793.00/11–354: Telegram

No. 381
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

top secret

278. Very limited distribution. Eyes only Rankin. FYI. Following is excerpt from instruction November 3 from CNO to CINCPAC1 regarding concurrence in ChiNat air retaliation against ChiComs:

“Concurrence will not be given for air retaliation against Mainland fields in this instance. In event of further ChiCom air attack against Tachen, you are authorized to acquiesce in ChiNat air retaliation provided that such retaliation can be initiated with sufficient promptness as would leave no doubt that the ChiNat reaction is, in fact, a retaliation for the specific ChiCom attack, and further provided that the targets attacked in retaliation meet your criteria as to feasibility and chance of success. Retaliation targets should be selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further ChiCom reaction against Formosa itself.

ChiCom air attack against other off-shore islands will be considered in Washington on its merits if and when occurring and is not considered as falling within purview of these instructions. In the event that ChiNat retaliation should provoke air attack against targets on Formosa, special considerations would be involved. Should Seventh Fleet aircraft encounter ChiCom aircraft in the act of attacking Formosan targets, they would be justified, within the framework of existing instructions, in repelling attack by force. Current instructions with respect to the Seventh Fleet’s responsibilities in defense of Formosa are not to be interpreted as authorizing you or your subordinate commanders to engage ChiCom forces, except as indicated above, nor to initiate attacks against China mainland targets except as necessary to provide for the security of your own forces.

MND Taipei should be made to clearly understand that ChiCom reaction to ChiNat retaliation involving ChiCom air attack against [Page 855] Formosan targets does not obligate United States to employ Seventh Fleet forces in further action against ChiCom forces.”2

Dulles
  1. Telegram 031925Z from CNO to CINCPAC, Nov. 3. (JCS records, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48) Sec. 86)
  2. A letter of Nov. 5 from General Chase to General Peng expressed nonconcurrence in “your proposal for CAF attacks of the Ningpo, Hangchow and Chuhsien airfields as retaliation for the Communist attack of Ta Chen last Monday, 1 November 1954”, proposed a conference to discuss the types of counteraction the Chinese might wish to take in the event of additional air attacks against Ta Chen, and stated:

    “I am directed to make certain that the Ministry of National Defense clearly understands that in event of a Communist attack against Formosa resulting directly from ‘unauthorized’ GRC retaliatory action, there is no obligation on the United States to employ the 7th Fleet to counter such Communist military actions, and that new instructions would be required as to 7th Fleet participation in further action against Communist forces.”

    An undated copy of the letter is in Taipei Embassy files, lot 62 F 83. According to despatch 646 from Taipei, May 10, 1956, which quotes the statement above, the letter was dated Nov. 5. (793.5/5–1056)