Communists
not to renew hostilities, thereby leaving Korea as a continuing
source of danger.
Concurrent Action
In considering the possible adoption of this course of action which
would have the effect of restricting the hostilities to minor
skirmishing and probing action together with continued air and naval
bombardment, we should examine whether there is any possible
concurrent action which might be taken to make this plan a more
effective means for implementing U.S. foreign polity (policy) vis-à-vis the Communists.
One of the chief arguments for renewing full-scale hostilities in
Korea is that failure to do so would constitute appeasement and
would be proof that the U.S. and UN are prepared only to resist
small aggressions, and not major ones. If, however, we can keep the
fighting and casualties to a minimum, continue to confine the area
of hostilities to Korea while at the same time emphatically and
dramatically indicating our determination to resist Communist
expansion in the Far East, we would not only strengthen our ties
with our Allies and win new friends in Asia but also avoid charges
of a vacillating and ineffectual Far Eastern policy.
It is suggested, therefore, that the NSC might consider, as an alternative to assuming the
offensive in Korea and as an action supplemental to the recognition
of a military stalemate in Korea, the strengthening of the general
structure of the security in the Far East. To this end, our efforts
and resources which would otherwise be expended in probably futile
hostilities on the narrow front of the Korean peninsula should
rather be invested on the broad front of Asia, including Korea,
Japan, Formosa and Southeast Asia.
A full-scale renewal of Korean hostilities would require us to
maintain our forces in Korea at least at their present level, incur
countless
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casualties and
expend treasure at the rate of approximately $5 billion per year.
Were such monies, troops and efforts utilized instead in a general
security assistance program embracing the expansion of ROK forces in order to permit a gradual
reduction of our own forces elsewhere in the area, the strengthening
of our Far Eastern Air Force for action anywhere in the area,
military aid to Japan, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and Formosa, we
would establish a broad and powerful front of resistance to
Communist expansion. Such a plan would be in accord with recent
requests of ROK for increased
military assistance; would reduce losses of our own manpower, would
be more acceptable to our Allies, particularly the UK, Australia and
France; and more importantly, would constitute a far more serious
blow to the Communists who fear such a united front, than would an
all out offensive in Korea. It would strengthen forces of the
countries of Asia and the Pacific area and facilitate the eventual
formation of a regional system in which each participant would play
its role in a master plan designed to defeat Communist efforts at
piece meal conquest of the Far East.
Applicability of NSC 118/2
The course of action which has been proposed appears to have the
practical effect of achieving all the objectives set forth in
Paragraph 1 of NSC 118/2 except for
Paragraph 1 a (1) which provides for the
conclusion of an armistice and for Paragraph 1 c which provides for military action until an armistice is
agreed and therefore is more in accord with the course of action
envisaged in “Tab B”. Economic and political sanctions could,
however, be continued and, if deemed advisable and feasible,
intensified.
The recommendations contained in Paragraph 2 b
are not directly applicable to the situation envisaged herein and
should be carefully reviewed prior to implementation.
Paragraph 2 b (2) is inapplicable.
Paragraph 2 b (3) would remove all
restrictions on military action and therefore, would probably be
unacceptable to our Allies as leaving too great discretion to the
Military Commander enabling him to make decisions which could void
completely the effect of the contemplated course of action.
Paragraph 2 b (4). Same objection probably
applies.
Paragraph 2 b (5). Although this might create
some objections by our Allies, this Government should seriously
endeavor to implement it.
Paragraph 2 b (7) should be implemented and
could be expected to be successful particularly if the participating
and other nations were convinced that neither we nor the ROK would initiate military action
which would spark an all-out offensive by either side.
Paragraph 2 b (8) is a matter for military
determination but certainly contains inherent dangers.
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Paragraph 2 c is of course directly opposed to
the course of action recommended here and is discussed at Tab
“B”.
Paragraph 2 [d]. All recommendations are
applicable and political advantages can be obtained from a vigorous
implementation of 2 d (2).
Tab “B”
Memorandum Prepared by
H.O.H. Frelinghuysen of the Office of
Northeast Asian Affairs
Problem
To determine whether, in the event negotiations fail, this Government
should adopt a course of action which would call for the exercise of
such additional economic and military pressures as would force the
Communists to accept an armistice; and to determine whether, in the
event it is decided to adopt such a course of action, the provisions
of NSC 118/2 are applicable.*
If the armistice negotiations terminate unsuccessfully or even if
they are protracted indefinitely and fruitlessly this Government
will be under heavy pressure from American public opinion to follow
a course of action which would force the Communists to accept an
armistice on our terms. Recent public opinion surveys indicate a
growing dissatisfaction with the present political and military
stalemate and reveal a repetition of the earlier demands for a
clear-cut victory in Korea including the imposition of the necessary
economic and military pressures to bring it about. Similarly such a
course of action would receive the whole-hearted backing of the
people and government of the ROK.
There is little doubt that if this end would be accomplished without
too great an additional U.S. military commitment or without
disproportionately heavy casualties, it would represent a great
victory for the UN, and tend to emphasize any divergencies existing
between the USSR and Communist China. It would increase presently
existing strains in the Chinese and North Korean Regimes, and at the
same time enhance our prestige in the Far East and other countries
now threatened by Communist aggression. It would reduce the Chinese
Communists and North Koreans effectiveness as military powers, and
contribute to the continued security of the ROK, thereby reducing, if not eliminating, an important
source of World tension. It would encourage the people and
Government of ROK, thus enabling
them better to attain political, economic and military
stability.
