611.95A241/12–254: Telegram
No. 425
The United States Representative at
the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of
State
priority
291. Re US fliers held by Red China. Immediately upon my return from Washington this morning I called Nutting1 (UK), Hoppenot2 (France) and Urrutia3 (Colombia) to inform them of our intention to move into the UN on this matter. Immediate reactions from all were favorable, Hoppenot saying that we could count on France for full support, and Urrutia saying this was case on which he would not have seek instructions but could assure us Columbia would support US in whatever we wanted.
Nutting, Dixon and Ramsbotham4 asked to come see me at once to discuss subject. UK expounded various alternative possibilities based on major premise that US desire was to secure release of fliers. As their ideas were developed it appeared that they feel only possibility for obtaining release of fliers lies in approaches to ChiCom authorities by some state maintaining diplomatic relations with them. For this reason they opposed SC action at least as initial step because Soviets will be bound to veto call upon ChiComs to release fliers and Communist attitude would thereby be frozen. On other hand, UK agreed to the importance of developing world opinion to back up whatever action is to be taken to obtain release of fliers. UK therefore prefers going to GA with resolution which would point out ChiCom action as violation Korean armistice and request good offices of some intermediary to seek release of fliers.
Meeting of 16 Powers5 (Ethiopia absent) was held this afternoon at my request at approximately same time President Eisenhower held press conference. I informed group of views of President and Secretary and indicated general lines former would take at press conference. I then made following points:
- (1)
- This was case of fliers operating under authority unified command on mission in connection with UN collective action. Release these fliers was properly a concern of UN as well as US. UN would [Page 984] never again take collective action if it failed to stand by those who had come to its aid in Korea.
- (2)
- Red Chinese action sentencing and imprisoning 11 fliers was breach of Korean armistice and case in UN should be confined to this point. (Two civilians also sentenced were not to be object of this particular case.)
- (3)
- Although US did not have any accurate data on soldiers from other members of 16 who might be held by ChiComs, we felt action by UN should seek their release if their detention could be demonstrated.
Representatives from all other countries expressed their extreme concern and shared our conviction that this was UN problem and that action looking to release of fliers should be taken. Hoppenot went so far as to state this was a matter of even greater concern for UN than for US.
Hoppenot, Munro (New Zealand) and Spender (Australia) all made point that our first step in the UN should be based on what all of them might be called upon to do in event decisions by SC and/or GA calling for release of fliers went unheeded.
These three, plus UK, strongly supported thesis made at noon by UK that some sort of good offices would be more likely to produce results than more straight-forward action we envisaged. Kyrou6 (Greece) suggested GA President might be asked take steps, including representations in Peking, as a first stage in seeking release of fliers.
Serrano7 (Philippines) expressed view echoed by others that UN should not call for action which ChiComs could frustrate and thereby demonstrate their successful defiance of UN. Sarper8 (Turkey) and Du Plessis9 (South Africa) both referred to possibility of detention their soldiers by ChiComs and hoped whatever action UN called for would include these among them.
Johnson10 (Canada) was first to raise question of whether the ChiComs would have to be invited to present their side of the case. Urrutia referred to Art 32 of Charter which requires participation without vote of any “party to a dispute under consideration by the SC”. It was later pointed out to him that this case was not a dispute between two nations under the meaning of Art 32 but a question [Page 985] of a breach of an agreement between the UC acting for the UN on the one hand, and the other side. UN action therefore was tantamount to one party to a contract calling upon the other party to live up to its agreement.
Other members of the 16 agreed to contact their govts immediately and seek instructions. South Africa, in particular, expressed desirability of US Missions abroad advising the various govts as to US thinking in this regard. I said principal point of contact would have to be NY but I agreed to present South Africa’s suggestion to attention of Dept.
Dept may wish to consider advisability informing US Embassies in capitals of 16 on general lines we are following here.
If possible, we hope have further meeting of 16 tomorrow at which time various issues raised today can be further thrashed out and possibly an agreed course of action reached. It may therefore be desirable to put before 16 as working paper text of draft resolution already conveyed to Dept by phone.
I have also informed Lebanon, Chinese, Brazilian and Danish Dels (other friendly members SC) of our intentions.
- Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State.↩
- Henri Hoppenot, French Permanent Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Francisco Urrutia, Colombian Permanent Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Peter E. Ramsbotham, First Secretary of the British Mission at the United Nations.↩
- The 16 powers that had contributed to the UN military effort in Korea.↩
- Alexis Kyrou, Greek Representative at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly.↩
- Felixberto M. Serrano, Philippine Representative at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly.↩
- Selim Sarper, Turkish Representative at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly.↩
- W.C. du Plessis, South African Representative at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly.↩
- David M. Johnson, Canadian Representative at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly.↩