751G.00/5–2554: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2526. Repeated information Geneva 150, Paris 892. Department for Secretary. Geneva for Under Secretary; Paris for Ambassador. I much appreciate Department’s having repeated to me Paris telegram 4402 (Geneva 243) as set out Deptel 2376 to Saigon1 and to have text of Secretary’s reply as expressed in Deptel 4194 sent Paris (Geneva Tedul 101).2
I think problem of Vietnam is now not independence but existence. Vietnamese, who for so many years talked about independence and advocated various formulae against French, now have hot breath of Ho Chi Minh and Communist China on their necks. In consequence, ably reasoned argument re independence delineated by Ambassador Dillon is for moment secondary to main problem which, as he correctly intimates, is how to fill power vacuum once French Expeditionary Corps leaves this peninsula and how therefore to establish a truly powerful Vietnamese National Army.
One method of establishing such an army would be adopt Vietnamese armistice proposals which demand that Viet Minh troops be incorporated in Vietnamese National Army. This would indeed result in a powerful Vietnamese Army but it would be Communist-controlled (Cf. Embtel 2443).3 Another method is for French to continue their training of Vietnamese recruits which thus far has proved of indifferent success and for Vietnamese Government by press gang methods to enforce its currently null decrees on conscription. As an example of complete failure of Vietnamese mobilization measures, Saigon is presently almost bereft of day laborers because they are hiding out in fear of being drafted into army.
Third possibility is completely to reorganize training methods in Vietnamese Army in hope that General O’Daniel or some other US expert will be able to create combat-worthy soldiers inspired by willingness to fight (Cf. Embtel 2499).4 Here, however, we run into basic difficulty of Vietnam which is absence of leadership by Bao Dai. Certainly no Vietnamese troops will charge across the field behind the portly figure of Buu Loc, nor will they fight for an absentee Emperor.
Given this situation it seems to me that suggestion set out in FYI section of Tedul 110 (repeated Paris 4225, Saigon 2385)5 has merit. [Page 1611] All Vietnamese politicians with exception of Nguyen De have in recent months been insisting on need for truly representative National Assembly and on requirement for a constitution. If Bao Dai would return and establish such a constituent assembly along lines set out referenced telegram, it would be more convincing proof to Vietnamese that they were independent than any treaty granted by French.6
Whether this alone would suffice to give morale to Vietnamese National Army is a question I do not feel qualified to answer from present evidence. I do not think Vietnamese National Army will fight better than South Korean Army after K–MAAG training, nor that it will become a ROK-type army unless there is some stiffening of foreign divisions alongside, whether American or French.
Thus, although it is desirable as an eventual goal that French Expeditionary Corps and Commander-in-Chief be withdrawn from Vietnam as suggested Paris telegram 4402 to be replaced by a strong Vietnamese National Army, I do not think that in terms of practical power relationships we can consider this an immediate possibility. The Vietnamese left to themselves will become almost instant prey to Viet Minh or to Chinese Communist infiltration. Possibly current five-power staff talks in Washington will be addressed to problem of filling this power gap (perhaps with participation of neighboring Asian contingents) until Vietnamese National Army becomes a combat-worthy instrument. Interdependence in immediate future is more important than independence.
- For text of telegram 4402 from Paris, May 17, see p. 1574.↩
- For text of telegram 4194 to Paris, May 21, see p. 1594.↩
- Dated May 18, p. 1579.↩
- Dated May 22, p. 1599.↩
- In the reference telegram, dated May 22, the Department of State discussed the policy of the United States with regard to Bao Dai and the question of the creation of a Vietnamese provisional national assembly; for text, see vol. xvi, p. 892.↩
- In telegram 2530 from Saigon, May 25, McClintock discussed the danger that a constituent assembly might be used by the Viet Minh to assume power and noted that such a body must not be allowed to become a tool of Bao Dai and his advisers. (751G.00/5–2554)↩