Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/11–3054

No. 416
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bond)

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] November 30, 1954.

Subject:

• China Item: Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments

Participants:

• Mr. Leslie K. Munro, Ambassador of New Zealand
• Mr. George Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy
• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• The Secretary
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
• Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Walter McConaughy, FE
• Mr. Niles W. Bond, UNP

Ambassador Munro and Ambassador Makins called this afternoon at their request to discuss further with the Secretary developments regarding the subject item. Ambassador Munro said that Mr. Laking had discussed this matter with Mr. Murphy a short time previously, and that he, the Ambassador, would be interested in hearing the Secretary’s present views as to whether and when we should proceed with the proposed New Zealand initiative in the Security Council. He said that it was still the view of his Government that this initiative should be carried through soon, but that he realized that the attitude of the UK and the U.S. had to be considered.

Turning to the question of the mutual security pact recently negotiated by the U.S. with the Chinese Nationalists, Ambassador Munro said that it was the view of his government that it would be helpful if the accompanying exchange of notes could be made public simultaneously with the treaty. He then expressed concern regarding certain language in the proposed joint press release on the treaty, in reply to which the Secretary and Mr. Robertson advised the Ambassador that the language in question had already been revised to meet the views of the New Zealand Government, and that this revision had been accepted also by the Chinese Government. Ambassador Munro expressed his appreciation for this change.

The Secretary stated that he planned to hold a press conference tomorrow (December 1) and that the joint statement on the treaty would be released at that time.¹ He said that a good deal of information about the treaty had already leaked and that it was therefore impossible further to defer official announcement of it. In response to a question from Ambassador Munro, the Secretary confirmed that the release tomorrow would consist merely of a statement concerning the treaty and would not include the text of the treaty itself. He said that the treaty, which had already been initialed, was expected to be signed fairly quickly, although no final decision as to timing had yet been made. He pointed out that it would be inappropriate to delay the signing too long after public announcement of the treaty had been made. With respect to the accompanying notes, the Secretary said that these would be exchanged at the time the treaty was signed.

Turning to the proposed New Zealand initiative in the Security Council, the Secretary said he believed that it was still a desirable operation but that perhaps it should be deferred until after the treaty and its implications had been made known and were more clearly understood. He went on to say that he did not regard it as practicable to publish the exchange of notes simultaneously with the treaty, but that he expected they would probably be made public a few days thereafter. He said it would be hard to keep them secret any longer than that and predicted that the whole story would probably be known within a week after the initial announcement of the treaty. He said that this would clear the way for introduction of the New Zealand resolution in the Security Council if the New Zealand Government still desired to proceed, but that he believed such action should not be taken until after the exchange of notes, as well as the treaty, had been made public.

Ambassador Munro then asked what steps, if any, the U.S. Government had in mind in the UN with regard to the thirteen American citizens sentenced by the Chinese Communists, and whether this problem did not have a bearing on the present exercise. The Secretary replied that in his opinion it did have a bearing, but that he had not as yet made up his mind as to how this matter could best be handled in the UN. He added that he wished to discuss this problem with Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Phleger in New York on Friday. The Secretary then recalled that in his speech on Monday evening he had said that the U.S. felt obliged to exhaust peaceful procedures, and said that this was in keeping with our responsibilities under the Charter. He said that the U.S. Government did have in mind presenting this case to the UN since it was a UN as well as a U.S. problem, in which connection he pointed out that the persons involved were serving under the UN Command at the time of their capture. He stated that the UN Charter, in enjoining unilateral action on the part of member states in certain circumstances, presupposed that effective collective action would be taken by the UN, and that whether the members would in the future be bound by this injunction would depend on the extent to which the UN provided an acceptable substitute. He said that the case of the fliers did pose a serious problem for the UN, whose future effectiveness might well depend on its response thereto. The Secretary then pointed out that in his speech on Monday evening he had not said that the U.S. would never take action on its own in this case, our responsibility in such cases being merely to give the UN a chance to act first.

Ambassador Munro then raised the question of timing if this problem were to be taken up in the General Assembly, pointing out that the U.S. and the UK in particular were pressing for a termination of the 9th session by December 10th. The Secretary admitted that there was a problem of timing involved here. He said that if we did not act ourselves, however, the Soviets might well raise the matter under their pending aggression item, using as evidence the alleged “confessions” of the prisoners. He reiterated that we had not as yet decided whether to take this up in the General Assembly or to resort to the Security Council despite the probable Soviet veto.

