Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–2454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

top secret

Washington, May 26, 1954—7:33 p.m.

4272. We have given consideration (Embtel 4514, repeated Geneva 287, Saigon 542)² to question of further clarification of independence of Associated States and following views should guide your discussions with French:

1. While fully aware of importance of juridical and constitutional factors in establishment of permanent and complete independence of Vietnam, it seems to me what is primarily needed now is something which will have immediate and convincing impact on world opinion and above all on Vietnamese themselves. We cannot wait for abolition of all deep-rooted abuses and extra-territorial privileges in times like these. We can, however, attempt have it made unmistakably clear that the Treaty of Independence between France and Vietnam represents full and unqualified commitment on part of France which will be carried out in practice.

2. Our present thinking is that in order achieve this, certain declarations and measures are required in immediate future, both by France and by other countries associated in regional grouping for collective defense. United States, in addition to such appropriate statements as might be made by President at time of his going to Congress for authority to intervene, might join with other countries concerned in a formal pledge of fulfillment of full independence and sovereignty provided by Article I of Treaty of Independence. This statement, couched in form of a common declaration of purpose, would have to be simple and explicit so there would be no room for doubt as to validity of pledge or as to intentions of countries participating in it.

3. Following represents certain minimum measures which we believe French should take now, and which we feel will not place government in more difficult position than it is already:

a. France and Vietnam should sign draft treaties promptly.

b. At moment of signature, President of Republic, in his capacity as President of French Union, should make statement to effect that Union is composed of equal and sovereign states.

c. A declaration that French will withdraw their expeditionary force from Indochinese states at earliest practicable date after end of hostilities, consistent with France’s obligations to Associated States, unless invited by respective governments of Associated States to maintain their forces. (Comment: We consider this to be at heart of any action French could take to convince world opinion they are in earnest. We feel such declaration should be made at actual time of signing or at least immediately after. Would appreciate your views as how and by whom this could be most effectively made.) This provision would not prejudice any base agreements which might be reached with Associated States. If United States or any other forces have been committed, we and any other countries would join in or make similar declaration.

4. Unless above are followed promptly by concrete actions which bear out professed intentions of good faith, hoped-for favorable reaction will not take place, and disappointment will set in correspondingly quickly. We suggest therefore that following measures be taken simultaneously or as soon as practical:

a. Participation of Associated States in programming all aid and direct receipt of military matériel aid. (This might require eventual renegotiation of pentapartite military agreement, but should not delay implementation.)

b. French should promptly find specific ways of giving Associated States, and particularly Vietnamese Ministry of Defense and Vietnam national army greater sense of participation in measures required for defense of their territory. We conceive such participation as being progressive in character.

5. Fundamental to problem is establishment at earliest date possible of representative and authentic nationalist governments. We would hope insofar as Vietnam concerned that French would join with us in impressing Bao Dai with necessity adopting prompt and effective measures to this end.

6. Furthermore, we believe series of measures could be taken locally, even in advance of full implementation Treaties, which should have favorable public effect in Associated States. These could take form of liberalization existing Franco-Associated States accords in such manner as to attain some of objectives toward which we are working. Owing to rapid military and political developments in Associated States, we are unable specify at this time exactly what these measures may be, but believe Embassy Saigon and Commissariat General in consultation may be able make appropriate recommendations to Department and Paris.³

Dulles

1. Drafted by Tyler of WE. Repeated to Geneva as telegram Tosec 269 and to Saigon as telegram 2418.
2. Dated May 24, p. 1604.
3. In telegram 4562 from Paris, May 27, Ambassador Dillon reported that he had communicated the contents of this message to Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had stated the belief that the greatest stumbling block to full U.S.-French agreement had now been removed. (751G.00/5–2754)