Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “China”

No. 291
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 11 September 1954.

Subject:

• U.S. policy regarding off-shore Islands held by Chinese Nationalist Forces, NSC Action 1206-f.

1. As a result of NSC Action 1206–f taken at their meeting on 18 August 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested by the Acting Secretary of Defense to forward their views on United States policy in regard to the islands close to the mainland of China now held by the Chinese Nationalist forces. In their memorandum of 2 September 1954,¹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded split views to the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations held one view. The Chief of Staff U.S. Army held another. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the views of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force. The Marine Corps was represented in the discussions which led to the preparation of this split paper but did not express a direct interest and therefore their views did not appear.

2. In accordance with an understanding between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense a discussion of the differing views contained in the memorandum of 2 September 1954 was held with the Acting Secretary of Defense on 3 September 1954 and prior to the formal submission of the split views therein. At the time this discussion was held the first dispatches on Chinese Communist action directed against Quemoy Island had come in, and as a consequence there was some discussion of this situation. Later in the afternoon of 3 September 1954, the Acting Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with the Acting Secretary of State in regard to the situation posed by the Communist action against Quemoy Island. As a result of this conference, the Acting Secretary of Defense dispatched a message to the President which outlined the Communist action against Quemoy, described in general terms the military situation there, and gave the President an outline of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 2 September 1954 in regard to off-shore Islands, pointing out that it had been written before reports of Communist action against Quemoy had been received. Copies of this dispatch were sent to the Secretary of State in Manila, the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Felix B. Stump (CINCPAC), and delivered to the State Department in Washington.

3. The Secretary of State in telegrams from Manila on September 4th and 5th² expressed certain views in regard to the situation at Quemoy and in these messages propounded two cogent questions:

a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that from a military point of view the defense of Quemoy Island is substantially related to the defense of Formosa?

b. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Quemoy Island is defensible by the Chinese Nationalists with U.S. assistance?

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after conferring with the Acting Secretary of Defense decided that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should prepare their views on these two questions as soon as possible. Two special meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were held on Sunday, 5 September 1954, and Monday, 6 September 1954. These meetings again resulted in split views. Forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A) are the views of the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Enclosure (B) contains the views of the Chief of Staff U.S. Army. The comments of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Enclosures (A) and (B) are contained in the appendix to this memorandum.

4. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is firmly convinced that the decision of the United States to act with military force, if necessary, in support of the Chinese Nationalists in this instance will have far reaching implications—politically, psychologically, and militarily—vis-à-vis the Communist regimes. Initially this reaction will serve United States interests with respect to the Chinese, subsequently in other areas of the Far East, and ultimately on a global basis. He considers that the policy recommended in Enclosure (A) to the memorandum of 2 September 1954, and reflected in Enclosure (A) to this memorandum, will enhance the position of the free world and will lead to a deterioration of that of the Communists. On the other hand, to follow the policy advocated by the Chief of Staff U.S. Army will lead to further deterioration of the posture of the United States and to greater and greater accretions to Communists strength and influence worldwide.

5. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concludes that the question involved in a decision pro or con on the use of United States forces to assist in the defense of Quemoy and other off-shore Islands now held by the Chinese Nationalists is fundamental in the following respects:

a. It affects the broad context of U.S. policy not only in the Far East but throughout the world;

b. As specifically related to the Far East, it affects the policy to be adopted by the United States in regard to that part of the world as a whole and particularly towards Communist China. Collaterally, the issue involves the will of the United States to support the defensive military operations of the Chinese Nationalists as an ally and to sustain the viability of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China;

c. The decision regarding Quemoy Island should be made in the light of our determination to resist the further spread of Communism. If we decide to resist such a limited aggression, we do risk an enlarged conflict. If we fail to resist this aggression, we commit the United States further to a negative policy which could result in a progressive loss of free world strength to local aggression until or unless all-out conflict is forced upon us.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends that the Secretary of Defense support the position taken in Enclosure (A) to this memorandum and in Enclosure (A) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 2 September 1954.