With regard to the bearing of this case on the proposed New Zealand initiative, the Secretary said that, while there was no technical relationship, it was related to it in the sense that it was a factor contributing to the climate in which we had to move. He said that the present climate was not so conducive to the success of the exercise as it had been when we had first entered into conversations on this subject, but that, on the other hand, it might get even worse if something were not done. He stated it was therefore his own view that we should go ahead with the proposed action rather than postponing it on the assumption that the climate might improve. He added that there seemed to him to be little prospect for improvement unless the world were alerted to the dangers inherent in the China situation.

Ambassador Munro then stated that he was somewhat apprehensive that Chiang Kai-shek, in an effort to overcome the domestic effect of the exchange of notes, might make public statements which would be inconsistent with the defensive character of the treaty and generally be very unhelpful in the present situation. The Secretary replied that Chiang was aware that he had virtually no chance of returning to the mainland except in the event of the internal collapse of the Communist regime, and that he was under no illusion as to the purely defensive nature of the treaty. He added that internal upheaval was a difficult thing to predict in Communist countries as we could never see beneath the surface, but said that we did not exclude the possibility of such a development in China at some time in the future. Ambassador Munro expressed fear that Chiang might nevertheless indulge in bellicose talk for domestic political and psychological reasons. Mr. Robertson expressed doubt that Chiang would make such statements, but admitted the possibility that he might be disposed to interpret the treaty in a way that suited his domestic political purposes. In response to a query from the Secretary, Ambassador Munro said that he deduced from all this that the sooner the exchange of notes were to be published the better it would be, and that if Chiang were to make bellicose statements, it would very definitely play into the hands of the Communists in the UN.

The Secretary then inquired of Ambassador Makins as to the attitude of the UK on these problems. Ambassador Makins responded by reading a communication from Sir Anthony Eden reporting the views of the British Cabinet. (Copy attached as Tab A.)²

The Secretary then said that it was his opinion that it would be unwise to try to decide today whether and when to proceed with the proposed exercise. He ventured the opinion that we might know more about the prospects 48 hours from now, and that by the first of next week we might be in a position to reach a decision. He added that we saw no evidence of an immediate crisis in the area of the offshore islands. The Secretary went on to say that he believed that the proposed exercise would eventually prove useful even if little positive progress should result. He said that he saw some force in the UK view that we should proceed with the exercise in circumstances which would make it appear to be a step toward pacification, rather than as a bellicose act directed against Communist China. He said that if it were to be announced simultaneously with the treaty, it might well be regarded as part of a double-barreled offensive against the Communists. The Secretary said that it might take a few days for the treaty to be fully understood by the American people, who, because of the timing, might erroneously interpret it as a form of reprisal against the Chinese Communist action in sentencing our fliers. In these circumstances, he said, it might be difficult to obtain public acceptance of the benign interpretation which we sought to give to the treaty. He expressed the view that it would be dangerous to underestimate the strength of public feeling in the U.S. on the recent Chinese Communist action, and that this feeling must be taken into account. The Secretary went on to say that he and the President were trying to exert a moderating influence, but that they would not do so to the extent of abdicating our rights. He said that if, given the present state of public indignation, there should be a major attack by the Communists on the offshore islands at this time, he would not dare to prophesy the outcome, and that we might even be drawn into the hostilities.

Ambassador Makins said that he was inclined to agree with the Secretary’s thoughts, and that he believed the same considerations had been in the minds of the Cabinet. He said that the latter now appeared to favor a delay in the proposed Security Council action in the hope of separating it from the treaty. He acknowledged, however, that the Cabinet seemed to be thinking in terms of a longer delay than the week or two which the Secretary appeared to have in mind. He said he wished to emphasize, however, Sir Anthony’s statement that his message represented the present view of the Cabinet, which wished to have the matter considered further with the Secretary, presumably here in Washington.

The Secretary suggested that a further meeting be held next Monday to reexamine the situation in the light of developments. He then asked the Ambassadors to convey to their Governments the view of the U.S. that the UN had a clear responsibility in the situation created by the Chinese Communist imprisonment of the U.S. fliers, and that if it did not live up to its responsibility in such cases it might be hard for individual members to avoid direct unilateral action. He said that this was a problem for all of the members and one which involved the very future of the UN.

The meeting adjourned after a brief discussion of other matters.

1. The text of the joint U.S.–Chinese statement and the text of statements with regard to the treaty made by Dulles at his press conference on Dec. 1 are printed in Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 895–898.
2. The attached document, unsigned and undated, stated the Cabinet’s conclusion that, in the light of the U.S. treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese sentencing of the American prisoners, the chance that Oracle (the New Zealand resolution) might lead to a relaxation of tension had been still further reduced and it might instead do more harm than good. The Cabinet thought the decision with regard to Oracle should be deferred until some time had elapsed after the announcement of the treaty.