Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.5/5–1056

No. 78
The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Chief of General Staff, Republic of China (Chow)¹

top secret

Taipei, February 5, 1953.

Dear General Chow: In view of the deneutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores, as recently announced by President Eisenhower, I desire to bring the following points to your attention:

a. Confirming the conversation held at the President’s house after lunch on February 1, I request that you make no significant attacks on Communist-held territory without first consulting me. This is in no way intended to limit your scheme of operations, but is merely to keep me informed, so that MAAG may be able to advise and assist in every possible way.

b. I suggest that immediate thought be given and plans be made to blockade the China mainland, with respect to Chinese Communists shipping only, from Swatow to Da-chen, both inclusive, and that I be informed of these plans in order that Navy Section, MAAG, and Air Section, MAAG, be enabled to assist in every possible way. Before any blockade is put in operation, however, I desire to be informed.

c. I recommend that plans be made at once to increase the frequency of raids, not only from the “off-shore” islands, but also from Formosa and the Pescadores, and that both little raids and big ones be planned and executed on a wide front in order to obtain prisoners and worry and confuse the Communist coastal defenses. Again I suggest that I be informed of these plans so that my General Staff and MAAG sections may assist to the maximum degree.

d. I further recommend that your naval surface reconnaissance and your CAF air reconnaissance measures be increased in order to secure more information about the enemy and about shipping in the Formosa Straits.

Please let me express my complete satisfaction and pleasure that Formosa and the Pescadores have been deneutralized. I have been working for over a year to accomplish this, and I am happy that President Eisenhower has actually done it.

Please rest assured that MAAG, Formosa, is at your service as ever to help in every possible way. Please accept my best wishes for continued success.²

Very sincerely,

William C. Chase

Major General, USA

1. The letter was sent to the Department, along with General Chow’s reply, as an enclosure to despatch 646 from Taipei, May 10, 1956. No other copy of the letter has been found in Department of State files.
2. In a letter of Feb. 13, to Chase, Gen. Chow Chih-jou replied as follows: (a) he agreed in principle that Chase should be informed before any “significant” raids were to be made on Communist-held territory but requested clarification of the meaning of the word” significant”; (b) in his opinion, only a blockade of the entire China coastline covering all vessels entering Communist ports, irrespective of nationality, would inflict serious damage on the Communist regime’s economic structure, while a full blockade of the waters suggested by Chase could inflict limited damage but would require U.S. political support, and a blockade limited to the area suggested by Chase and applying only to vessels flying the flag of the Communist regime would not justify the effort; (c) he agreed that plans should be made to increase the frequency of raids on the mainland but stated that this would necessitate increased U.S. military aid; and (d) he assured Chase that steps to implement his last recommendation would be taken in the very near future. General Chow continued by expressing concern about the lack of close coordination between Chinese and U.S. military authorities and raised the following points for Chase’s consideration: (1) the establishment of a Sino-American Combined Staff Organization; (2) planning for the joint defense of Taiwan and the dispatch of a USAF Jet Fighter Wing to Taiwan until jet aircraft had been made available to the Chinese Air Force in sufficient numbers for effective defense; (3) speedy delivery of military aid items which had already been allocated, increased military aid, and extension of the scope of military aid to include aid for Chinese troops and guerrilla units stationed in the offshore islands; and (4) making available transport and landing craft, which would be required for increased raids, as well as PT boats, which were not included in the current program. The letter was sent to the Department with Chase’s letter as an enclosure to despatch 646 from Taipei, May 10, 1956. (793.5/5–1056)