[Appendix]

Comments by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)

Chairman’s Comments on Enclosure (A)

1. On pages 2 and 3³ a statement is made to the effect that the Communists could mount an assault against Quemoy in the space of a couple of hours. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff feels that this is an extremely optimistic estimate of Communist capabilities. The difficulties of loading and transporting a sizeable force in junks and sampans at night with the coordination necessary to concentrate a sizeable simultaneous attack at one point, are considerable. The Chairman believes that it would be possible by proper reconnaissance and intelligence to predict, in advance, an attack of this kind since large numbers of junks and sampans would have to be concentrated.

2. On page 3,⁴ it is again stated that successful defense of the islands of Quemoy and Little Quemoy in the face of a determined attack would probably involve U.S. forces in some action against the mainland. The Chairman feels that it would undoubtedly involve some action by U.S. forces against the Chinese mainland.

Chairman’s Comments on Enclosure (B)

3. On page 3, paragraph 5 (a) it is stated in part that “Chinese Communist air forces are capable of massing sufficient MIG 15’s without warning to gain local air superiority over the target area. Within a period of from 12 to 18 hours, up to 550 jet fighters and 150 piston fighters could be available. 250 piston type bombers and 150 IL 28’s also could be employed without warning.” The Chairman feels that this is an extremely optimistic estimate of the Chinese Communist air capabilities and does not agree that the Chinese Communists have a capability of employing a force of this magnitude without warning, assuming reasonable reconnaissance and intelligence efforts continue to be made by the Chinese Nationalists and/or our own forces. The Chinese Communist Air Force figures given are the major part of their combat strength—including most of the aircraft now deployed in Manchuria.

4. On page 4, paragraph 5 (c), it is stated that a successful defense of Quemoy Island would require the commitment of at least one division of U.S. ground forces with necessary antiaircraft artillery and supporting troops in addition to U.S. naval and air forces. The Chairman does not agree that it is necessary to commit U.S. ground forces since the Chinese nationalists are fully capable of providing additional manpower for the defense of this position. U.S. material assistance will, of course, be necessary and limited technical assistance may be desirable.

5. On page 5, paragraph 6 (a), the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, discusses the effect of redeployment of certain air squadrons to Formosa as requested by CINCPAC. CINCFE’s views on this redeployment are attached to Enclosure (B) as an appendix. In connection with these comments, the Chairman feels that sufficient air strength (probably one interceptor wing) can be redeployed from the Japan–Korea area without unduly jeopardizing the security of our forces there. He points out that an attack on Japan, such as is envisaged by CINCFE, would involve a totally different situation requiring implementation of our global war plans.

6. On pages 5 and 6, paragraph 6(b) (c), the freedom of action proposed in Enclosure (A), to be granted to the responsible U.S. commander in the area, is alleged to confer upon a subordinate military commander, the power of decision with regard to peace or war. The Chairman considers this an exaggeration. The authority of the commander concerned would be clearly delineated in the orders promulgated to him in consonance with orders from the President, even as they are presently clearly and definitely set forth in the directives to the Commander 7th Fleet in pursuance of existing policy regarding the defense of Formosa. Furthermore, recognition should be accorded to the reliability of our modern communication systems, which enable a prompt and adequate flow of information between the commanders on the scene, the Commander in Chief Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

7. On page 6, paragraph 7, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, states that the risks involved in a decision to assist in the defense of Quemoy would demand emergency action to strengthen the entire National Military Establishment. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in complete disagreement. The current military concept of the United States envisages the application of U.S. military force on a limited basis in supporting the ground forces of our allies and coping with so-called “brush fires.” While some minor adjustments in our military deployments and programs might be indicated in this eventuality, they should not, at this time and under these circumstances, involve major changes in our military programs in anticipation of either all-out war with Communist China or general war. Actually this recommendation, if followed, would materially increase the risk of enlarging the conflict.

Enclosure “A”

Views of the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney), the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (Twining), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Shepherd)

Subject:

• U.S. Military Assistance in the Defense of the Quemoy Islands

1. In his consideration of the subject, the Secretary of State has propounded two cogent questions to the Secretary of Defense:

a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that from a military point of view the defense of Quemoy Island is substantially related to the defense of Formosa?

b. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Quemoy Island is defensible by the Chinese Nationalists with U.S. assistance?

2. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that from a military point of view the defense of Quemoy Island is substantially related to the defense of Formosa?

