794.00/2–2952
No. 535
The United States Political Adviser to
SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State
[Extract]
No. 1214
Subject:
- Weekly Political Notes from Japan
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1. Administrative Agreement Signed.1 (This item secret.) The Administrative Agreement was signed on February 28, 1952, at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Dean Rusk and Earl D. Johnson for the United States and Katsuo Okazaki for Japan. The text was released to the press the same day.
The last week of the negotiations was concerned mainly with (1) revising the provision regarding defense measures, a “generalized” version prepared by the United States which proved highly acceptable to the Japanese, (2) amending the wording regarding continued use of facilities and areas by the United States forces and agreeing to an exchange of notes on this matter, and (3) resolving certain questions regarding taxation to be made by Japan on its contribution of $155,000,000 for the maintenance of the United States forces, where it was agreed that since Japan had already drawn up its budget for the fiscal year 1952–1953 on the basis that this sum could be subject to taxation, there would be no objection this year but in succeeding years it would not be appropriate that Japan diminish its contribution through taxes.
The Agreement was signed in an atmosphere of great public interest and apprehension, which was reflected at the signing ceremony by a flood of klieg lights and clicking cameras and batteries of microphones. The Budget Committee of the House of Representatives had for several weeks been wrestling with the budget, and Opposition politicians had used this opportunity to grill Government leaders on all aspects of the Agreement, including rearmament, despatch abroad of the National Police Reserve, jurisdiction, taxation, and even expenses. A series of robberies, generally reported as involving foreigners in United States army uniforms, had sustained the attention aroused by the Senju bank holdup of February [Page 1208] 18, and pointed up the significance of the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the anticipated Agreement.
On February 26, a new high in public interest was reached when Asahi and Yomiuri published detailed summaries of the Agreement, probably based on information received from the Finance Ministry, which contained accurate outlines of a number of clauses regarding expenses, taxation, and procurement, but was generally vague or inaccurate on other major items such as facilities and areas, jurisdiction, and defense measures. These articles served, however, to provoke bitter attacks in the Diet and press, and charges of extraterritoriality swelled. The Opposition issued a statement condemning the Government’s conduct of the negotiations and in the Budget Committee proposed a vote of no-confidence in State Minister Okazaki on the ground that he had failed to report adequately the contents of the Agreement to the Diet. Various lawyers and commentators argued that the criminal jurisdiction provisions, as reported in the press, would constitute a violation of Japan’s sovereignty and thereby continued to concentrate public interest on the issue of extraterritoriality.
Publication of the text of the Agreement and press conference by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Okazaki did not appear substantially to reduce criticism of the Agreement, even though there seemed to be at least temporarily a lessening of public apprehension as efforts were made to understand its terms. Opposition leaders continued to attack the Government and announced their plan to hold a public rally in protest on March 6. The press generally took the view that the Agreement was not concluded on an equal basis and that it failed to answer important questions regarding criminal jurisdiction and emergency defense measures. There was also some concern over hitherto neglected technical issues, such as use of military currency and dollar checks by the United States forces, the free entry of United States vessels, planes, and personnel, and the right to equal use of Japanese public utilities.
It is still too early to assess Japanese reaction in proper perspective, but the mood of concern tinged with bitterness would appear to presage a period of difficulty in United States–Japan relations. (RBF)2
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First Secretary of Mission