Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

793.5 MSP/8–2554

No. 262
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 25, 1954.

Subject:

• Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (GRC)

Problem

Subsequent to FE’s memorandum to you of March 31 (Tab A),² recommending that you approve the negotiation with the Government of the Republic of China of a Mutual Defense Treaty, developments have taken place which FE believes warrant a re-consideration of your decision at that time to withhold your approval.

Discussion

1. Shortly after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference the Chinese Communists launched a violent propaganda campaign promising to “liberate” Formosa and denouncing U.S. “occupation” of the Island. Although the theme of this campaign is an old one its proportions indicate that a major Communist effort is under way to focus international, as well as domestic, attention on the Formosa issue. This campaign may be expected to generate increasing international pressures for a negotiated change in the status of Formosa as a means of removing a serious cause of tension. But the U.S. is determined to preserve the status of Formosa even at the risk of war. Thus pressures for a change in its status merely increase tension. If this is made unmistakably clear to the world through the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty, it will remove the basis for the pressures and undermine the effectiveness of the Communist propaganda campaign.

2. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has expressed willingness, for the first time, to give a commitment that he would undertake no major military action without U.S. approval, provided a Defense Treaty were concluded. This assurance would provide us with greater control than we now enjoy over the circumstances under which our armed forces might become involved in a major conflict in the Formosa area.

3. The progress being made in the formation of a Southeast Asian Pact, from which the GRC is excluded, has heightened its desire for treaty ties with the U.S. and its sense of being discriminated against. It also points up the absence of multi-lateral security arrangements in the Northeast Asian area. Conclusion of a Defense Treaty with the GRC would be an important step toward eventual achievement of the latter goal.

4. FE believes that the present public commitment to employ U.S. forces for the defense of Formosa would be strengthened if it had formal Senate sanction. Conclusion of the proposed treaty would ensure this step.

The foregoing points are discussed in more detail in the attached memorandum (Tab B).³

FE recognizes the desirability of keeping the Communists guessing as to our intention respecting defense of the off-shore islands, but does not believe that conclusion of a Treaty need change the present situation. When the Treaty is concluded it can be reiterated that a number of these islands may be so intimately connected with the defense of Formosa that the military would be justified in concluding that the defense of Formosa comprehended the defense of those Islands.

Recommendation:

That you approve the negotiation of a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Government of the Republic of China and that you be prepared to inform the Chinese Government of this decision at the time of your visit to Formosa.

[Here follow a list of attachments and a series of brief notes indicating that memoranda from the Bureau of European Affairs; the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; the Policy Planning Staff; and the Counselor were attached (see Documents 264–267), and that the Bureau of United Nations Affairs had no comments.]

Note: L comments on the Draft Treaty remain as stated in Mr. Phleger’s memorandum to Mr. Robertson of March 22, 1954,⁴ as follows: “The form of the draft of a proposed mutual defense treaty between the United States and China which was attached to your memorandum of March 15, 1954,⁵ appears appropriate, in the event that it is determined as a matter of policy that it is in the interest of the United States to negotiate such a treaty.”

1. This memorandum was originally sent to the Secretary on Aug. 25 but was returned to Robertson with an attached note of the same date from Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, stating that Dulles had just left Washington and suggesting that Robertson should circulate the memorandum to interested bureaus for comment before his return on Aug. 30. Robertson resubmitted the memorandum, probably on Aug. 27, with no change in the text but with the addition of brief notes regarding the concurrences and a new Tab C, consisting of memoranda from interested bureaus; see Documents 264–267. The attachments are not filed with the source text but with Smith’s memorandum to Robertson, Document 269. Both versions of Robertson’s memorandum are filed, along with Kitchen’s note, in FE files, lot 64 D 230.
2. Document 182.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed; attached to Robertson’s Mar. 31 memorandum, Document 182.
5. See footnotes 2 and 5, Document 182.