Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 302
Memorandum of Discussion at the 215th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 24, 19541

top secret
eyes only

[Extracts]

Present at the 215th meeting of the Council were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item [Page 659] 3); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Rose; Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security2

. . . . . . .

Mr. Dulles then produced charts analyzing military activity in the Quemoy area from September 3 to September 22, inclusive. These charts indicated the artillery rounds, naval gun fire, Chinese Nationalist bombing of the Amoy region during this interval.

Mr. Dulles then commented that Chinese Communist apparent concentration on Quemoy may prove to be a feint, with the Tachen Islands the actual objective. Accordingly, developments in the latter area were being carefully scrutinized. Governor Stassen indicated his belief that the Chinese Communists were quite likely to make a sudden move against the Tachen Islands.

. . . . . . .

3. Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands (NSC 5429/2; NSC Action No. 1224-b3)

Secretary Dulles said that he had had quite extensive discussion of the proposal for dealing with the offshore island problem in the UN, with Foreign Secretary Eden in London last Friday. Eden had listened with interest, but was guarded and non-committal in his response because of the inherent complications of the question. He had said that he would, however, give the matter study, and yesterday in New York, Dixon had come to see Secretary Dulles with a series of questions which had arisen in Eden’s mind since his first conversation with Secretary Dulles. These questions were mostly technical and legal in character. Eden had said, however, that while he thought there would be a great deal of support in the UN for a U.S. position against Chinese Communist attempts to seize [Page 660] Formosa, similar support would not be forthcoming for the defense of Quemoy.

Secretary Wilson inquired how the United States would feel if we got this thing before the UN and the UN recommended the return of the offshore islands to the Chinese Communists.

Secretary Dulles replied that of course he wouldn’t feel very happy about such an outcome, but that it would be better for the United States to get out of the islands under such circumstances than merely to run away from them with our tail between our legs.

Governor Stassen expressed fear that the Chinese Communists might attack the offshore islands within a month’s time and before any decision could be reached by the UN. He expressed the belief that in that event the United States ought to “slap them down” but then withdraw and avoid any involvement in war with China. He said he remained convinced that the Chinese Communists were simply probing the intentions of the U.S., and that if we met force with force they would not press an attack on the islands.

Secretary Humphrey said that it was his understanding at Denver that we had decided to pull out of Quemoy and were simply searching for the best possible alibi.

In the course of discussion as to whether the renewal on September 22 of heavy bombardment of Quemoy by the Chinese Communists was the direct result of continuing Chinese Nationalist military action in the vicinity of Amoy, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the Chinese Nationalists had generally followed the advice we had given them with respect to action in this area.

The National Security Council:4

Discussed the subject in the light of an interim oral report by the Secretary of State on actions taken to date pursuant to NSC Action No. 1224-b.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason
  1. Drafted by Gleason on Sept. 27.
  2. This portion of the memorandum summarized an intelligence briefing by Allen Dulles; only those paragraphs pertaining to China are printed here.
  3. See footnote 9, Document 293.
  4. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1228. (S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1954”)