Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/4–352: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

top secret
emergency

Tokyo, April 29, 1952—11:15 p.m.

CX 67750. Re CX 67738.²

1. Koje-Do: It now appears clearly evident that in those compounds at Koje-Do yet to be screened, any screening and segregation program will meet with violent resistance.

a. These compounds are well organized and effective control cannot be exercised within them without use of such great degree of force as might verge on the brutal and result in killing and wounding quite a number of inmates. While I can execute such forced screening, I believe that the risk of violence and bloodshed involved, both to UNC personnel and to the inmates themselves, would not warrant this course of action. Further, the unfavorable publicity which would probably result, regardless of our attempts to keep the forced screening program from the press, would provide immediate and effective Communist propaganda material extremely difficult to counteract at this stage of negotiations.

b. Therefore, unless instructed to the contrary, I plan to omit screening of those compounds at Koje-Do which have violently opposed the screening program to date, and list all their inmates for return to Communist control. In the event that any inmates of these compounds should forcibly oppose return to Communist control at the time the exchange takes place, they would then be retained in UNC custody and their names deleted from the rosters submitted to the Communists with appropriate explanation.

c. This course of action would, I think, conform to US principles on POW issue.

2. Pusan: A different situation exists at hospital compound number 10 at Pusan where there are approximately 3500 POWs and civilian internees yet to be screened. General Van Fleet reports that a situation has developed in this compound which requires immediate action to establish firm control and to protect sick and wounded. Such action may involve force and possible loss of life. Such screening as is practicable will be conducted at this compound but only as an incident to establishment of necessary control.

3. Since screening, with preparation of final rosters, is scheduled to begin on or about 1 May, request approval of action outlined in para la, or other instructions, ASAP.³

1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that this telegram was seen by the Secretary of State.
2. Supra.
3. In telegram JCS 907528, dated Apr. 29, 1952, the JCS approved Ridgway’s plan to omit the screening of those compounds where he feared the process would meet with violence. Ridgway was also explicitly ordered not to furnish the Communist Delegation with any additional lists of POWs at that time (795.00/4–352).