Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.00/11–554

No. 384
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 5, 1954—6–6:30 p.m.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Spender, Australia
• Mr. MacArthur

Ambassador Spender called at his request upon the Secretary. He said he had received a cable from Prime Minister Menzies and Foreign Minister Casey regarding the proposed security treaty between the US and Nationalist China and the proposed New Zealand Security Council resolution. Rather than go over this cable verbally, he had summarized the salient points made by his Government in a memorandum, which he handed the Secretary. (Attached.)²

The Secretary read the memorandum and asked if this was a full résumé of the points which the Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had made. Ambassador Spender replied in the affirmative and then made reference to the Chalmers Roberts article in this morning’s Washington Post regarding the negotiation of a security treaty with Nationalist China. He asked whether the discussions with the Chinese Nationalists had progressed further since he had discussed this with the Secretary on October 31³ and whether we were in fact in real negotiation with the Chinese Nationalists. The Secretary replied by saying that at this stage the conversations with Foreign Minister Yeh had proceeded further in that we had this week had two exchanges of views with Yeh on the contents of a possible mutual defense treaty.

Sir Percy then inquired whether the US was committed to such a treaty. The Secretary replied that in principle we were committed to a treaty if agreement could be reached on a basis which was satisfactory to the US Government. He explained that there was nothing new in our discussion of a security treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, since the latter had been raising this question with us for over a year; when he had visited Formosa in September and Mr. Robertson had visited there in early October, Chiang Kai-shek had pressed for a security treaty. The Secretary said that the formulation of a treaty was extremely difficult for reasons which he had explained to the Ambassador, particularly since the treaty would only cover specifically Formosa and the Pescadores, and since it was defensive in character. This raised a problem for the Chinese Nationalists with respect to the off-shore islands, but he believed that they had weighed the advantages and disadvantages and concluded that a treaty covering Formosa and the Pescadores had advantages which out-weighed the disadvantages of excluding Quemoy and the other small islands. The Secretary said that while the treaty area would not cover these small islands, it would not exclude the possiblity of our joining in their defense if we conclude that it is essential to the defense of Formosa. Ambassador Spender asked how this would be handled in the text of the treaty and the Secretary replied that we had not yet gotten that far.

Ambassador Spender then asked how far we had got with the Chinese Nationalists regarding the terms of the treaty. The Secretary replied that he thought the status was about 60–40. There were certain provisions which followed the other similar treaties we have negotiated in the Pacific area which did not raise any real problems. However, there were other complicated issues which he had just explained to the Ambassador which were difficult. Furthermore, in the past we had not concluded any treaties with countries while they were in a state of war, which was the situation existing between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. The Secretary said it was very important in drawing up a treaty to strike the right balance, and that a number of the points set forth in the Australian memo which Sir Percy had handed him had been in his mind for a long time. The important thing was to strike a proper balance which on the one hand would in no way impede the inherent right of self-defense which the Chinese Nationalists must enjoy, and on the other hand not have a situation where the US might be dragged into hostilities by unilateral action of the Chinese Nationalists. Sir Percy said he could understand the difficulties and he assumed that when the Secretary had made reference to 40% of the difficulties in drawing a treaty still remaining to be solved, he had in mind this striking of the appropriate balance. The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

Sir Percy then inquired what value any action in the UN would be if we concluded a defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalists. The Secretary said the value of UN action would be to stop the fighting in the small off-shore islands which would not be covered in the treaty area. Fighting in these islands could spread and develop into a general war, which everyone wished to avoid. In effect, the Secretary believed that UN action with respect to the off-shore islands would have the effect of diplomatic action, which was proposed in the memo which Sir Percy had handed him. Diplomatic action presented many difficulties, since the US, for example, did not even have relations with the Chinese Communists. Similarly, the Australians had no relations with the Chinese Communists. Furthermore, the Secretary felt that action with respect to the Security Council along the lines of the New Zealand memorandum might result in a cooling-off period and a hesitancy on the part of the Chinese Communists to hot up or make an all-out assault on Quemoy and the other small islands.

Sir Percy inquired what we would do if the USSR vetoed the Security Council resolution. The Secretary answered that as a practical matter, we would be right where we were when the action was put forward. He added that we had talked generally with the UK and New Zealand about this, and he believed there was general agreement that if the USSR vetoed, we would leave the matter with the Security Council and not try to push it in the General Assembly.

Sir Percy then inquired whether there was not danger of a Chinese Nationalist veto. The Secretary replied that while the Chinese Nationalists were not happy about the New Zealand resolution and did not like it, he did not believe they would veto, but as of today he could not be certain of this. Sir Percy asked whether, if we did not have a specific commitment from the Chinese Nationalists not to veto, we would still go ahead with the UN action. The Secretary replied that he did not know whether we could get a specific commitment from the Chinese Nationalists, but we would use our influence to persuade them not to veto. The Chinese Nationalists certainly would not support the New Zealand resolution, and we would not press them to do so, but we would do what we could to hold their opposition short of a veto.

Sir Percy then said that before leaving he would specifically like to inquire whether we agreed to the Australian proposal that in the future they should participate in further discussions between the US, UK, and New Zealand with respect to this entire matter. He said the Australian Government had been deeply hurt at not being made a party from the very beginning to the US-UK-New Zealand discussions and negotiations. As a staunch partner and ally of the US, Australia felt that it should be included. He believed the Australian Government had a better understanding of the matter since he had fully reported the Secretary’s explanations given him last Sunday evening,⁴ but he nevertheless still felt very strongly that the Australians should participate directly in future talks. The Secretary replied that we would keep the Australian Embassy in close touch with all that went on in our discussions. Sir Percy said they wanted more than being kept in close touch—they wanted actually to sit in on the discussions and have the possibility of having Australian governmental views considered before decisions were taken. The Secretary replied that he could not promise this. As he had explained before, New Zealand had a special status in this matter because it was a member of the Security Council. If we started taking Australia into the discussions, there would be no reason why we should not take in the Philippines and our other Manila Pact powers. He said we wanted the Australian Government to be fully and currently informed and we would keep them fully informed, but this was the extent of the commitment which he could make.

1. A note by O’Connor, attached to the source text, indicates that Secretary Dulles had cleared only the last page (the last paragraph).
2. The document, headed “Formosa” and dated Nov. 5, raised several questions with regard to the proposed treaty and Security Council resolution and recommended that both should be put aside for the present and that the whole question should be explored privately with like-minded governments with a view to subsequent diplomatic approaches to Peking and Moscow. It also stated that Australia had a direct interest in the problem and that the Australian Government considered that it should be a participant in the discussions taking place between the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand.
3. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
4. Oct. 31.