From the military point of view, the retention of Quemoy in the hands of the Chinese Nationalists has the following advantages:

The Kinmen group blocks Amoy approaches and can likewise be used to counter ChiCom invasion operations from that port. These islands are important also because of: (1) NGRC morale, (2) psychological warfare purposes, (3) commando raiding, (4) intelligence gathering, (5) maritime resistance development, (6) sabotage and (7) escape and evasion.

On the other hand, in possession of the Chinese Communists it affords them unrestricted and unimpeded use of their best harbor south of Shanghai from which could be launched an amphibious attack against Formosa and the Pescadores. The possession of Quemoy by the ChiNats is not essential to the defense of Formosa, nor is its possession by the ChiComs essential to the capture of Formosa, so far as can be judged, but it is substantially related to the defense of Formosa. This is also true of the Matsu and Tachen groups.

Aside from the tactical relationship of these offshore island groups to the defense of Formosa, it is considered important to emphasize that the loss of these islands cannot be weighed solely in terms of territory or tangible military resources. The adverse results of their loss through failure of the United States to assist the Chinese Nationalists in their defense would be such as to undermine the morale of the NGRC, which in turn would have a substantial bearing on our ability to defend Formosa.

3. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Quemoy Island is defensible by the Chinese Nationalists with U.S. assistance?

This question cannot be answered by a simple “yes” or “no”.

The Quemoy island group, of which there are two principal islands, are in and form a part of the harbor of Amoy. Little Quemoy is distant but 4 miles from Amoy and Quemoy 7 miles at its closest point. On the other hand, Amoy itself is an island, lying off the small alluvial plain of the Chin-lung Chiang river. It is surrounded on three sides by the mountains of Fukien province and has no rail and but poor road connection with the hinterland. Its commercial communications with the rest of China are mainly by sea.

In view of the time and space factors inherent in the geography, it is essential that the defenders of Quemoy have a freedom of action which may extend beyond the immediate tactical situation. It is not enough that they await the actual assault, which could be mounted by masses of men moving by night to concentration points and arriving at their objective by junks and sampans in the space of a couple of hours. Constant surveillance will be required to spot concentrations of waterborne craft, of troops and of guns. If of such size as to threaten the islands, they must then be destroyed. The same is true of the air threat if and when it develops. In this connection, successful defense of the islands in the face of a determined attack would probably involve U.S. Naval and air forces in some direct action against the Chinese mainland.

There is need for accurate and timely intelligence of the situation at Quemoy from U.S. sources and through U.S. channels of communication. The only communications with Quemoy at present are through ChiNat channels.

The great imponderable in any estimate of the defensibility of the islands is the morale and will to fight of the ChiNat garrisons. Hence the necessity for the freedom of action U.S. forces assisting the ChiNats must have in order to reduce or abort the threat of assault before it is launched. Subject to such factors as infiltration and subversion, morale and the concomitant will to fight rest primarily on the ratio of the chances of victory to the chances of defeat. From the standpoint of the United States, in entering into the commitment here being considered we must be willing to pay the price to keep this ratio high.

In summary, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps consider that against such effort as the ChiCom are likely to commit or could support, Quemoy is defensible with our aid, provided:

a. We maintain constant surveillance of the Amoy area and the sources of air and sea-borne threats to Quemoy.

b. We install and maintain U.S. channels of communication with our personnel on the ground in Quemoy.

c. The responsible U.S. commander be given freedom of action to strike when and where necessary to defeat an actual invasion of the ChiNat-held islands or to break up ChiCom concentrations, deployments and dispositions which in his judgment are preparations of a sort and scope which constitute a major threat of invasion. The question of the use of atomic weapons would be presented if and when the need arises, but with the understanding now that if essential to victory their use would be accorded.

d. U.S. naval and air forces are committed to this task and maintained in the general area and on the requisite degree of alert.

4. It is the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps that fulfillment of the foregoing conditions are within U.S. current capabiliities, with certain administrative redisposition of available forces. It may be necessary to request increases in specific categories of forces, but failing an expansion of the area of conflict, they would be minor. The defense of Quemoy cannot be considered in isolation since the ChiCom have the capability of threatening simultaneously the three groups of offshore islands held by the ChiNats and considered by CINCPAC important to the defense of Formosa—the Quemoy, Matsu and TAchen islands—thus creating uncertainty as to their true objectives. Such action, should it develop, might require on our part increased reconnaissance forces and a degree of alert on the part of the principal defensive U.S. forces which could be maintained over the long pull only by some over-all increase in order to afford more frequent rotation.

