795.00/4–2652
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)
Subject:
- Korea
Participants:
- The Honorable P. C. Spender, Australian Ambassador
- Mr. David W. McNicol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
- Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary (UNA)
- Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary (FE)
- Mr. David W. Wainhouse, UNP
The Australian Ambassador, accompanied by Mr. McNicol, came in to see Mr. Hickerson this morning at his request.
The Ambassador stated that he found it difficult to believe that approximately 70,000 prisoners of war including civilian internees will have their lives jeopardized if they are returned to the Chinese Communists and to the North Koreans. He felt that the questioning of the prisoners of war was superficial and did not go to the heart of the problem. In his view the questions put and the answers elicited did not get at the motives of the prisoners. The motive for refusing to go back is to the Ambassador the heart of the problem to which the questioning should have been directed.
Mr. Hickerson explained that the problem involved in the (forcible) return of the prisoners of war was not whether the lives of the POWs would be imperilled but whether the POWs would return without our having to apply force to make them return. Mr. Hickerson further explained the method and the care that was used in screening the POWs mentioning particularly that our screeners made known to the POWs the Communist announcement of amnesty to all POWs who are returned. We ourselves were astounded at the large proportion who said they would resist being returned. Mr. Hickerson stated that the figure has deeper significance than we realized of conditions in China. The Ambassador thought it was better food and better treatment in the camps than they got at home.
[Page 172]Mr. Johnson told of screening POWs in a hospital in Pusan. Notwithstanding the good treatment, better food and care, the proportion desiring to return was considerably larger than at the camps. The Ambassador replied that that was not surprising to him. When people are sick he went on to say they naturally want to be home.
The Ambassador inquired whether other representatives (presumably of countries with troops in Korea) had raised any objections to the method of screening. Mr. Hickerson replied that no other representative has raised objections to the method of screening.
The Ambassador said he wanted it made clear that he was not receding from the position taken on forcible return of POWs.
Mr. Hickerson made it clear to the Ambassador that at the forthcoming plenary our negotiators will state that we are prepared to return some 70,000 POWs for the 12,000 POWs which the other side holds, and that after an armistice is signed we are prepared to have the rest of the POWs we hold rescreened either by some international group such as the ICRC in the presence of military observers of both sides, or by joint Red Cross teams in the presence of military observers of both sides.
The Ambassador again asked whether 60,000 would violently resist or commit suicide. Mr. Hickerson said that 60,000 perhaps would not commit suicide, but they would resist, and we are not willing to use force to make these people return. Mr. Hickerson repeated that the screening was a good one. The Ambassador however said he was not satisfied with the method. The proportion of those refusing to return he felt is too large.
The Ambassador then asked if General Ridgway had estimated the reaction of the Communists to “the package proposal,” i.e., will they accept the package or will they break off negotiations. Mr. Hickerson replied that he has not seen any estimate by General Ridgway and there is no way of telling what the Communist reaction would be. Mr. Wainhouse said that General Ridgway has taken the view in the past that the Communists want an armistice and presumably in making this package proposal has taken this into account.