793.5/11–2254
No. 400
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)
Subject:
- Mutual Defense Treaty—Eighth Meeting
Participants:
- Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
- Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- Dr. Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
- Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA
Mr. Robertson referred to the conversation of November 19 regarding the effect of the proposed exchange of notes on the right of the Chinese Government to intercept Communist shipping without joint agreement. He said he felt that interception of shipping did involve the use of force from the treaty area and therefore was covered by the language of the exchange of notes. It was true that the U.S. has contributed to the capabilities of the Chinese Navy. The U.S. believes that collaboration should continue. However this Government does not want to be in a position of having no control over offensive action against Communist shipping which could provoke retaliation and lead to war. His thought was that while interception activities were covered by the terms of the exchange of notes, we should be governed by the circumstances of each individual case. Decision would be made in accordance with the conditions existing at the time. He recalled that the Soviets have raised the so-called “piracy item” in the UN. We are assisting the Chinese UN delegate in defending against this Charge.
Mr. Robertson added that we wanted the treaty to be advantageous to the Chinese Government, but the U.S. Government had to go into the treaty with its eyes open, knowing precisely what the risks were, and maintaining control of the risks so far as possible. Mr. Robertson quoted the Legal Adviser as believing that it would be psychologically advantageous to the Chinese Government to give wide publicity to the exchange of notes. This was because the notes associated the two governments more closely than ever before and made it clear that necessary military actions of the Chinese Government would have the agreement of the U.S.
Dr. Yeh said he wanted to clarify the ship interception matter additionally. He wanted it understood that the U.S. would have no objection to a continuation of the practice as it now stands.
[Page 922]Mr. Robertson said it was his impression that the Secretary did not feel that he could agree to the blanket exclusion from the terms of the exchange of notes of any offensive action which might bring on retaliation. This is the danger we are trying to guard against in the exchange of notes.
Ambassador Koo said he took this to mean that the present practice would continue, subject to joint consultation.
Mr. Robertson said he thought the answer was yes. He remarked that under the treaty our common interests would be more closely bound together than before. We would be more directly associated than under the 7th Fleet Order. It would be a close alliance. Where military action was involved there would be consultation as in the past. The exchange of notes would formalize the commitment, which would otherwise be of the same nature as that which already exists between CINCPAC and the Chinese authorities. The exchange of notes was intended to cover all forms of offensive military action.
Dr. Yeh said that he wanted to state for the record that from the Chinese Government point of view the interception of ships carrying strategic material to Communist China was not an offensive action. It was self defense. This was especially true as to cargo destined for the Amoy area. It was all strategic and invariably directly used against the Chinese Government. The Mainland coast is very long and at best the Chinese Government naval forces can cover only a small portion of it. Interceptions take place only in or near the Formosa strait. The affected shipping constituted a direct threat to Formosa and the Pescadores. Hence the Chinese Government wanted to continue its port closure policy. The Chinese Government consistently has acted with great caution. The Chinese Government recognizes that its enforcement of this policy must not harm American interests or Sino-American joint interests. The Chinese Government will consult the U.S. Government in the future as in the past. So far the interception policy has not endangered the U.S. Government.
Mr. Robertson said that perhaps the Foreign Minister should meet with the Secretary to consider this interpretation. He said that the extent to which the Chinese Government was free to act without agreement and the extent to which it was obligated to seek agreement should be made very clear. Mr. Robertson recalled that a Chinese destroyer escort had been torpedoed by the Chinese Communists a few days before. The naval situation had explosive potential. He said that it was not the U.S. intention to hamper the Chinese Government in the discharge of missions which were in our joint interest. We wanted to work together. Mr. Robertson said that he wanted to say for the record that the point raised needed to be [Page 923] clarified. He could not yet say whether the U.S. accepted the Chinese interpretation.
Ambassador Koo said that as a practical matter the representatives of the two governments are in the habit of consulting as allies on these matters. He felt that the Chinese Foreign Minister’s view was a reasonable interpretation. Mr. Robertson said you cannot stop shipping without the use of force, whether it is necessary to apply the force or not.
Dr. Yeh said he preferred to let the present arrangements in this respect remain in effect rather than have a special interpretation attached to any article of the treaty. He said he raised the question because he wanted to be entirely fair. He said the treaty relationship would not work if anything went amiss through a misunderstanding. He felt that both he and Mr. Robertson were responsible as negotiators to work out a complete understanding. He felt it was to the mutual interest to agree to let the ship interception matter rest as it was.
Mr. Robertson said he did not think so. It was better to clarify the matter fully.
Dr. Yeh asked if the Secretary had yet considered the matter.
Mr. Robertson said the Secretary had not yet finished his review of the problem. He was not authorized to accept the Chinese interpretation without further consultation.
Ambassador Koo said the retention of the right of self-defense was important. So long as his Government consulted with the U.S. authorities as in the past, the essential thing was done.
Mr. Robertson said the Secretary had observed that good faith must be exercised on both sides. Circumstances and conditions may change. The naval issue involves a delicate question which calls for a clear understanding.
Dr. Yeh said that he and Ambassador Koo were of the same opinion. The Chinese military authorities would continue to consult with the U.S. representatives in good faith, but did not want any limiting interpretation attached to the treaty or the exchange of notes.
Ambassador Koo said his Government could claim the right of self-defense. In a sense the question was academic since he was confident that the two sides could have an understanding without changing the language of the notes.
