751G.11/5–2654: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
4542. Repeated information Geneva 297, Saigon 546. Re Tedul 110, repeated Paris 4225, Saigon 2385.1 We heartily concur with Department’s decision carry on with Bao Dai solution, at least for time being and in spite of serious shortcomings of the man. Establishment of truly nationalist Vietnamese Government is absolute prerequisite to restoration even small degree political stability at present time to say nothing of future progress. Yet, we cannot visualize, from practical aspect, establishment and functioning of such government without Bao Dai or some other superior authority to serve as conciliator of the vastly different regional and political groups which would have to be represented in such a government if it were to be truly representative of country as a whole. Furthermore, the unfortunate fact is that the Vietnamese people require such authority. Things simply do not work unless someone is issuing the orders and enforcing them.
In our opinion, reasons which led us to accept Bao Dai solution when it was first devised by France at about time of the Baie d’Along agreements are still valid. Institution of the monarchy remains a deeply inbred tradition in Vietnamese life, in spite of the manner in which it has been discredited by Bao Dai both prior to the Viet Minh rebellion and since. It constitutes a valuable asset which, if properly exploited, can pay great dividends. No question but that Bao Dai, by virtue of the traditional symbolism of office he occupies, has an authority which does not exist in any other part of our side of the Bamboo Curtain in Vietnam. Vietnamese conceive of the monarchy as something removed from and superior to everyday petty problems of life. Advantage of this fact, in that it enhances the authority of the Chief of State as supreme arbitrator, more than compensates for Bao Dai’s abuse in making it serve as an excuse for his own lassitude and indulgence. If there were a substitute for him we should seriously consider a change but there is none and we must make use of what we have.
Moreover, in our opinion, we have never really put Bao Dai to the good use of which he and the office he occupies are capable. Steps outlined by Department in reference telegram and now being put into [Page 1617] action by Under Secretary are, we believe, in right direction. In considering manner in which he could be put to best use, we consider it of supreme importance that nothing be done to give Bao Dai or the French the impression that this is inauguration of new policy designed to exclude the French. This impression could be easily acquired by both sides and would be detrimental to our objectives at both ends if for different reasons.
Although we agree with the need to establish a provisional national assembly on the argument that it is required as a symbol of national independence, we retain the reservations we have acquired as a result of past experience with “congresses” and “assemblies” in Vietnam and, therefore, hope that the functions of the national assembly will, for some time and at least until the Vietnamese Government is firmly established, be limited to constituent and consultative, rather than legislative powers.
We have never questioned Bao Dai being a patriotic Vietnamese but we do not believe that French have prevented him from playing more effective part as Chief of State. Bao Dai has chronic habit of blaming French for his own failings. Greatest French mistake with regard to Bao Dai has been to fail to push him into action and, consequently, to have permitted him to indulge his own weaknesses. But his deficiencies are inbred and not the result of influence of France or anyone else. As former High Commissioner Pignon often said, “there was little criticism of what Bao Dai did (politically)—it is just that he didn’t do anything often enough”. The point is to get Bao Dai to go to work and the United States should be able to help considerably in this task, both because of the position of special influence we occupy in the Imperial eye, and because we can apply the same methods which the French have used, but we hope, more efficiently.
Without getting into question of specific means to be employed, we think one of the main weapons to use in driving Bao Dai into action is control of his Exchequer. Nothing impresses him as much as gold and we should endeavor to arrive at arrangement with the French on controlling that portion his income we can in order to enforce our objectives.
We shall not attempt pass judgment on specific method dealing with question provisional assembly, but agree its stated purpose should be to write a constitution, and if we find that this creates difficulties, we should be prepared to reconsider subject for it is possible that the drafting of a workable constitution for Vietnam will present great difficulties to say nothing of those of governing the country constitutionally.
We are encouraged by present indications that Ngo Dinh Diem is to be brought back into public life as Prime Minister. Even with his [Page 1618] personal limitations, he is step in right direction and diametric change from prototype of suave Europeanized money-seeking dilettante represented by Buu Loc, Tran Van Huu and General Xuan,2 all of whom have failed so miserably.
We agree that under no circumstances should we commit ourselves irrevocably to Bao Dai or any other particular reform in Vietnam including eventual establishment of permanent assembly. We may find envisaged provisional assembly incapable of carrying on even its limited function. In the meanwhile, Bao Dai is essential to us for foreseeable future, and having recognized this fact, we should direct our efforts to putting this asset to good use with, at all times, the knowledge and cooperation of the French. The combination of their experience and our means should yield good results.
- See footnote 5, p. 1610.↩
- Gen. Nguyen Van Xuan, former President of Cochin China, 1947, and of the Central Provisional Government of Vietnam, 1948.↩