Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199
No. 193
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)1
Subject:
- Security Situation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
Participants:
- Dr. Wellington V. Koo, Chinese Ambassador
- The Secretary of State
- Walter P. McConaughy, Director for Chinese Affairs
Dr. Wellington Koo called at his own request. He said that he wished to discuss a matter which was very close to the heart of his Government, namely, the prospect for the negotiation of a bilateral security pact between the United States and the Chinese Government. He recalled that preliminary discussions had been initiated several weeks ago, between his Foreign Office and the American Embassy in Taipei. Also, he had discussed the subject briefly with Mr. Robertson and Mr. Drumright. He understood that consideration of the matter had been suspended by the Department early in April because of insufficient time to go into the matter thoroughly before the Geneva Conference opened. He did not know whether the Secretary had had an opportunity to give the matter further consideration since his return from Geneva.
The Secretary said that he and his associates had indeed given the matter very thorough consideration and were continuing to do so. They had been troubled by certain difficulties which to date had not been resolved. It is not a simple matter to negotiate a security pact with a country which is actually carrying on military operations. The United States Government does not want to hamper the operations of the Chinese Government against the Chinese Communists. At the same time this Government is not prepared to assume treaty obligations the terms of which might bring about its direct involvement. There is a real problem in working out language which would preserve Chinese freedom of action against the Chinese Communists without committing the United States to a possible course of action which might not then be in the best general interest.
The Secretary said that a difficult problem had also existed in Korea, where this Government was willing to assume a commitment to come to the defense of the territory controlled by the Republic [Page 423] of Korea, but did not wish to encourage an invasion attempt by President Rhee which might provoke a North Korean counterattack which might force us into hostilities in order to throw the Communists out of South Korea. The Secretary pointed out that the mutual security treaty with Korea was not concluded until after the signature of the Armistice Agreement of July, 1953. The Secretary read to the Ambassador that portion of Article III of the Korean Treaty which referred to “territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other”. He remarked that “lawfully” implied “peacefully”. The Secretary said in a humorous vein that in the absence of an Armistice Agreement between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists, the situation as to China was not analogous to that in Korea. As long as the Korean Armistice was observed, we wanted to restrain Syngman Rhee from engaging in hostilities. But there was a state of running warfare between the recognized Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist regime which neither the United States Government nor the Chinese Government wanted to stop. We are in the position of wanting neither to check Chinese operations against the mainland Communists nor to get directly involved ourselves in those operations. It was feared that a mutual security pact might have one of these undesirable effects. The Secretary thought that there might be a prospect that the current situation would develop to our mutual advantage and that possibly the present arrangement should not be modified.
The Ambassador asked if we could not devise some language which would circumvent the difficulty the Secretary had described? He remarked that the proposed pact would of course be defensive in nature. He thought the defensive aspect could be made clear.
The Secretary was doubtful whether this could readily be done. The Secretary pointed out that it was difficult to justify a purely defensive pact when one of the parties by tacit agreement in effect was carrying on offensive operations. Both parties needed freedom from rigid treaty obligations in such a situation.
[Here follows discussion concerning United States policy with regard to Southeast Asia and United States-British differences with regard to the Far East.]
The Ambassador asked if the principles the Secretary had enunciated as to a bilateral pact would apply also to Chinese participation in a multilateral pact?
The Secretary said he thought the principles would be the same. We do not want to include in a pact any country which is actually in a state of war. Nor do we want a pact the terms of which might inevitably require the United States to wage an unlimited war. The [Page 424] Secretary said that we do not want to commit our military resources or prestige in the vast area of mainland China. He mentioned that even the Japanese had got themselves completely bogged down in the course of eight years of fighting in China. It was a big country, with a lot of people.
The Ambassador said that, as he understood it, the Secretary was not seeking a complete system of security arrangements for the Pacific area at this time, rather depending on ad hoc arrangements according to the particular current circumstances of the various countries of the area.
The Secretary confirmed that this was substantially correct. The ad hoc arrangement seemed to have more to recommend it. He said that we were rather disinclined to include in formal security pacts any country experiencing fluctuations in the area which is under its effective administrative control. We were not thinking in terms of a present showdown in unconditional surrender terms. Our immediate objectives would have to be limited.
A great deal of thought had been given within this Government to the situation and the prospects of the Chinese Government. It seemed best to make no change in the existing arrangements for the defense of Formosa since the situation is not stabilized. We are in a position where this fluidity needs to be retained. A formal security pact would tend to freeze the situation. The United States Government does not wish to commit itself to direct involvement in the struggle between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists, but on the other hand, it does not want to run the possible risk of seeming to limit by treaty the unquestioned freedom of the Chinese Government to carry on operations against the Chinese Communists. The United States Government does not want the Chinese Communists to be encouraged to believe from any Sino-U.S. treaty arrangements that they are immune from attack so long as they do not start an invasion of Formosa.
The Secretary pointed out that in Korea the situation had been stabilized by an Armistice before the Treaty came into effect. The Treaty could not be invoked through a breach of the Armistice by the Korean Government, since this would not be a lawful action. Since the Armistice had no termination date in the absence of a political agreement, it could be considered to be of indefinite duration. No initiative on the part of the Korean Government could oblige the United States to take military action under the treaty. However, in the case of China we wanted the Chinese Government to have the ability to exercise initiative against the Chinese Communists. We might want to help along that sort of initiative some day, but we would want complete latitude, not hampered by formal treaty obligations or restrictions.
[Page 425]The Ambassador remarked that since the situation was fluid, changing circumstances might lead to an altered situation. Might an altered situation make the prospect for a mutual security treaty more favorable?
The Secretary said that this might be the case.
[Here follows further discussion relating to Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina.]
As the Ambassador arose to leave the Secretary said that he wanted to assure the Ambassador that the interest of the Chinese Government in additional security arrangements by treaty would be borne in mind, and that the situation and the needs of the Chinese Government were viewed with utmost sympathy here. There was certainly no lack of interest on our part in the effective defense of the territory under control of the Chinese Government, but we do not want to freeze the present situation or indicate by any treaty action that we are accepting the present status.
The Ambassador asked if it would be correct to say that the entire mutual security treaty problem is under study and that the situation will continue to be reviewed in the light of the current situation as it develops?
The Secretary said he thought that this was a correct statement.
- A handwritten note on the source text indicates that it was approved by Secretary Dulles.↩