Enclosure “B”

Views of the Chief of Staff United States Army (Ridgway)

Subject:

• U.S. Military Assistance in the Defense of the Quemoy Islands

1. I have considered the two questions raised by the Secretary of State in Secto 1 [Dulte 1], together with the views of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps as expressed in Enclosure “A”. I cannot concur in the views expressed therein and, accordingly, submit a separate analysis of the questions asked.

2. With respect to the question of whether “from a military viewpoint the defense of the Quemoy Islands is substantially related to the defense of Formosa,” it is my view that the defense of the Quemoy Islands is not of sufficient military importance to the defense of Formosa to warrant the commitment of U.S. forces to its defense. My reasons follow:

a. The defense of Formosa will not conceivably become a problem except in war with Communist China. In such case, retention of Quemoy could serve only three major purposes—(1) as an element in an outpost line of observation, (2) as an obstacle to Chinese Communist offensive operations against Formosa and the Pescadores, and (3) as a base for offensive operations against mainland China.

b. In the event of all-out Communist attack, the forces required to insure retention for any of the above purposes would not be commensurate with any military advantages accruing from the successful defense of the Quemoys. Should our Far East military position have so deteriorated as to give a Communist major attack on Formosa or the Pescadores any reasonable chance of success, an all-out defense of the Quemoys in the face of an all-out Chinese Communist attack would be militarily unsound because of:

(1) The vulnerability of the Quemoys and the military advantages lying with the Communists in operations against Quemoy.

(2) The magnitude of the United States and Chinese Nationalist forces required.

(3) The minuscule importance of Quemoy in such a situation, because of:

(a) The ease with which the Communists could conduct operations against Formosa without using the Amoy area.

(b) The lack of any decisive or even major objectives for counter-offensive operations within any reasonable distance inland of the Quemoys.

3. I note that the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps view the defense of the Quemoy Islands as being substantially related to the defense of Formosa but not essential to its defense. I note further that they base the importance of Quemoy largely upon political and psychological considerations including the effect upon the morale of the Chinese Nationalist forces and also, in part, upon a number of relatively minor military purposes served by Chinese Nationalist retention of the islands.

a. It is apparent that the use of the phrase “substantially related to the defense of Formosa” may lead to grave misunderstanding. A decision that the defense of the Quemoy Islands is “substantially related to the defense of Formosa” could lead to war with Communist China. In view of the fundamental issue involved, such a decision should be justified militarily on the basis that the Quemoys are essential to the defense of Formosa and not merely on the questionable and indefinable basis that they are “substantially related” thereto. No such justification of essentiality exists within the category of military factors and none has been produced by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who have stated clearly that the defense of the Quemoys is not essential to the defense of Formosa.

b. With respect to the importance of the Quemoys in blocking the Amoy approaches if retained by the Nationalists, or in the possession of the Communists affording them use of Amoy Harbor for launching an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores, it is pointed out that the Fukien-Chekieng coast is long and irregular and contains many areas for assembly, staging and embarkation. The Communists could launch a major attack against Formosa and the Pescadores irrespective of control of the Quemoy Islands.

c. With respect to the political and associated psychological issues which are involved, these should be decided by proper authority and should not be the subject of military comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. In summarizing my views with respect to the question discussed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, I emphasize that from the purely military point of view the defense of the Quemoy Islands is not substantially related to the defense of Formosa.

5. My views concerning the question of the defensibility of the Quemoy Islands are as follows:

a. Intelligence estimates indicate that the Chinese Communists are capable of massing four armies and supporting troops in the vicinity of Amoy for an all-out offensive against the Quemoy Islands. Sufficient junks and small craft could be concentrated on short notice to lift approximately 50,000 troops and some supporting artillery for an initial assault, with additional forces in follow-up echelons. The actual assault could be mounted by troops moving by night to concentration points and arriving at their objective by junks and sampans in the space of a few hours. Chinese Communist air forces are capable of massing sufficient MIG 15’s without warning to gain local air superiority over the target area. Within a period of from 12 to 18 hours, up to 550 jet fighters and 150 piston fighters could be available. 250 piston type bombers and 150 IL 28’s also could be employed without warning.

