Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

693.941/3–152: Telegram

No. 536
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Tokyo, March 1, 1952—2 p.m.

Topad 1822. Dulles from Sebald. In absence Yoshida, discussed urtel 2334, Feb 28, with Iguchi whose reactions generally confirm comment penultimate para mytel 1815, Feb 29.¹ Regarding what appears wide area difference between Chinese and Japanese drafts,² I expressed concern that Japanese appear to have overlooked important commitment that substance Japanese-Chinese treaty wld be in accordance with principles of multilateral. Iguchi replied that while my view seemingly correct, he felt confident in consequence negotiations satisfactory middle-ground will be reached. Iguchi said Japanese considerably concerned over Chinese demand treaty must apply all China and then brought into conformity Yoshida–Dulles formula by separate document. States Japanese cannot agree this proposal which is main stumbling block present negotiations. On other hand, Kawada already instructed agree use “peace” treaty in title.

Iguchi fully aware Senate atmosphere and we consider problem sufficient importance be brought directly Yoshida’s attention. Interview being arranged afternoon March 4 subsequent to which I will advise you further.

Sebald

1. The antepenultimate and penultimate paragraphs of this telegram read:

   “Comment: As we view situation here were it not for possible effect upon forthcoming Senate deliberations San Francisco treaties present negots in Taipei shld not be unduly alarming. Chi are certainly a match for Japs in negots of this kind and while latter undoubtedly take courage from real or implied support US as indicated by close relationship fostered thru peace and security treaties and successful conclusion admin agreement, they nevertheless fearful Chi might take advantage hitherto preferred sitn, powerful support certain elements Wash and long history Jap aggression Chi mainland. We believe our immed objective shld be ensure continued negot without reaching point where mutual distrust might bring Taipei conf to sudden end. From all we can gather Japs will exert utmost to continue talks and are fully alive to serious consequences which wld fol intransigent attitude or failure reach acceptable compromise with Chi.

   “On other hand during this initial sitn of mutual sparring for position US might be placed in invidious position being charged with exerting undue pressure upon Japs perhaps in consequence Chi airing their concepts in public press. We fully appreciate desirability Japs explicitly carrying out provisions Yoshida to Dulles ltr and believe they will do so but only after some delay and rptd attempts whittle down what they consider unreasonable Chi demands.” (693.941/2–2952)

2. A copy of the Chinese draft as of Feb. 21, is enclosed with an unnumbered despatch dated Feb. 23 from the Embassy in Taipei to the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser to SCAP. (Tokyo Post files, 320 Formosa–Japan)

   No copy of the Japanese draft of Mar. 1 has been found in Department of State files.