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On the other hand, such a course of action would probably prove
undesirable if not unacceptable to our Allies, perhaps making it
necessary for us “to go it alone”; the greatly increased casualties
and the fate of the prisoners of war would undoubtedly create
demands for the extension of hostilities to Manchuria and the China
mainland thereby increasing the risk of Soviet involvement and a
third world war; would adversely affect our military assistance
programs to other areas of the world; might, in the event that it
appeared to be succeeding, inspire aggressive Communist action on
other frontiers to relieve the pressure; would probably be met with
every possible resistance on the part of the Soviet Union including
the possible use of its air force, submarines and perhaps
specialized ground elements.
Applicability of NSC 118/2
The course of action considered herein is, in practically all
respects, in accord with U.S. objectives as set forth in Paragraph
(1) aNSC
118/2. Paragraph (1) a (4) would, however,
need clarifying as it is unlikely that the desired political
objectives could be accomplished if the stated limitation remains
imposed on the expansion of ROK
forces. The difficulty of achieving the objective cited in Paragraph
(1) b, i.e. “Avoid the extension of
hostilities in Korea into a general war .…” will be greatly enhanced
but not necessarily made impossible.
As far as the Recommendations are concerned Paragraphs 2 b, c, and d are
applicable and despite the objections which some of our Allies may
raise to having all of these recommendations put into effect, the
exigencies of the situation and the dissatisfaction of the American
public with “half-way” measures will undoubtedly make it imperative
that we make every endeavor to implement them.
Tab “C”
Memorandum Prepared by H.
O. H. Frelinghuysen of the Office of Northeast
Asian Affairs
Problem:
To determine whether, in the event of a break-off of armistice
negotiations, this Government should initiate an all-out military
offensive designed to drive the Communists out of Korea and unify
the country by force; and, whether if it is decided to adopt this
course of action, the recommendations contained in NSC 118/2 are applicable.
Discussion:
(This course of action is fully analyzed in the Staff Annex of NSC 118/2.) It would be the course of
action most acceptable to the Government and people of the ROK and to that segment of American
public opinion which demands “total victory”. It would, if
successful,
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eliminate
Korea as a source of world tension and represent a major victory in
the free world’s struggle against Communist expansion. The strength
and determination evidenced by such action would undoubtedly give
renewed faith and encouragement to the people of the Far East and
other areas faced by or struggling under Communist oppression. It
would inflict a major blow to the military strength of the Chinese
Communists, perhaps resulting in a major split in the Sino-Soviet
partnership. The unification of Korea would not only eliminate Korea
as a world trouble spot but would also reduce our future economic
commitment to that country by restoring it to a position where, with
rehabilitation assistance from the U.S. and U.N., it could gradually
attain economic viability.
Since the attainment of this objective would represent such a
tremendous victory for the U.S. and democratic interest, it is clear
that the Communist orbit, led by the USSR, would probably be
prepared to go to almost any lengths, including total war, to deny
its achievement. At the present time there exist a number of points
susceptible to undesirable Communist pressures designed to reduce
the success of our efforts in Korea. It is probable that in direct
proportion to our success in subjecting North Korea to our control,
Soviet-inspired incidents, if not actual hostilities would break out
at one or several of such points. It is extremely probable that, in
the event of a UN attack sufficient to unify Korea by force, the
Soviet Union would be prepared to render all necessary assistance,
including the direct involvement of Soviet forces, to forestall such
an eventuality.
A course of action contemplating the defeat of Communist control in
Korea would be unacceptable to our Allies and undoubtedly result in
a gradual loss of their support. Indeed, they would probably exhibit
an increasingly hostile attitude which would have an adverse effect
on the successful implementation of our foreign policy in other
areas. The success of which would be further reduced by the
tremendous burdens imposed upon our national economy and military
production, thus necessitating a drastic curtailment of our
assistance programs.
Applicability of NSC 118/2:
The objectives envisaged in the course of action discussed above are
not in accord with those set forth in para 1 of NSC 118/2. The latter document
envisaged the termination of hostilities at as early a date as
possible and the withdrawal by stages of non-Korean Armed Forces.
Although NSC 118/2 provides for the
development of “strong barriers against Communist subversion and
military aggression in Korea”, it does not contemplate the
elimination of Communist control from all of Korea nor the
achievement of the unification of the country by force. This is made
clear in para 1d which states that the U.S.
should have as
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its
objective the development of “political and social conditions in
Korea which would facilitate an independent and democratic
Korea.”
The recommendations in paras 2b, c, d though
applicable to the course of action under discussion would probably
not be sufficient for the accomplishment of the objectives thereof.
Para 2b(2) recommends that this Government
“increase the scale of military operations consistent with the
capabilities of the forces available to the Commander in Chief of
the UN forces”. It is apparent from the discussions contained in the
NSC staff study and from
General Ridgway’s recent
statements before Congressional Committees3 that the forces presently available in Korea are
not sufficient for an all out offensive.
