793.00/11–154
No. 373
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and
Security Affairs (Bond)1
Subject:
- China item: Consultations with the United Kingdom and New Zealand
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Mr. David Key, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Niles W. Bond, UN Political and Security Affairs
- Sir Robert Scott, Minister of British Embassy
- Mr. G. R. Laking, Minister of New Zealand Embassy
Sir Robert Scott and Mr. Laking came in today at the former’s request to discuss with the Secretary recent developments affecting the subject item.
Sir Robert opened the meeting by stating that his Embassy, with the thought that the Secretary might wish to show the text of the New Zealand resolution to Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh, had telegraphed London to see if the Foreign Office had any additional changes to suggest in that text. He said that Sir Anthony Eden had replied in the negative, but had expressed the hope that if the resolution were to be shown to the Chinese Nationalists it would be made clear to them that the UK would not be finally committed to it until it had had a chance to see what form the proposed U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China would assume. The Secretary remarked in this connection that we had been running into difficulties in our discussions with the Chinese Nationalists, and that there had even been differences of opinion within our own Government concerning this exercise.
Sir Robert said that his Government was still troubled by the question of how the proposed course of action could be sold to Peiping, adding that the British Chargé d’Affaires in Peiping, Humphrey Trevelyan, had predicted a bitterly negative reaction from the Chinese Communists. Sir Robert then handed the Secretary a copy of Mr. Trevelyan’s report (the text of which is attached).2
[Page 824]Sir Robert said his Government was awaiting with interest the results of Prime Minister Nehru’s conversations in Peiping,3 the purport of which was still not known in London. He added that Mr. Nehru was expected back on November 5, and that it was Sir Anthony Eden’s thought that, subject to U.S. approval, it would be well to disclose to him at an early date the general outlines of our proposed exercise. He said that Sir Anthony believed that the Indian reaction would be strongly negative unless Nehru could be persuaded in advance of its advantages.
The Secretary, referring to Mr. Trevelyan’s message, remarked that it might be that the intensity of the feeling of both Chinese Governments on this subject might make the whole operation unfeasible. He noted in this connection that opposition on the part of the Chinese Nationalists was mounting rather than otherwise, and that the more they thought about it the less they liked it. Referring to morning press reports of the Communist bombing of the Tachen islands, the Secretary said that this increased the urgency of the exercise and provided a new source of concern over the possible outcome of developments in that area. He said that he had talked this morning with the President and the Secretary of Defense and that the U.S. would probably take steps to provide additional logistical support to the Chinese garrisons on those islands.
Sir Robert then said that there would appear to have been at least a partial leak of the plans on which we had been working, as evidenced by a piece by Walter Winchell, the text of which Mr. Laking showed to the Secretary. The Secretary remarked that it was a pretty garbled version but that Winchell was obviously on the scent. Mr. Laking said that he was worried by Winchell’s mention of Australia and New Zealand in this connection and that he believed Canberra and Wellington should be forewarned in the event questions should be asked. The Secretary indicated that he did not believe that we should allow Winchell’s story to push us into making any statements which we did not wish to make.
Sir Robert said that the one specific point which he had been instructed to discuss with the Secretary was the desire of his Government, which he had mentioned earlier, to discuss the proposed mutual defense treaty and New Zealand resolution with Mr. Nehru as far in advance of any public announcement as possible. He said [Page 825] that London felt that Mr. Nehru’s visit might have been educational and that they were anxious to try to bring home to him the advantages of a course of action which might have the effect of steering us away from the alternative of war. He said the only specific information which the Foreign Office appeared to have received concerning that visit was that Pillai, who accompanied Mr. Nehru, had told Trevelyan in Peiping that Mr. Nehru had received the impression that Moscow and Peiping had arrived at an agreed point of view with respect to what should be done about Formosa, but that this point of view had not been disclosed to the Prime Minister.
The Secretary said that there was an element of timing involved here and that, unless events should necessitate emergency action on the part of the UN, he did not believe that we would be sufficiently sure of the Chinese Nationalist attitude to be able to proceed any further before the first of next week. He stated that the Nationalist attitude had deteriorated from one of reluctant acceptance to one of apparent unwillingness to go along with the plan, and added that it was possible they might even publicly denounce the whole scheme. The Secretary said, however, that U.S. relations with Nationalist China were so close that we could not proceed without having reached some accord with them on this subject. He said that he proposed to talk with George Yeh within the next day or so, but pointed out that it was only Chiang Kai-shek who would have final authority to decide the Nationalist Chinese attitude.
The Secretary then went on to say that our own Joint Chiefs of Staff were not very happy with the plan either. In response to Sir Robert’s question as to what alternative there was, the Secretary said that this was exactly the question he had asked the Joint Chiefs. He said he feared that the U.S. might otherwise find itself involved in a war with Communist China, which it was our policy to avoid. Such a war, he said, would be easy to start but hard to finish. He added that it might be that such a war could not be avoided, but that it must not be we who precipitate it.
Sir Robert said that he was very much discouraged about the general prospect in the Far East, citing current difficulties in Korea and Indochina in addition to the explosive possibilities of the China situation. As indicative of the growing importance of the China question, Sir Robert said that Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida, during his talks with UK officials in London, had shown himself to be mainly concerned with the question of Japan’s relations with mainland China, particularly with respect to trade.
Sir Robert said then that he would report to London that it might be next week before the U.S. Government would regard itself as sufficiently squared away to consider agreeing to talks [Page 826] with Mr. Nehru. The Secretary indicated assent, but went on to say that he saw no harm in their discussing with Mr. Nehru the general situation in the Far East, which it must be apparent to everyone was becoming more aggravated, particularly with the reported attacks on Tachen. The Secretary concluded by saying that if the Chinese Communists persisted in their present aggressive tactics to the extent of trying to seize Formosa, there was no question but what they would have a war on their hands.
- A note attached to the source text indicates that it was approved by the Secretary.↩
- The report, not dated, predicted that the Chinese Communists would not separate the offshore islands question from the question of Formosa; that they would interpret an announcement of a prospective U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalists as notice that Formosa was to be permanently separated from the mainland; and that, under these circumstances, they would regard acceptance of the New Zealand proposal as tantamount to acquiescence in such a separation. British support of the proposal, Trevelyan thought, would make the Chinese associate the United Kingdom with U.S. Formosa policy and give up all hope that the British might secure any modification in U.S. Far Eastern policy and Security Council action would not bring about an agreement on the islands and might increase tension in the area.↩
- Nehru had been in the People’s Republic of China, Oct. 19–30.↩