751G.00/5–2554: Telegram
The Chargé in the Philippines (Lacy) to the Department of State
2670. Sent priority Saigon 278 repeated information Department 2670, Paris 20, Geneva 6. For McClintock from Meloy. General O’Daniel held 2-hour meeting with Defense Secretary Wilson evening 24 May Sangley Point. Admiral Stump (CINCPAC), Vice Admiral Phillips (Commander First Fleet) also present, as well as Wilson party including Navy Under Secretary Gates.
O’Daniel presented briefing on organization and problems MAAG Indochina, outline enemy dispositions and capabilities, his own estimate military situation to effect if Viet Minh attack in force in delta within next 30 days, French will be unable hold more than small [Page 1612] Haiphong beachhead without substantial and immediate reinforcement. O’Daniel reviewed his 22 May conversation with General Ely in Saigon as reported Saigon’s 2499 to Department repeated Paris 885, Geneva 1441 and set forth his recommendations which had already been telegraphed Department Army following 23 May conference with Stump. In summary, recommendations were:
- 1.
- Time of essence. US must immediately participate training Vietnamese National Army and must train units of division size.
- 2.
- US officer advisors should be placed with components of divisions thus trained and should remain with them in combat. US must have share planning and operational control these forces.
- 3.
- Inter-governmental agreement must be reached soon as possible to this effect and MAAG’s terms reference changed accordingly. MAAG should move into this field far as possible immediately without awaiting final agreement be reached.
- 4.
- Vietnamese Government must take strong measures conscript necessary manpower.
- 5.
- Top priority should be given MAAG’s requirements including airlift of supplies.
Secretary Wilson inquired whether or not General Navarre should be removed. O’Daniel said yes. I interjected supporting statement Embassy Saigon believed Navarre would never willingly accept or cooperate with O’Daniel’s desire form divisions. Admiral Stump agreed, recalling Navarre’s earlier strong public statements he “would turn in his suit” if US participated in training. I recalled Embassy Saigon had reported March 15, two days after Viet Minh attack Dien Bien Phu began, Navarre had told De Jean situation was lost. This did not sound like confident, aggressive leader who was needed.
Secretary Wilson inquired possibilities Guillaume succeeding Navarre as he understood Guillaume had been freed his duties in Morocco. As matter personal opinion I said I agreed Guillaume had reputation aggressive leadership O’Daniel could verify from personal experience, but felt before rushing into urging appointment Guillaume we should remember incident when Guillaume publicly berated newly-arrived American Consul Rabat. Guillaume had accused Consul Rabat receiving and listening to Moroccan nationalist leaders who had come to Consulate. Guillaume told Consul if he wanted information on conditions Morocco he should come to Information Officer Guillaume’s staff. I felt this might bode ill for Guillaume’s attitude toward O’Daniel’s participation in training, operations and planning. Secretary Wilson, Gates and Stump did not agree and stated they would have done same thing Guillaume’s place.
Later in discussion I again interjected saying McClintock had authorized me speak for Embassy Saigon and there several political [Page 1613] aspects Indochina situation I thought Secretary Wilson should have in mind. I proceeded describe political situation as reported recent Saigon telegrams and spoke along following lines. Embassy Saigon strongly supports General O’Daniel’s recommendations as to training Nationalist Army but is important remember certain factors which make us view picture occasionally with less optimism. There time when political deterioration becomes disintegration. We believe that time reached and passed in Vietnam. Vacuum of political authority exists Vietnam with absence Bao Dai and most of cabinet. Without strong central authority would be very difficult raise manpower O’Daniel will need for formation Nationalist Army and men drafted by press-gang methods may be questionable material for training.
Indochina cannot be considered as whole, but three states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia must be viewed as separate entities posing special problems. Vietnamese most war-like with Tonkinese in north heading list. Laos and Cambodia sharing Buddhist pacifist feelings not war-like nations.
Although sharing common danger Communist conquest with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos consider conflict be chiefly problem of Vietnam with which they not concerned so long as Viet Minh remain without their borders.
Embassy Saigon agrees with O’Daniel time fast running out. Our view there three things must be done:
- (1)
- French must be persuaded hold line. This applies not only holding Delta, where danger immediately threatens, but also to serving as screen behind which O’Daniel must train National armies. By O’Daniel’s own plan first divisions could not be formed and ready until November or December. This indicates extended period French effort.
- (2)
- There must be immediate US participation training National armies which necessitates US participation planning and operational control if these troops to be used effectively.
- (3)
- Strong and vigorous leadership must be re-established Vietnam, for only by re-establishment central government authority can people have confidence in government, country or selves. Without strong central authority manpower cannot be conscripted for O’Daniel’s divisions. Through all of this flows important corollary that psychologically people must be given confidence and something fight for.
Secretary Wilson said he thought it most important realize differences attitudes and cultural histories of Indochinese. I pointed out there were elements strength such as firm administration and leadership of Tri in north and reminded Secretary decision had been received arm Tri’s militia and that O’Daniel’s staff even now in Tonkin examining situation. In Cambodia, new Defense Minister seemed strong figure who could lend stability to shaky nation.
[Page 1614]Under Secretary Gates expressed concern remaining time insufficient take necessary action. Secretary Wilson took problem under consideration.