751G.00/6–2054: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy at Saigon1
2738. Limited distribution. Pass Chief MAAG. Joint State Defense Message. Saigon 28262 and 2846.3 Buu Loc letter transmitted Saigon 2826 raises problem whether or what to respond to formal request government Vietnam for large-scale training program at time when current policy directives State and Defense have clearly outlined opposition participation such program until and unless certain conditions have been satisfied. Department’s 25884 and Defense’s DA 9628395 express our continuing policy.
Additionally, we now have to reckon with policy Mendes-France [Page 1753] Government to end fighting by July 20, with uncertainties and dangers that such policy implies. At same time new government coming to power Vietnam. We have no way knowing what policies it will pursue, or with what success. Military situation Vietnam obliges us consider what measures may be necessary prevent American equipment falling into hands Communists and has direct bearing on provision additional equipment for proposed divisions.
We recognize, however, that our constant emphasis on need for training Vietnamese army may have led government Vietnam expect from US large-scale training programs, material assistance and financial support which as yet have not been approved by US Government.
At same time we must avoid any action which might contribute disintegration military and political situation Indochina through fostering assumption that we are “writing off Indochina”.
Action Embassy Saigon:
With reference note from Government Vietnam (Saigon’s 2826 and 2846), we believe under present circumstances no written reply, other than acknowledgment already made, should be made this time. In light factors mentioned above, only reply we could make would be substantially negative. Therefore Embassy Saigon should inform Prince Buu Loc orally, if it still feels reply must be made outgoing Prime Minister, that question US participation National Army training will be discussed with incoming Prime Minister Diem when he has had opportunity consider this problem. Oral reply should indicate that General O’Daniel has been directed within scope means available to him to assist by advice wherever possible in developing training program National Army. It should be made clear that we are not now in position undertake training Vietnamese divisions, pending decisions at governmental level.
Action Chief MAAG Saigon:
Ref MG 1724A and MG 1750A.6 Your recent requests for personnel augmentation have been granted to large degree. You are authorized continue discussions with appropriate French military authorities toward end that your MAAG assist by advising in training activities Vietnam National Army. Utilization MAAG personnel such advisory capacity must be commensurate with efficient accomplishment their primary duties, in accordance Defense guidance ref use adm personnel tng functions, and is not to be construed as US approval MAAG tng mission for Vietnamese armed forces. Temporary mobile US training teams, if requested by French, should make useful contribution [Page 1754] training program. (WAR 84822).7 Decision that US undertake training functions proposed Vietnamese light divisions still awaiting clarification complex political-military situation. No additional financial responsibility can be undertaken by US this time.
Action Embassy and MAAG Paris:
General De Shazo,8 after consultation Ambassador Dillon, is authorized inform General Ely Department Defense has approved augmentation approximately 90 additional personnel who are being sent MAAG Saigon undertake planning as well administrative functions. Of this group 12 officers have already arrived. General O’Daniel is authorized, in consultation General Ely and military officials Vietnam develop plans by which his present MAAG personnel plus augmentations can be utilized fullest degree assist advising on training Vietnamese troops. Such utilization personnel must be commensurate with efficient accomplishment their primary duties, in accordance with Defense guidance ref use adm personnel training functions, and is not to be construed as US approval MAAG tng mission Vietnamese armed forces. General Ely should be informed that in this connection US does not undertake assume any additional financial responsibility pay and maintenance Vietnamese troops. Decision as to US undertaking training Vietnamese light divisions still awaits action French and US Governments.
- Drafted by Hoey and Sturm of PSA. Also sent to Paris as telegram 4841 and to Geneva as Tosec 487.↩
- Telegram 2826 from Saigon, June 18, not printed, contained the text of a letter from outgoing Premier Buu Loc to Chargé McClintock expressing approval of arrangements between General O’Daniel and General Ely providing for a larger role for the United States in the training of Vietnamese forces. (751G.5 MSP/6–1854)↩
- Telegram 2846 from Saigon, June 20, not printed, contained the text of a reply which McClintock proposed to send to Buu Loc. (751G.00/6–2054)↩
- For telegram 4551 to Paris, June 12, repeated to Saigon as telegram 2588, see p. 1684.↩
- In telegram DA 962839, June 16, General Ridgway advised General O’Daniel that negotiations with France regarding a possible U.S. role in Indochina had not been completed and that therefore agreements on military details should not be concluded until governmental decisions were made and intergovernmental agreements were reached. (751G.5/6–1654)↩
- Telegrams MG 1724A, June 16, and MG 1750A, June 20, from General O’Daniel at Saigon to the Department of the Army, urging a greater U.S. training role, are not printed. (751G.5/6–1654; 751G.5/6–2054)↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Maj. Gen. Thomas E. de Shazo, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Paris.↩