Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

611.95A241/12–1454

No. 444
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Chinese Political Affairs (Jenkins)

secret

[Washington,] December 14, 1954.

Subject:

• Canadian Approaches to Indians Concerning U.S. Airmen Sentenced in Communist China

Participants:

• Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador
• Mr. James J. McCardle, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy
• Mr. Robert Murphy, The Deputy Under Secretary
• Mr. Alfred leS. Jenkins, CA

Ambassador Heeney called at his request to discuss the problem of the 11 U.S. Air Force personnel sentenced in Communist China on Charges of “espionage”. He said that his Government was anxious to be as helpful as possible in this matter, and that to this end the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi, Mr. Escott Reid, on December 10 had talked with the Indian Foreign Secretary. He said that the Indian Foreign Office seemed to be ill-informed of the true facts in the case. Mr. Reid had attempted to set the Indian Foreign Secretary straight on a number of points, but since it was Ottawa’s intention not to let the matter rest there, the Ambassador wanted to make sure that there was nothing of significant relevancy to the case which the Canadians did not know about.

The Ambassador said that the Indian Foreign Office appeared to accept rather fully the reasoning of the Chinese Communists as transmitted by the Indian Ambassador in Peiping. He mentioned the Chinese (and apparently Indian) misconceptions under the following headings, during the discussion of which Mr. Murphy offered a full briefing of the facts as we know them:

1. Discussions at Geneva. According to the Indian Foreign Secretary, the Chinese reason that since we had not included the names of these airmen in POW lists given to the Military Armistice Commission but had included them on the lists handed to the Chinese Communists at the informal talks at Geneva, this constituted a tacit admission that these men were not POW’s.

The Ambassador was assured that the names of these airmen had been included in the lists of POW’s missing or known to be in Communist hands which were presented to the Military Armistice Commission. Their POW status was not reiterated at Geneva because this status was naturally assumed, and because we wished at Geneva to avoid interference with efforts properly being made through the Military Armistice Commission. The approach at Geneva was made primarily on behalf of the Civilians detained in Communist China, on a humanitarian basis, and the list of military personnel was appended to the civilian list because these men were known to be held in Communist China. Mr. Murphy pointed out that furthermore it was incumbent upon the Chinese Communists to notify the Military Armistice Commission of all UN personnel held by them, and that even if these men had not been mentioned both at Panmunjom and at Geneva, the Chinese should have notified the Commission that they were holding them as POW’s.

2. Espionage Charges. The Indian Foreign Secretary states that the Chinese Communists claim their representative at Geneva made it clear that it was the intention of the Chinese Communists to try these men for espionage, and that the United States representative had not objected in principle.

The Ambassador was told that to our knowledge no mention at all was made at Geneva about possible espionage Charges. No verbatim record of the meetings was made, in the attempt to keep the contact with the Red regime as informal as possible, and to avoid participating in “agreed minutes” which the Communists desired. Mr. Jenkins stated categorically that no mention of possible espionage Charges was made during the phase of the talks which he conducted for our side. Mr. Murphy pointed out that had such mention been made during the phase conducted by Ambassador Johnson the latter would have reacted vigorously and certainly would have reported it to the Department telegraphically. The Chinese Communists had merely promised that the cases of all Americans detained in China would be reviewed, and, in the light of the talks going on, there was the possibility of commutation of sentences or early release for good behavior, and subject to Chinese laws. This statement was made in the context of discussing the civilians detained in prison.

3. Case linked with that of Chinese Students in U.S. The Indians say that the Chinese Communists consider the problem of Americans imprisoned or otherwise detained in Communist China as directly linked with that of Chinese students in the United States.

The Ambassador was told that we consider that these problems are not directly linked, and particularly that there is no comparison in the circumstances of the two groups or in the legal or humanitarian considerations involved. We do not wish to be put in the position of bartering in human lives. At the same time we are aware that some face-saving device may be needed by the Communists. Mr. Murphy expressed the conviction, with which the Ambassador agreed, that the Chinese Communists had been surprised and disturbed by the magnitude of the chain reaction which their inexcusable act had set off. The Ambassador said that the Canadians had tried to impress upon the Indians the depth of feeling on the subject which was evinced in American public opinion. Mr. Murphy said that it was doubtless difficult for the Communists to realize the high value which we place on individual human lives.

