795.00/5–252
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)1
Subject:
- Extraordinary Efforts to Bring About an Armistice in Korea.
In view of the current status of the Korean truce negotiations, I believe that we should consider two steps which might help bring about an armistice on our terms:
1. Approach to Nehru.
We should consider asking Ambassador Bowles to invite Nehru’s intercession with the Communists to agree to an armistice on the basis of our package offer. Indications from New Delhi are that India supports our position on the prisoner of war question as well as on the question of excluding Russia from the neutral observation commission. It is pleased with our decision to concede on the airfields question. There would seem to be a reasonable chance, therefore, that Nehru might agree to approach either the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that these are the only issues remaining in the truce negotiations, there is no danger that Nehru might insist that we make some concessions in return.
If Nehru agrees to make the approach, it might have some effect on the Communists. In any event, it could do little harm and if the approach is made and fails, it would help bring home to Nehru Communist intransigence and accelerate the process of his education in regard to the East-West struggle.
2. Approach to the Russians.
We should also consider an approach to the Russians through Ambassador Kennan. We would make it clear to the Russians that this is our final offer, stress the dangers inherent in failure of the armistice talks and continuation of the Korean fighting, and emphasize that an armistice in Korea could be a first step towards solution of the Korean problem and thereafter to consideration of other Far Eastern questions troubling the peace of the world.
[Page 189]If such an approach to the Russians is to be made, we would have to consider its timing both in regard to the status of the negotiations at Panmunjom and in regard to the possible Nehru approach discussed above. As to the latter, it would seem that the two approaches are not inconsistent and would supplement each other, and we might consider whether they should be more or less simultaneous, or have one follow the other.
It might be desirable for us to get together on these suggestions after you have had some time to consider them.
- This memorandum was also addressed to Matthews, Perkins, Allison, Byroade, Bohlen, and Nitze.↩