Dr. Yeh said Secretary Dulles could rest assured that the Chinese Government would not take advantage of the treaty to intercept vessels to a degree which would involve the U.S.
Mr. Robertson said the consequences of ship interception could not be predicted.
[Page 924]Dr. Yeh said the Chinese Navy did not intend to use guns against any merchant ship. He mentioned the interception of the Soviet Tanker Tuapse.
Mr. Robertson said the Secretary felt that ship interceptions comprised a use of force.
Dr. Yeh said that surely the Secretary did not contend that the Treaty prohibited ship interceptions.
Mr. Robertson said he thought the Secretary felt interception plans called for consultation. He wanted to finish his conversation with the Secretary on this matter. The consequences of ship interception could invoke the treaty. Mr. Robertson mentioned that the Secretary was planning to leave on November 24. He wanted to finalize the Treaty arrangements before then. He thought that perhaps the Foreign Minister would wish to communicate with his Government in regard to the announcement.
Dr. Yeh said he had received a telegram from Vice Minister Chen [Shen] that morning. There were so many rumors that either he or Premier O.K. Yui would have to make a report to the Foreign Affairs Committee soon. Chen [Shen] had suggested that Foreign Minister Yeh return. Dr. Yeh asked if Mr. Robertson had consulted the Congressional leaders?
Mr. Robertson said he had consulted some, but not all. He was seeing some of them again on November 23—Senators George, Mansfield and Knowland. He wanted to show them all the draft documents. Mr. Robertson said the longer the delay in completing the treaty negotiations the more irresponsible speculation there would be. He stressed the importance of reaching full agreement, or else discontinuing the negotiations.
Dr. Yeh said that he could not stave off the Foreign Affairs Committee very long after an official announcement was made.
Mr. Robertson said the Secretary would not release any information until full agreement was reached on the text. He mentioned that he had flown to Georgia in October to see Senator George about the Treaty. Senator George had approved the Treaty in principle but he has not yet seen the full text. He had recently talked to Senator Sparkman informally about the Treaty. The Department wanted to go over the Treaty with Senators in both parties so the leaders would be prepared when the announcement was made. It was difficult to get all the committee members together.
Dr. Yeh said that he could refuse to show the text to members of the Legislative Yuan until the Treaty was signed.
Mr. Robertson said that we were holding the Treaty text very close. It went from person to person only by safe hand. No extra copies were made. The people who are handling it will not talk. The whole thing is being carried forward on an intimate basis. The [Page 925] Department is earnestly endeavoring to meet the Chinese wishes. We believe that the text now represents the attitude and view of both sides. He had the feeling as to the present text that “This is it”. The question was how to handle the final details. There should be a clear understanding before it was initialled.
Dr. Yeh said he agreed. A clear understanding should be reached as soon as possible. He would have to make a secret report to the Legislative Yuan at about the time the text of the Treaty is released. Otherwise the Legislative Yuan would be offended.
Dr. Yeh asked if we were absolutely insistent on the last sentence of the exchange of notes. Mr. Robertson said this was correct. Psychologically it strengthens the case for the Treaty. It would disarm critics of the Treaty.
Dr. Yeh said he had two points to make about the proposed joint statement: 1) the U.S. draft was not in joint form. The U.S. seemed to be speaking. 2) The last paragraph is in the future tense, but yet it recapitulates what is past.
Dr. Yeh said his Government hoped that the exchange of notes would not be simultaneous with the signing of the treaty. His Government suggested an interval of one or two weeks would be appropriate.
Ambassador Koo said that the lapse of some interval was certainly important.
Mr. Robertson observed that the exchange of notes was an integral part of the understanding attendant upon the Treaty. There would be no ratification of the Treaty without the exchange of notes.
Dr. Yeh said the interval would help him in presenting the matter to the Legislative Yuan. There would be no disadvantage to the U.S. in waiting a few days.
Mr. Robertson agreed that the exchange of notes could follow shortly after the signature of the Treaty.
Dr. Yeh suggested an interval of 10 days. He felt there was nothing to be lost by waiting for this period.
Mr. Robertson suggested that the final paragraph of the joint announcement read “Following the signing of the treaty, an exchange of notes will set forth certain understandings relating to its operation, including a recognition of the inherent right of the Republic of China as to the self-defense of territories now or hereafter under its control, and agreements as to the mutual interests of the parties in the security and defense of the treaty territories”.
As to the timing, Mr. Robertson felt we should have early arrangement as to date of initialling, date of signature, and the date of release of the joint communiqué.
[Page 926]Dr. Yeh said that time should be allowed for experts to go over the text carefully in both languages. He felt that both languages should be equally authentic.
Mr. Robertson said he thought we could initial the Treaty right away. It would not be necessary to put it in Chinese before initialling the text. The joint statement should be agreed upon before arrangements for signature were made.
Dr. Yeh said that he wanted the Vice Minister to see the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative Yuan before the exchange of notes was published.
Ambassador Koo said the schedule as he envisaged it was as follows:
- 1.
- initial the Treaty
- 2.
- issue joint statement
- 3.
- sign the Treaty.
Mr. Robertson suggested that the treaty be initialled on Wednesday the 24th.
Dr. Yeh said this was agreeable. He would tentatively agree to announce the Treaty on noon November 29 which would be 1 a.m. on November 30 in Taipei.