At the Ambassador’s request, Mr. Jenkins reviewed the post V–J Day history and present status of Chinese students in the United States, emphasizing how few of the students actually wanted to go to Communist China. It was pointed out that of some 6,300 students arriving in the United States since V–J Day on student visas or on other visas for purposes of study, about 800 had left the United States between V–J Day and the Korean War, that since the outbreak of the Korean War only 434 students had applied to leave the country, and that only 124 of these had been prevented from doing so, in accordance with U.S. laws applicable in the President’s discretion during times of national emergency. Of these 124, 62 subsequently indicated that they no longer wished to leave the U.S. Of the remaining 62 who wished to depart, 27 have been told they were free to do so and 11 have actually departed. This leaves 35 still wishing to depart, whose cases are still under review.

4. Chinese claim plane downed over China. The Indian Foreign Secretary further said that the Chinese claimed that the B–29 which carried the 11 men had violated Chinese territory, and had been downed in China.

The Ambassador was told that all information available to us led to the conclusion that the plane was downed in North Korea, but that it was true we could not document this with complete certainty. The radar evidence was mentioned, and the Ambassador was told on a confidential basis that the relatives of one of the airmen had received a letter from the latter in very simple code which spelled out that the airmen were brought down in Korea and later taken to Communist China by train. While the family is known to have spoken of this letter in public, we prefer that the information be held confidential for the time being, for fear of possible harm to the writer in the event his very simply coded message becomes known to the Communists—assuming that they do not already know of it. Mr. Murphy made it clear, however, that even if the plane had been downed on Chinese soil the point of fighter attack on it was over Korea, and the locale of its landing could constitute no evidence of espionage. In any event, the status of the men as POW’s who should have been returned long ago is not altered.

5. Terms of sentence viewed as “lenient”. The Indian Foreign Secretary, according to the Ambassador’s report, said that the terms under the circumstances were “lenient”, and would seem to indicate that the Chinese themselves considered that their grounds for a Charge of “espionage” were shaky. When he appeared to believe that the terms were for only one year, Mr. Reid reportedly pointed out that the sentences involved from four to ten years of imprisonment.

. . . . . . .

The Ambassador inquired as to the exact mission of the plane at the time it was shot down. He was told that to the best of our knowledge its sole mission on that flight was leaflet dropping in support of UN actions—a normal part of modern warfare. Mr. Murphy commented that it was unfortunate that Colonel John Knox Arnold, Jr. was on that flight—that he should not have been, in his opinion. Some of the personnel on the plane did appear to have some specialized training beyond the leaflet-dropping category, but this mission was for the latter purpose. In any event, uniformed men carrying out their assignments in war time were not subject to Charges of espionage.

The Ambassador asked whether there was any truth to reports that 15 Americans on espionage missions had been captured in Manchuria. Mr. Murphy said that he had not heard of any such figure, and that in any case the utility of dropping Caucasian agents into Manchuria would on the face of it be open to question, to say the least.

The Ambassador observed that the Chinese Communists had attempted to depict the B–29 as a “special type” of plane. He was told that to the best of our knowledge there was nothing special about the type of plane, but that conceivably it could have had some special equipment on it which was not pertinent to this mission.

In closing, the Ambassador thanked Mr. Murphy for the full and frank discussion, saying that it would be very helpful to them in their supporting efforts in the case. He asked whether there was any remaining point which may be “on our conscience” in connection with the case—hastening to add that he did not mean to imply that we were being anything less than frank. Mr. Murphy assured him that we were holding from him nothing of relevancy to the case, of which he was aware.

Mr. McCardle, in a telephone conversation with Mr. Jenkins on the following day, again expressed appreciation for “the most helpful discussion with Mr. Murphy.” …

(Note: Tedul 2, December 15,¹ sent out previous to Mr. McCardle’s telephone conversation, was repeated to New Delhi and requested the Embassy to seek an early occasion to take action in this regard in such context as to honor the confidence of the Canadians in reporting to us.)

1. Tedul 2 to Paris, Dec. 15, reported this conversation. (611.95A241/12–1554)