751G.00/6–2054: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2844. Sent Paris 1011, Geneva 252; repeated information Hanoi, Bangkok unnumbered. Assistant Air Attaché Lansdale and Embassy officer called June 15 on Colonel Jean Leroy, Chief of now defunct UMDC (Catholic militia formerly operating principally in Ben Tre province of south Vietnam), at Saigon headquarters. Establishment and few troops visible made favorable impression.
Leroy, recently returned from year’s study at one of French military schools, is temporarily without precise job, but is performing special missions for Vietnamese General Staff and Minister National Defense. He had just completed five-day inspection tour of security [Page 1723] situation in five “old provinces” south Vietnam, once considered surest in area, for Quat.
Leroy permitted on-the-spot reading of secret report to Quat, in which he said security in once safe provinces had deteriorated dangerously within last six months, and that if immediate remedial action not taken, all would be lost in two or three months. Among reasons given for grave state of affairs were: Auto defense units in villages were badly paid, clothed, armed, fed, and often wholesale withdrawal of arms would follow desertion of handful men, thus leaving village without protection; Vietnamese Army concerned much more with tailoring of uniform and unearned decorations than with primary purpose of combatting Communist enemy; provincial departments of government were either corrupt or unable understand people’s need of psychological support and spiritual leadership; top government officials ostentatiously traveled about in large cars, ignoring poverty of masses, which were therefore forced to look with greater respect on austere Viet Minh; youth sought some sort of ideal for which to fight, but none was forthcoming from hidebound, incomprehensive mandarins. One of most striking observations was made in connection statement on disarming whole villages as penalty for one or two desertions, practice which Leroy declared drove people to Viet Minh, “to whom human life not so cheap”.
Leroy concluded summary current situation with declaration that people had not yet chosen between Viet Minh and National Government, but that if urgent steps not taken, they would surely soon opt for Communists.
In listing measures recommended for improving situation, Leroy concentrated on steps designed to gain sympathy and support of masses, chief among them being adequate arming and training of village auto defense units. These would be backed up by regional and provincial troops, and all forces would receive thorough police indoctrination. For exterminating or chasing out three Viet Minh regular battalions operating in “old provinces,” Leroy estimated five regular National Army battalions would be needed for six months. In social action field, Leroy mentioned pensions for widowed troopers, construction of schools and hospitals.
Catholic militia leader refused lend copy above report, but volunteered prepare special study for General O’Daniel, if possible before meeting scheduled evening June 21 with O’Daniel, Lansdale, and myself.
During subsequent discussion, Leroy claimed have 30,000 troops, despite fact UMDC officially disbanded last year. He also declared General Hinh had asked him train three divisions, which Leroy would be willing do on condition he be permitted select officers from among [Page 1724] own men and from “good” elements in Vietnamese National Army. He himself would never serve in National Army, especially not under “Little Aviator” Yinm [Hinh] but nonetheless was prepared train and turn over troops. Leroy went on to boast that he could recruit 100,000 men in two weeks, but was afraid that if he did so, nearly entire National Army would desert to him. He also claimed Hoa Hao General Soai, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen were ready to place their men under his leadership. This seems incredible in land divided to point of disintegration, but is no more an orientalism than many other developments in Vietnam.
Interesting point made by Leroy was that US owed it to itself to back vigorous, clean anti-Communist elements here inasmuch as its prestige had gravely suffered in Asiatic eyes through support of corrupt Chiang group in China, stalemate equivalent to defeat in Korea, Viet Minh trouncing of US-backed French at Dien Bien Phu, and policy of assisting graft ridden Bao Dai Government.