794.5/6–2452: Telegram

No. 576
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan1

top secret

85. Eyes only for Murphy. Re ur 660.2 Depts State and Defense concur in recommendations JCS and CINCFE that discussions be initiated with Yoshida on informal and oral basis to estab intergovernmental agreement in accordance with substance draft oral communication transmitted to you in Deptel 540.3 Agreement estab that both you and CINCFE will participate in discussions with Yoshida. CINCFE being instructed accordingly.

Dept fully concurs in substance oral communication in view (a) understanding reached between Rusk and Okazaki in informal discussions in course negot Administrative Agreement (memos conversation available in Emb) to effect that combined command wld be estab in event of hostilities or threat thereof, commander of which wld be designated by US; and (b) situation in Far East which clearly dictates mil necessity reach early agreement with Jap Govt on various matters concerning combined strategic planning for defense of Jap. However, Dept desires to emphasize importance conversations be kept on highly confidential basis with full consideration given polit sensitivity Jap this issue and recognition continuing need consultation with Jap Govt in implementing agreement.

Request you keep Dept informed in detail these conversations and developing polit implications.

Re last para urtel release subj to resolution questions of executive authorization and legal title. Re first, Dept unaware of any policy whereby release heavy equipment to JNPR dependent Jap–US [Page 1281] agreement joint defense measures. In Apr 1951 President accepted JCS recommendation concurred in by State that (l)a “Special Far East Command Reserve” be estab from US Army stocks which wld be available as stockpile of equipment for then existing 4 JNPR divs, but which wld not be placed in hands Jap without specific prior agreement by Dept of State or approval at highest govtal level and (2) Dept of Army be authd undertake planning and budgeting for material sufficient fully to equip overall total of 10 JNPR divs by Jul 1, 1952.4 On Sept 28, 1951, State in reply5 to Defense–JCS proposal that heavy mil equipment be made available JNPR, took position in view then existing FEC policy decisions that heavy equipment be retained in possession US forces at their own bases in Jap but that personnel from JNPR be brought to those bases in rotation for training in use equipment. To best knowledge Dept, executive auth for Defense place heavy equipment in hands JNPR still dependent on prior State agreement or approval highest govt level. Defense has not approached State this matter since last fall.

Re second, partly as result Supreme Court decision on steel seizure, questions have arisen on legal auth further transfers without Congressional auth. Legal problem under continuing close study. Dept will inform you when matter clarified6

  1. Drafted in NA; cleared by phone with Martin in S/MSA and cleared with Allison in FE and Matthews in G.
  2. Document 574.
  3. See footnote 5, Document 573.
  4. See the letter (with enclosure and notes) dated Apr. 20, 1951, from Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall to Secretary Acheson, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1001.
  5. See footnote 8, ibid., p. 1361.
  6. In reply, Murphy stated in telegram 126 from Tokyo, July 10, that he discussed this message with General Clark and that the two of them planned to have an informal discussion with Minister Okazaki and the Prime Minister on July 23. (794.5/7–1052)