793.11/11–3053
No. 155
The Ambassador in the Republic of
China (Rankin) to the Department of
State
No. 320
Subject:
- Views of President Chiang Kai-shek as Expressed to Official American Visitors in October–November 1953.
During the months of October and November 1953, a succession of important American officials, both civilian and military, visited Formosa. They included two United States senators, 14 members of the House of Representatives, two four-star and three three-star admirals. Details of these visits have been or will be reported in separate, unclassified despatches in every case. Each of the visitors, with three exceptions, had at least one interview with President Chiang Kai-shek, and it is the purpose of the present despatch to summarize the salient points raised in these conversations, as well as to comment incidentally.
It is my general practice to accompany each visitor who meets President Chiang for the first time. In cases where there is a long standing acquaintanceship, I usually ask the visitor whether he prefers to have me with him or to see the President alone. Examples of the latter were the visits of Senators William F. Knowland and H. Alexander Smith.
The visit of Vice President Richard M. Nixon was a special case, particularly since he and Mrs. Nixon were house guests of the Chiangs. I inquired as to the Vice President’s wishes, and he responded with the question as to which course Chiang would prefer. I replied that the President probably would prefer to see him alone and might speak more frankly under such circumstances. In consequence, they spent nearly eight hours together, with only interpreters present. The interpreters included the President’s confidential secretary, Sampson Shen, the Foreign Minister, and Madame Chiang.
The Chinese prepared a lengthy memorandum of the Chiang–Nixon conversations and sent a copy to Vice President Nixon through the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo. Unfortunately they kept only one copy in Taipei, and for reasons best known to President Chiang not even the Foreign Office has been permitted to place the text in its files. However, I was permitted to read the one copy in Taipei, besides discussing the subject matter with the Vice President. Other official visitors who have seen Chiang alone also have told me about their conversations.
In receiving official American visitors President Chiang is cordial—almost affable—and smiles most of the time during a conversation. He makes a special effort to be informal, and in the case of house guests may show them to their rooms himself. He permits himself an occasional joke and seems to enjoy attempts at humor on the part of his guests. After a few initial pleasantries, however, he usually manages to get around to the themes closest to his heart. In the case of a visitor whom he has not previously met, and of whose views he is uncertain, Chiang ordinarily begins by expressing sincere appreciation of the aid so far extended by the [Page 335] United States. Currently, however, he notes with regret that deliveries of military equipment are behind schedule, that 30 percent of all such items appropriated for and allocated in the fiscal years 1951–53 have not yet been delivered, and that nothing from the 1954 program has yet arrived. He expresses the hope that his distinguished visitor will exert any influence he may consider appropriate to expedite these deliveries; also to provide sufficient “economic” aid to support the large military program which is placing an excessive burden on Formosa’s economy.
At this point the questions of Korea or Indo-China frequently arise. Chiang makes it clear that he considers both problems insoluble by themselves. As long as the China Mainland remains in Communist hands, he believes that all neighboring countries will not only be under constant threat of aggression but will be kept in turmoil as may be necessary to serve Communist ends. Apparently he does not expect an early resumption of fighting in Korea, or open intervention by the Chinese Reds in Indo-China. In fact, he considers the present situation in those two countries to be all but ideal from the standpoint of the Kremlin. Important military forces of Communist China, the United States and France are tied down, while no Soviet forces are involved in any way. If the United States or France should weary of the game and withdraw, the Communists would take over. But there is no hurry about this, and meanwhile Red China continues to be desirably involved, largely dependent upon the Soviet Union for various kinds of support, and unable to get ahead with an industrial program which otherwise might eventually produce a degree of military and economic independence. All of this is according to President Chiang.
If he considers his listeners to be particularly sympathetic to his point of view, or if they are successful in drawing him out, Chiang will expand on his central theme: a return to the China Mainland of his armed forces and his government as the only practicable means of liberating China from Communist control and at the same time removing the threat of Red aggression against peripheral regions such as Southeast Asia. He estimates that a successful landing in South China would require 600,000 men, which would be well within the manpower resources of Formosa. Within three to six months after establishing a substantial beachhead, exploiting it as opportunity might warrant, and defeating all attempts to dislodge his forces, he confidently expects to gain the active support of the local population concerned, and to see the beginning of large scale defections from the Communist forces to his. He also is confident that the Soviets would not intervene in such an operation, particularly in south China, unless they had decided in any event to precipitate a general war.