b. If the Chinese Communists launch an all-out assault, it is considered that the Quemoy Islands could not be defended successfully by the Chinese Nationalists without U.S. assistance. This would be true even if the current deficiencies of the defense forces on Quemoy in medium artillery, antiaircraft artillery and armor were remedied.

c. In view of the closeness to the mainland of the Quemoy Islands, the relatively short time required to concentrate both air forces and waterborne craft, and the availability within striking distance of adequate Chinese Communist ground forces, it would be difficult for the United States to defend successfully the Quemoy Islands by naval and air forces alone. It is my view that the Quemoy Islands can be defended successfully by the Chinese Nationalists with U.S. assistance, provided such assistance includes reinforcement by U.S. ground forces in the strength of at least one division, with the necessary antiaircraft artillery and other supporting troops, together with adequate naval, air, and logistical support. However, this defense would require that no restrictions be placed on U.S. military operations against Chinese Communist forces and against mainland targets to whatever depth inland may be militarily advantageous.

6. Any action to engage in the defense of the Quemoy Islands should be undertaken by U.S. forces adequate beyond any possibility of failure. If we go in, we must go in to win. However, the provision of the necessary forces, and the initiation of the requisite actions, carry with them certain grave implications. CINCFE’s estimate of the impact on his mission is contained in the Appendix hereto.

a. The release by CINCFE to CINCPAC of the forces required by the latter to implement his plan for the defense of the Quemoys would decrease the forces available to CINCFE to a point which might seriously threaten the security of his command. Because the current deployment of Chinese Communist air forces poses an immediate threat to CINCFE’s area of responsibility, the 7 USAF jet squadrons requested by CINCPAC cannot be made available to him within risks acceptable to CINCFE. Moreover, the provision of U.S. forces for the defense of the Quemoy Islands would seriously interfere with planned U.S. redeployment from the Far East and would represent an unwarranted commitment of available U.S. forces in the absence of decisive action under the conditions of intervention envisaged. Under these circumstances, substantial increases in U.S. forces in the Far East would be necessary to carry out a successful defense of the Quemoy Islands. This could lead ultimately to inability to meet U.S. commitments in other areas.

b. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps indicate that U.S. forces assisting the Chinese Nationalists must have freedom of action in order to reduce or abort the threat of assault before it is launched. This includes granting authority to the responsible U.S. commander to strike when and where necessary to break up Chinese Communist concentrations, deployments and dispositions which, in his judgment, are preparations of a sort and scope which constitute a major threat of invasion. This would involve U.S. naval and air forces in some direct action against the Chinese mainland, and could involve the use of atomic weapons. These actions, however logical militarily, would constitute aggression on the part of the United States which would, in the eyes of the world, be guilty of initiating war against Communist China.

c. In essence, the United States would be conferring upon a subordinate military commander the power of decision with regard to peace or war. The gravity of this decision is such that this authority should be reserved to the President or to an individual specifically designated by him.

d. If war with Communist China should actually result, the Quemoy Islands would be only of minor importance, except with respect to the possible loss of all or a major part of the Chinese Nationalist forces on the Quemoys, and any U.S. forces which might then be in the area. Under such circumstances, the probable decision would be to promptly withdraw all these forces for more profitable use elsewhere. It is illogical to risk war for a geographic position which would probably be abandoned in the event of war.

7. The possibility that the United States Government may decide to participate with armed force in the defense of Quemoy dictates the wisdom of considering immediately the major actions which should accompany such decision. This decision would in my opinion inevitably result in all-out war with Communist China, and would increase the risk of general war. The risks involved would demand emergency actions to strengthen the entire national military establishment and to prepare for war. Specific immediate actions should include, as a minimum:

a. Deployment of requisite military forces to the area.

b. Expansion of forces in being.

c. Expansion of the training base.

d. Increased production and procurement.

8. The measures outlined above would be all the more necessary because the burdens of the war might have to be borne by the United States without assistance from its major Allies, who might not view sympathetically such U.S. military operations against Communist China.

