Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1

Department of Defense files: Telegram

¹

No. 129
The Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump), to the Chief of Naval Operations (Fechteler)²

top secret

[Honolulu?,] July 23, 1953—10:04 a.m.

232004Z. CNO 222159Z of July.^* Consider my Formosa directive should be modified to include assistance to ChiNats in defense or recapture of those off-shore islands or island groups which they now hold and which are determined by us to be essential for retention. Essential for retention falls into 2 categories:

A. Essential for defense of Formosa and Pescadores.

B. Essential for other US interests. Category “A” islands are PaiSha (Kaoteng), Pei-Kan-Tang (Tangki Tao), Ma-Tsu, Pai-Chuan Tao (White Dog), Chin-Men Tao (Quemoy) (Kinmen), Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy Island), Ta-Tan Tao and Erh-Tan Tao. These islands block the Foochow and Amoy approaches which are possible staging areas for offensive action against Formosa and Pescadores and can also be used to counter ChiCom invasion operations. Retention of these islands is considered further essential for NGRC morale, psychological warfare purposes, NGRC pre-invasion mainland operations, commando raiding, intelligence gathering, maritime resistance development, sabotage and escape and evasion. Category “B” islands likewise essential for retention are Shang-Ta-Chen-Shan and Hsia-Ta-Chen which though not essential to defense of Formosa and Pescadores do serve other purposes listed for category “A” islands. There are other ChiNat islands which are desirable for retention as they serve to facilitate the security of above essential islands. I do not propose US assist in defense these islands but ChiNats should be prevailed upon to defend and US should assist material wise as practicable. If my directive is modified as above I propose to make COM7THFLT operationally responsible in same manner as for defense of Formosa and Pescadores. I would contemplate the use of US Naval and Air Forces in defense of essential islands and no others. This would involve destroyer and carrier air operations against the ChiComs together with Air Force units if made available. This would vary according to island groups as possibly only air operations could be conducted in defense of Kinmen. I consider it essential that I be authorized to permit ChiNats to attack unmistakable ChiCom concentrations on mainland when proximate to and threatening an essential island or island group. I recognize that forces would have to be made available to me by the JCS upon my recommendation but propose to predetermine force and timing requirements for each essential island group based on detailed studies. Meanwhile every effort is being made for ChiNats to plan and prepare proper defense islands determined to be essential or desirable for retention.³

1. The source text is not the transmission copy of the telegram; it is labeled Enclosure “D” to JCS 2118/57.
2. Also sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. On file in J.C.S. Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. Telegram CNO 222159Z is not printed.]
3. The Joint Chiefs replied in JCS telegram 948918, Sept. 24, that they did not wish to recommend an increase in U.S. responsibility for defense of the off-shore islands at that time but that, in case the decision was made in the future that the United States should take an active part in the defense of the islands, and to facilitate the development of a future JCS position on the subject, CINCPAC was instructed to submit a plan for employment of U.S. forces in defense of each island or island group concerned. (JCS records, CCS 381 (1–24–42) Sec. 43)