[Page 336]President Chiang is careful to point out, however, that while he has sufficient manpower to undertake a return to the China Mainland, United States policy will determine whether such an operation is to be made possible. He recognizes that a considerable expansion in the present military aid program would be required. Depending upon the rapidity of such expansion, he estimates that to prepare for a successful invasion would require from three to six years, beginning immediately. He also mentions the need of continuing United States logistical support during the operation, but appears to assume that his air and naval forces could be made adequate to the occasion.
Apparently on the assumptions that the effort put forth in Korea by the Chinese Communists represented their maximum present capability, and that increasingly long and difficult communications would reduce that capability in corresponding degree as the projected threater of operations is moved to the south, Chiang occasionally expands on the details of the campaign which he foresees. He did so with Vice President Nixon. His reference to a minimum preparatory period of three years might suggest that he is not impatient. But evidently he realizes that his chances of success will depend in large degree upon the relative speed with which the offensive power of his forces and that of the Chinese Reds are increased between now and M–Day. This explains why his most modest request—speeding up the delivery of arms already authorized—is so often repeated. Moreover, he understands very well that any increase in the size of his military establishment will necessitate larger economic aid.
On comparatively rare occasions, President Chiang’s impatience with what he considers the extreme slowness of American policy development becomes evident. This occurred during his talk with Senator H. Alexander Smith and myself before dinner on the evening of November 6, and again after dinner in a larger group including Senator Smith, Mr. Francis Wilcox,1 Admiral Felix B. Stump and Vice Admiral William K. Phillips.2 Chiang made four points, substantially as follows:
- 1.
- The United States still has no Far Eastern policy.
- 2.
- The United States is expending its resources in Korea and Indo-China to no purpose whatever.
- 3.
- Everything the United States is doing in the Far East at the present time is exactly as the Soviets would have it done.
- 4.
- The only solution for Asia and for the whole world is to get at the heart of the matter and drive the Communists out of China.
I attempted to steer the conversation into smoother waters by suggesting that since, for whatever reasons, the United States was not at present prepared to tackle directly the problem of Mainland China, as an interim measure the President would no doubt favor our helping in Indo-China. But he insisted that this was pure waste.
With reference to Chiang’s intimation that the United States was doing everything wrong, Admiral Phillips expressed the thoughts of most of us when he asked bluntly if the President wanted the United States to pull out of Asia and go home. Another of the Americans present, Mr. Wilcox as I recall, put the question whether the United States had made a mistake in going to the aid of Korea. Apparently realizing by this time that he had gone too far, and prompted by the Chinese Foreign Minister who had been absent during the first part of the discussion, Chiang retreated to the extent of admitting that we had taken the right course of action in Korea in 1950, and that under the circumstances we should help the French in Indo-China.
Senator Smith left Taipei on the morning after the discussion just described. At breakfast he was waited on by Premier Chen Cheng and the President’s elder son, Lt. General Chiang Chingkuo, who had been sent to explain away some of the pronouncements of the night before. I also suggested to the Senator that Chiang’s statements should not be taken literally, but rather as a reflection of his keen disappointment over Far Eastern policy development under our new Administration, upon which he had counted so much.
President Chiang’s outburst before Senator Smith appears to have served one useful purpose: he has since been much more restrained in talking with official Americans. I told Vice President Nixon something of foregoing incident before his departure, and his reply was to the effect that neither in tone or substance had Chiang gone to extremes during their lengthy talks. This is also borne out by the Chinese memorandum of conversation, although the latter bears evidence of the delicate editorial touch of Madame Chiang.
Other topics discussed in the various meetings between President Chiang and the American visitors included relations with Japan, the Far Eastern policy of the United Kingdom and the possibilities for additional defense pacts between countries with interests in the Western Pacific. The last subject was touched upon by President Chiang in his talks with Vice President Nixon. However, statements made in these connections were of secondary interest in comparison to the topics dealt with in earlier paragraphs.
Copies of despatch pouched to Hong Kong and Tokyo.
[Page 338]Action requested: Department please send copies of this despatch to Seoul, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, Rangoon, New Delhi, Moscow and London.