9. In summary, and for the reasons stated herein, I conclude that:

a. From the military point of view, the defense of the Quemoy Islands is not substantially related to the defense of Formosa.

b. The Quemoy Islands are defensible against an all-out Chinese Communist attack only if (1) the Chinese Nationalist forces are reinforced with completely adequate U.S. ground, naval and air forces and furnished logistical assistance, and (2) military operations against the Chinese Communists could include mainland targets to whatever depth inland might be militarily advantageous and with any or all available weapons.

c. The military value of the Quemoy Islands and their continued retention by the Chinese Nationalists is not sufficient to warrant United States military operations in their defense and to justify the war with China which would ensue.

d. In the event the U.S. Government should decide to participate with its armed forces in the defense of Quemoy, then collateral actions are required, including the immediate strengthening of the national military establishment and preparation for war.

10. In the event of a decision to participate with armed forces in the defense of the Quemoys, I recommend that:

a. Decisions simultaneously be made for immediate actions to strengthen the national military establishment and prepare for war, as indicated in paragraph 7 above.

b. Authority to direct an overt act which could result in war with Communist China be reserved to the President or a single individual designated by him.

Appendix to Enclosure “B”

Views of the Commander in Chief of the Far East (Hull)⁵

top secret

• “1. Adm Stump and I met late the morning of 6 Sep to discuss the Quemoy problems … [and] the augmentation of forces which Adm Stump has asked that CINCFE be prepared to provide.
• “2.… I could release, and I have already agreed to provide, the … cruisers … and the additional destroyer division requested … [DA IN 82923C, 4 Sep 54⁶]. The bulk of the naval forces are already in the South, so that further diversion is not too serious.…
• “3. On the air side, I am unable to agree … to furnish the air units which have been requested.
• “4. If U.S. intervention takes place, there may develop a necessity for implementation of our … [Operations Plan or Emergency War Plan]. If that should prove to be the case, the U.S. Air Forces diverted to the defense of the Quemoy area would be seriously maldeployed. In the light of the grave threat represented by the total Communist air power in this general area and the center of gravity of enemy air deployment, which is definitely in the North, it appears that these air forces should remain where they will be most useful in contributing to the security of the forces of my command and the fulfillment of my over-all mission with respect to Japan and the Ryukyus.
• “6. Quemoy Island is positioned so close to the mainland that its defense will require that the defending forces go inland to some degree. …[while] Formosa’s position 100 miles from the mainland does not present the same requirement … [if] … the U.S. intervenes with military forces in the defense of Quemoy Island, there is serious likelihood that the situation would progress rather swiftly to that of general hostilities with Communist China since I believe the task of localizing the fighting would be most difficult.…
• “7. There are a number of more detailed reasons for not diverting CINCFE air force units [such as the air redeployment and conversion program, the fact it would be necessary to divert from Korea the required air units and part of the supporting signal, antiaircraft and engineer units, the difficulty of extricating from Formosa air units once committed, etc.]…
• “8. …I feel that, initially at least, the requirement for an air effort in the Amoy area should be met by U.S. naval air and by NGRC air forces. I feel that I cannot concur in the release of any air force units to CINCPAC for operation in the Kinmen [Quemoy] area due to the present situation here and to the dangerous impact such release would have on the situation in Korea and on my primary mission for the defense of Japan.
• “9. The successful defense of Quemoy or any other of the offshore islands will depend in the final analysis in my judgment on the caliber and strength of the Chinese Nationalist ground forces deployed for their defense. I am not in position to judge the capacity of these troops. I seriously doubt that intervention by U.S. naval and air forces would prove decisive if the ground forces are unequal to their task. Intervention by U.S. forces is war with Communist China and even though it may be conceived initially as a limited operation only events to follow will prove or disprove such to be the case. The loss of these islands would unquestionably be a serious blow to the morale of Nationalist China. On the other hand, should the U.S. intervene and be unsuccessful in defending them, it would be catastrophic to the prestige of the U.S. throughout Asia. For this reason, if decision is made for the U.S. to intercede in the defense of any of these offshore islands, it must be done with whatever force is necessary to achieve success, including the use of atomic weapons if necessary.”

1. Not printed, but see the message from Anderson to Eisenhower, Document 270.
2. Dulte 1 and Dulte 5, Documents 273 and 278.
3. Numbered paragraph 3, the third subparagraph in Enclosure A below.
4. Reference is to the last sentence in the subparagraph cited in footnote 3 above.
5. Extracts apparently taken from a message from Hull to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; ellipses and bracketed material are in the source text. The date of the message is not indicated.
6. Not printed.